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General introduction 
International remittances defined as the money sent back by migrant workers living abroad 
constitute one of the most important aspects of the current economic globalization.1 These 
flows result from the fact that more than 215 million people or 3 percent of the world 
population, live outside their countries of birth (United Nations Statistics Division).  
Remittance inflows to developing countries have tremendously increased since two decades. 
On the one hand, this increasing trend could reflect the effort made by some countries to 
better record remittance inflows in their balance of payments. On the other hand, the trend 
could reflect the counterpart of the migration pressure that is observed around the world: both 
south-south and south-north migrations. According to the World Bank (2011), in 2010, 
worldwide remittance flows are estimated to have exceeded $440 billion. From that amount, 
developing countries received $325 billion (7% of this amount is received by the low income 
countries and 93% by the middle income group), which represents an increase of 6 percent 
from the 2009 level. The true size, including unrecorded flows through formal and informal 
channels, is believed to be significantly larger.2 Recorded remittances in 2009 were nearly 
three times the amount of official aid and almost as large as foreign direct investment (FDI) 
flows to developing countries.  
                                                 
1
 In the empirical literature, there are two main approaches in measuring remittances. The broader measure 
records remittances as the sum of three aggregates: First, workers’ remittances records current transfers to 
nonresidents by migrants who are employed in, and considered a resident of, the countries that host them. The 
category employee compensation is composed of wages, salaries, and other benefits earned by individuals in 
countries other than those in which they are residents for work performed for and paid for by residents of those 
countries. Finally, migrants’ transfers are contra-entries to the flow of goods and changes in financial items that 
arise from individuals’ change of residence from one country to another, such as movement of accumulated 
savings when a migrant returns permanently to the home country. In most research on remittances, all three types 
of transfers are summed and labeled “remittances”. But as Chami, Fullenkamp and Gapen (2009) showed, this 
aggregation is not appropriate, since the three different types of transfers have different properties and respond 
differently to economic shocks. The narrower definition of remittances records only the first category but suffers 
from the limitation that for many countries, the distinction between the three categories is not possible. 
2
 Page and Plaza (2006) have estimated that the share of unrecorded remittances in total remittances averages 
48% worldwide, ranging from 73% in Sub-Saharan Africa to a negligible amount in South Asia. Sub-Saharan 
Africa has the highest share of unrecorded remittances, which reflects the fact that the informal channels are 
common in many African countries because the formal financial infrastructure is limited (Sander and Maimbo, 
2003). 
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In economic terms, remittances represent a significant amount of external resources for many 
developing countries. For example, there are more than 20 countries for which the remittance-
to-GDP ratio exceeds 2 digits in 2009: Tajikistan (35%), Tonga (28), Lesotho (25), Moldova 
(23), Nepal (23), Lebanon (22), Samoa (22), Honduras (19), Guyana (17), El Salvador (16), 
Jordan (16), Kyrgyz (15), Haiti (15), Jamaica (14), Bosnia and Herzegovina (13), Serbia (13), 
Bangladesh (12), Philippines (12), Albania (11), Togo (10), Nicaragua (10) and Guatemala 
(10).  
The high economic importance of remittances has increased the interest of researchers in 
various macroeconomic aspects. 
The dynamic properties of remittances: Stability and countercyclicality 
While it is now recognized that remittances appear more stable than the other components of 
the balance of payments such as exports, foreign direct investment (FDI) or official 
development assistance (Chami et al., 2008; Gupta et al., 2009, Neagu and Schiff, 2009), the 
question whether remittance inflows increase when the output gap is negative 
(countercyclicality) or when the output gap is positive (procyclicality) is a hot debate. At the 
macroeconomic level, the issue of the cyclicality of remittances has two main implications. 
From a theoretical point of view, the cyclicality of remittances informs on the motive behind 
remittances. Countries with altruistic migrants are those receiving countercyclical remittances 
while procyclical remittances are the feature of countries for which remittances are driven by 
the investment motive. From a practical view, the nature of the cyclicality of remittances 
informs the policymakers on the role that remittances could play in mitigating bad shocks 
when they are countercyclical. In contrast, procyclical remittances could become a real 
concern when they threaten the macroeconomic stability by exacerbating the domestic 
business cycle. 
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The macroeconomic empirical literature analyzing the cyclical properties of remittances 
consists of an evaluation of the cyclicality of remittances with respect to the GDP cycle. For 
some authors, remittances react countercyclically to the real GDP cycle at home (see Sayan, 
2006 for the case of the low and lower middle income countries). Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz 
(2007) however conclude that remittances are aligned with the business cycle in Sri Lanka. 
Acosta et al. (2008a) showed that the countercyclicality of remittances increases with the 
level of economic development, being highest among upper-middle income countries. This 
result is close to that of Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) who concluded that remittances 
were more procyclical in countries with shallower financial systems. Neagu and Schiff (2009) 
addressed the question of the cyclicality of remittances and found that remittances are pro-
cyclical in 65% of cases in the period 1980-2007 using 116 developing countries. Gupta et al. 
(2009) showed that remittance de-trended flows for Sub-Saharan Africa are positively 
correlated with GDP growth during the period 1980-1995 but remittances appear 
countercyclical with respect to growth during the last decade. Recently, Frankel (2011) using 
a bilateral panel data on remittances showed robustly that remittances are countercyclical with 
respect to income in the worker’s country of origin (the recipient of the remittance), while 
procyclical with respect to income in the migrant’s host country (the sender of the 
remittance).  
Two important elements emerge from this literature. First, when bilateral panel data are 
mobilized and the business cycle in the migrant host country is also taken into account, the 
countercyclicality of remittances is perceived. Secondly, the econometric approach to 
measure the cyclicality of remittances vis-à-vis the output gap is suitable to gauge robustly the 
strength of the relationship between remittances and the business cycle. However, the 
empirical literature has so far neglected the issue of the endogeneity of the domestic business 
cycle with respect to remittance inflows even though the reverse causality is evident. Indeed, 
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regressing simply the remittance cycle on the domestic output gap could lead to misleading 
results if the issue of the reverse causality going from remittances to the domestic business 
cycle is not tackled.  
The macroeconomic determinants of remittances 
The empirical literature on the macroeconomic determinants of remittance inflows has 
provided clear results. The empirical method has consisted in mobilizing aggregated data at 
the country level and using panel data estimators to identify the effects of specific variables 
explaining remittance inflows.  
The first variable that is recognized to explain significantly the level of remittances that a 
country receives is the level and the composition of the stock of migrants. Countries that 
export a large number of emigrants receive on average more remittances than the others 
(Freund and Spatafora, 2008; Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz, 2008; Frankel, 2011). The composition 
of the migrant stock also matters. Indeed, two recent papers have confirmed the result that low 
skilled migrants remit more than the others (Faini, 2007; Adams, 2009). 
The second significant determinant of remittance inflows is the financial costs associated with 
remitting money. Freund and Spatafora (2008) showed that high transaction costs charged by 
Money Transfer Agencies (MTA) significantly reduce the amount of remittances received. 
The negative impact of the costs of sending money on the level of remittances has also been 
recognized by the international community and actions toward reducing these costs have been 
called. In the L’Aquila 2009 G8 Summit, leaders pledged to reduce the cost of remittances by 
half (from 10 to 5 percent) in 5 years.3 
                                                 
3
 See paragraph 134, page 49 of the L’Aquila 2009 G8 Summit: 
http://www.g8italia2009.it/static/G8_Allegato/G8_Declaration_08_07_09_final,0.pdf 
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Beck and Martinez Peria (2009) and using the recent World Bank dataset on remittance costs 
showed that across all corridors the average mean cost is 10.2 percent of the amount 
remitted.4 However, there is a lot of heterogeneity in costs even when one considers the same 
sending or the same remittance-receiving country. For example, the most recent data suggest 
that the most costly corridors belong to the Sub-Saharan African region: Tanzania – Kenya, 
Tanzania – Rwanda, Tanzania – Uganda and Ghana – Nigeria with an average cost of $45 for 
every transaction of $200 (which represents approximately 22%). In contrast, the least costly 
corridors are Saudi Arabia – Pakistan, Saudi Arabia – Nepal, United Arab Emirates – Pakistan 
and United States – India, with an average cost of $5.5 for sending $200. The main conclusion 
of the study of Beck and Martinez Peria (2009) is that corridors with larger numbers of 
migrants and more competition among remittances service providers exhibit lower costs. This 
result confirms the findings of Freund and Spatafora (2008) who found that transfer costs are 
lower when financial systems are more developed in the receiving country. 
The third determinant of remittances recognized in the recent macroeconomic empirical 
literature is the occurrence of natural disasters. The existing cross country studies showed that 
remittances increase significantly in the aftermath of natural disasters (Yang, 2008; 
Mohapatra et al., 2009; David, 2010). This result highlights that remittances provide a form of 
insurance to households against natural shocks. Moreover, Mohapatra et al. (2009) found that 
remittances also constitute an ex ante risk management strategy by providing households with 
the financial resources needed to better prepare themselves against future shocks. Remittance-
receiving households have houses built of concrete rather than mud and greater access to 
communication equipments. They also resort more on cash reserves rather than selling 
livestock to cope with drought. 
                                                 
4
 The World Bank sponsored online database “Remittance prices worldwide” provides data on the cost of 
sending and receiving relatively small amounts of money from one country to another. The site covers 200 
"country corridors" worldwide, from 29 remittance sending countries to 86 receiving countries. Data are 
available at the following address: http://remittanceprices.worldbank.org/ 
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Beside this literature focusing on the determinants of remittance inflows to developing 
countries, the question of the macroeconomic consequences of remittances has also been 
extensively studied.5 We provide below a brief review of these studies. 
The macroeconomic consequences of remittance inflows to developing countries 
The literature on the macroeconomic consequences of the remittance inflows to developing 
countries can be split into two broad camps: on one side, the club of optimists and on the 
other side, the club of sceptics.  
Taking an optimistic view, remittances contribute to the development of recipient countries by 
relieving households’ financial constraints through their positive effect on financial 
development (Gupta et al., 2009; Aggarwal et al., 2011), by protecting them against natural 
disaster shocks (Yang, 2008; Mohapatra et al., 2009; David, 2010), and by reducing 
macroeconomic volatility (IMF, 2005; Bugamelli and Paternò, 2011; Chami, Hakura and 
Montiel, 2009; Craigwell et al., 2010). It has also been shown that remittances have a positive 
effect on country sovereign ratings (Avendano et al., 2011) and reduce the probability of 
current account reversals (Bugamelli and Paternò, 2009) what contributes to build  and 
reinforce the credibility and the attractiveness of the receiving countries in the views of the 
international investors. Abdih et al. (2009) showed that the inclusion of remittances in the 
traditional analysis of the sustainability of the debt alters the amount of fiscal adjustment 
required to place debt on a sustainable path and therefore the sustainability of government 
debt is improved. There are still good news from remittances at the macroeconomic level. 
These flows reduce inter-household income inequality (Chauvet and Mesplé-Somps, 2007; 
Koechlin and Leon, 2007), foster economic growth in less financially developed countries 
                                                 
5
 There are many papers on the effects of remittances using micro-level data drawn from household surveys. 
While this literature provides interesting results, we limit the literature review on the papers using macro-level 
data given that the thesis adopts a clear macroeconomic approach and uses only macroeconomic data in all the 
chapters. 
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(Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009), enhance economic growth in financially developed 
economies of the Latin American region (Mundaca, 2009) and in a context of good 
institutions (Catrinescu et al., 2009). Overall, they have a pro-poor effect by lowering poverty 
indices in receiving countries (Adams, 2005; Acosta et al., 2008b; Gupta et al., 2009)  
For the sceptics (including the pessimists), there are some beware news associated with 
remittance inflows. The most recognized fear is that remittances contribute to increase the 
level of real effective exchange rate and hence, deteriorate the external competitiveness of the 
receiving economies. Several papers using a cross country approach with panel data have 
shown that remittance inflows lead to exchange rate appreciations (Amuedo-Dorantes and 
Pozo, 2004; Acosta, Baerg and Mandelman, 2009; Acosta, Lartey and Mandelman, 2009; 
Barajas et al., 2010) but at the same time, well functioning domestic financial systems help 
offset this appreciation by redirecting remittance inflows into a productive use (Acosta, Baerg 
and Mandelman., 2009). Remittances could also magnify the domestic business cycle by 
increasing the correlation between labor and output (Chami et al., 2008). Another fringe of the 
literature focusing on the dark side of remittances has consisted in examining the effect of 
these flows on the behavior of the receiving households and hence, has provided clear 
macroeconomic implications. Indeed, Chami et al. (2003) and Chami et al. (2005) emphasized 
that remittances could lead to a moral hazard problem on the receiving household side by 
reducing the labor supply and increasing leisure. This implies that remittances do not have 
positive effects on economic growth. This neutral effect on remittances on growth has been 
confirmed by a recent work of Barajas et al. (2009). 
The literature has also recognized that remittance inflows do not only affect the receiving 
household but also the quality of the governments in developing countries. Abdih et al. (2008) 
using a large sample of developing countries, demonstrated that remittance inflows reduce the 
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governance quality in recipient countries. This arises because the access to remittance income 
makes government corruption less costly for domestic households to bear; consequently 
corruption is likely to increase. Singer (2010) provided strong support to the hypothesis that 
remittance inflows increase the likelihood that policy makers adopt fixed exchange rates. The 
author explained this result by the fact that the countercyclical behavior of remittances 
increases their ability to mitigate the costs of forgone domestic monetary policy autonomy. 
To sum, the existing macroeconomic literature on the consequences of remittances is a mix of 
good news (remittances increase household welfare) and beware news (the effects beyond the 
households are sometimes frightening). This thesis follows this recent literature and focuses 
exclusively on the macroeconomic consequences of remittance inflows in a large sample of 
developing countries. The thesis recognizes that the effects of remittances go beyond the 
narrow scope of receiving households and explores also the consequences on the public 
sector. In each step, empirical models are specified in order to test econometrically the main 
hypotheses formulated while many robustness checks are also performed to test the sensitivity 
of the main results to various changes. Because remittance inflows are plausibly endogenous 
to many macroeconomic variables used as outcomes in the thesis, the instrumental variable 
approach is always used in order to try to identify causal effects.  
Many points not studied by the existing literature have constituted the starting points of the 
essays provided in this thesis. 
1. Although there are some evidences at the macroeconomic level that remittance inflows 
reduce poverty (Adams, 2005; Gupta et al., 2009), nothing is said about the effect of these 
flows on the distribution of domestic wages. The central question is: do remittances help 
reduce the number of people being paid less than 2$ a day? Indeed, remittance inflows can 
contribute to reduce poverty and hence to increase household welfare by providing financial 
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resources needed to increase and smooth consumption, to send children to school or to favor 
the access to health care services or by affecting the distribution of domestic wages through 
the reduction of low wages. The later effect arises when remittances increase the reservation 
wage and/or remittances increase the level of labor-intensive projects.  
2. Despite the large number of papers focusing on the macroeconomic stabilizing effect of 
remittances, little is said about the consequences of remittance inflows on the household 
consumption instability over the time. Moreover, the issue of the identification of the type of 
shocks which are effectively mitigated or not by remittances has not yet been studied. Are 
remittances more effective to insure against natural shocks than against fiscal and financial 
shocks? Does the macroeconomic stabilizing effect of remittances on consumption and output 
depend upon the level of remittances? Put differently, is there a threshold level of remittance 
inflows beyond which their stabilizing effect is strongly attenuated? In this literature, little is 
also said about the role that remittance inflows could play in the mitigation of the 
consequences of natural disasters on the aggregate output. We know that remittances tend to 
increase in the aftermath of natural disasters and even that they contribute to build the ex ante 
risk management strategies in many areas. However, we are not able to conclude yet that the 
aggregate output is more stable in remittance-dependent disaster prone areas compared to the 
others. This issue is particularly relevant given that the level of remittance inflows itself could 
have some destabilizing effects (Chami, Hakura and Montiel, 2009).  
3. Although the recent macroeconomic literature gives conflicting results regarding the nature 
of the relationship between remittances and the domestic financial system in promoting long 
run economic growth – the question is whether remittances and the domestic financial system 
are substitutes (Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009) or complements for the long term economic 
growth (Mundaca, 2009) – the same question can hold in the case of the macroeconomic 
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stabilization.6 Are remittances and the domestic financial system complements or substitutes 
for the stabilization of the consumption and the aggregate output? Is the stabilizing effect of 
remittances reinforced in less financially developed countries? These questions are not yet 
studied in literature and need attention. 
4. Recognizing that the effects of remittances also encompass their impacts on the 
government behavior and on the fiscal variables, several questions therefore emerge: Do 
remittances induce a fiscal retrenchment in more opened countries? In other terms, is the role 
of insurer of last resort against external shocks often played by government spending in more 
opened developing countries (see Rodrik, 1998) affected by remittance inflows? Indeed, one 
could hypothesize that the insurance role played by remittance for households affects the 
incentive of the government in more opened developed country to provide insurance against 
external shocks through the public consumption. The second point that emerges is whether 
remittance inflows induce a fiscal retrenchment in social sectors (public education and health 
subsidies), a phenomenon called the ‘public moral hazard problem’. Indeed, many scholars 
have cautioned the fact that remittance inflows by partially resolving bottlenecks, remittances 
may actually encourage states in the developing world to ignore their traditional 
responsibilities because they assume that remittances will fill various voids (Grabel, 2009). 
Chami and Fullenkamp (2009) add that if conditions are bad at home, families send more 
members abroad and use remittance income to compensate for the lack of government 
services. Therefore, they lose interest in pressuring the government to deliver better services, 
and the quality of government declines because the government does not feel compelled to 
provide services as it realizes that households can fend for themselves. A formal empirical test 
                                                 
6
 In this growing literature on the effects of remittances conditional on the level of financial development, Acosta 
et al. (2009) have empirically demonstrated that remittances by themselves tend to put upward pressure on the 
real exchange rate. But this effect is weaker in countries with deeper and more sophisticated financial markets. 
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of these assertions is therefore welcomed in order to conclude on the existence or not of the 
remittances induced public moral hazard problem in developing countries. 
5. However, there are also good news in the relationship between remittances and the 
government. From a fiscal point of view, remittance inflows could increase the fiscal space in 
the receiving economy. While Abdih et al. (2009) showed that remittances contribute to 
enhance the government debt sustainability, their contribution on fiscal space could also pass 
through the level and the stability of tax revenues. But the question is how remittances can 
affect government tax revenues while they are not directly taxed by governments? It is 
possible that remittances increase indirectly the tax revenue ratio by expanding the tax bases. 
Given that remittances are primarily devoted to consumption rather than to private 
investment, one can expect remittances to significantly increase government tax revenues in 
countries that rely on an indirect tax based system like the value added tax (VAT). Chami et 
al. (2008) using a dynamic general equilibrium model calibrated to match the characteristics 
of the Chilean economy showed that the use of a tax on labor income rather than a tax on 
consumption has the undesirable effect of making the government rely more on inflation to 
appropriate resources as the level of remittances increases because remittances decrease the 
labor supply and consequently the labor tax base. In contrast, when the government uses 
consumption taxation, an increase in remittances leads to an increase in tax revenues through 
private consumption and the government policy is relatively less distortionary. While this 
result is interesting and highlights the theoretical efficiency of a consumption tax based 
system over the labor tax in a remittance dependent economy like Chile, the generalization of 
this result to the whole sample of developing countries is not yet provided. Moreover, 
remittances could not only increase the level of government tax revenue ratio but could also 
increase its stability. The stabilization of government tax revenues induced by remittances is 
therefore more likely to occur in countries that rely on a VAT system given the stabilizing 
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effect that remittances could exert on the private consumption. Altogether, countries that 
depend on a VAT would benefit more from remittances to increase their fiscal space. 
Remainder of the thesis 
The thesis is divided into two broad parts. Each part consists of three chapters.  
The first part focuses on the effects of remittance inflows on several indicators of aggregate 
welfare. Chapter 1 analyzes the impact of remittance inflows on the share of people selling 
low wages. Using the most recent data on the prevalence of working poor in developing 
countries, the chapter examines whether the level and the regularity of remittance inflows 
help reduce the prevalence of working poor in receiving countries. It finally investigates 
whether remittances are more likely to reduce the prevalence of working poor in a context of 
shallow domestic financial systems. Given that remittances are suspected of endogeneity due 
to an obvious reverse causality issue, the variable is instrumented by the income per capita in 
the migrant host countries. The results highlight a robust and negative impact of remittance 
inflows on the low wages and this effect is stronger in a context of low level of financial 
development, strong macroeconomic instability and highly predictable remittances. 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 focus more deeply on the stabilizing effect of remittance inflows. In 
Chapter 2, the hypothesis that remittances contribute to stabilize the household consumption 
per capita is tested. In addition, we examine whether this stabilizing effect of remittances 
diminishes in a context of high level of financial development and high levels of remittance 
inflows. Finally, the chapter explores the types of shocks which are significantly absorbed by 
remittances. Using a dynamic panel data framework and after factoring in the endogeneity of 
remittances, the results uncover a robust stabilizing impact of remittances on private 
consumption. Moreover, this stabilizing effect tends to decrease with the level of remittance 
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inflows and financial development. Finally, it appears that remittances contribute to absorb 
various shocks including natural disasters, agricultural shocks, discretionary fiscal policy, 
banking and financial crises and exchange shocks. 
Chapter 3 continues in the same direction and analyzes the stabilizing effect of remittances on 
the aggregate output. More specifically, the chapter examines whether remittance inflows help 
dampen the effect of natural disasters on the aggregate output. This question seems 
particularly relevant insofar as two opposite effects of remittances can be formulated. On the 
one hand, remittance inflows could dampen the effects of natural disasters on the output 
through their contribution on ex ante risk management strategies and ex post risk coping. On 
the other hand, the dependency on high levels of remittance inflows could threaten the 
macroeconomic stability when receiving households are less incited to insure themselves or to 
build resilience (the well-known ‘Samaritan dilemma’ problem) or when high remittance 
inflows in the aftermath of natural disasters fuel macroeconomic instability through the 
standard channels of exchange appreciation or domestic inflation. Using a dynamic panel data 
framework and after factoring in the endogeneity of remittances, several results emerge. First, 
natural disasters exert a significant positive effect on the volatility of the aggregate output. 
Second, remittance inflows dampen this effect. Third, the shock absorber role of remittances 
is strongly reduced as the level of remittances increases. 
To sum, the first part of the thesis has highlighted the positive contribution of remittance 
inflows to the private sector and the aggregate welfare. However, it appeared that this effect is 
not linear and some countries benefit from remittance inflows much more than others. This is 
especially the case of financially underdeveloped economies and countries receiving 
‘reasonable’ amounts of remittances in proportion of their GDP. 
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The second part of the thesis turns to the analysis of the effect of remittance inflows on the 
government. Three chapters constitute this part. 
Chapter 4 analyzes the link between remittances and the size of government captured by the 
government final consumption. The chapter revisits the Rodrik’s (1998) result that more open 
developing economies have bigger government because the public final consumption acts as 
an insurance provided to the private sector against the external shocks. Starting with a simple 
theoretical model, the chapter shows that when countercylical remittances are accounted for, 
the elasticity of government spending with respect to the external risk is reduced. Indeed, 
remittances tend to reduce the role of insurer of last resort often played by the governments in 
small open economies. This hypothesis is not rejected by the data. Using a large sample of 
developing countries and a dynamic panel data framework, the results uncover a diminishing 
effect of trade openness on the government consumption as the level of remittances rises. It 
also appears that it is when remittances are effectively countercyclical that this fiscal 
retrenchment operates. In addition, the econometric estimations revealed that remittances tend 
to become more countercyclical as the degree of trade openness increases. 
Chapter 5 tests the hypothesis that remittance inflows reduce the willingness of governments 
of badly governed countries to spend on social sectors (education and health). To test the 
existence of this public moral hazard effect induced by remittances, a large sample of 
developing countries and various dynamic panel data estimators are used. The results suggest 
that the effect of remittances on the public education or health spending turns negative at high 
levels of bad governance. These results confirm the intuitions formulated by Grabel (2009) 
and Chami and Fullenkamp (2009). 
Chapter 6 is the last of the thesis. After analyzing the consequences of remittances on the 
governments through the expenditure side (Chapter 4 and 5), this chapter explores the issue of 
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the impact of remittance inflows on the government tax revenues. Based on a comprehensive 
dataset on tax revenues and on the presence of the value added tax (VAT) in a large sample of 
countries, the chapter tests the hypothesis that remittances increase both the level and the 
stability of the government total tax revenue ratio in countries that have adopted the VAT. 
This arises because remittances help increase and stabilize the private consumption (see 
Chapter 2) and because the private consumption constitutes the tax base of the VAT. The 
estimated dynamic panel data models do neither reject these hypotheses nor the transmission 
channel of the impact through the private consumption. 
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 1.1. Introduction 
According to the recent World Bank Report (World Bank “Migration and Remittances 
Factbook”, 2011), the worldwide remittance flows are estimated to have exceeded $440 
billion in 2010. From that amount, developing countries received $325 billion. The Report 
also highlights that recorded remittances were nearly three times the amount of official aid 
(ODA) and almost as large as foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to developing countries. 
For instance in Sub-Saharan Africa, remittances range from less than 1% of GDP to 25% in 
Lesotho, and they exceed by large both FDI and aid in countries like Mauritius, Nigeria, 
Egypt, Morocco, Senegal and Lesotho. Ratha (2009) summarized all existing empirical 
evidence and conclude that for a large fraction of the poorest nations, remittances exceed both 
ODA and FDI.  
Given this increasing evidence, it is not surprising that the last decade was marked by an 
increasing attention paid to the role played by remittances on development goals. At the 
macro level, the emphasis has been stressed on poverty, investment, growth, consumption, 
competitiveness and macroeconomic stability (Adams and Page, 2005; Woodruff and 
Zenteno, 2007; Chami et al., 2003; Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009; Catrinescu et al., 2009; 
Barajas et al., 2009; Bugamelli and Paternò, 2011; Chami, Hakura and Montiel., 2009; 
Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2004; Barajas et al., 2010). At the micro level, a lot of research 
has been carried out on the relationships between labor supply and the income earned abroad 
and sent back by migrants (Funkhouser, 2006; Cox-Edwards and Rodriguez-Oreggia, 2009).  
This paper contributes to the debate over the impact of remittances on labor market outcomes 
in receiving countries in three ways. It is based upon a large dataset covering about 80 
developing and emerging countries over a large time span (1990-2008). This dataset contains 
systematic information about remittances and the proportion of poor workers, which is 
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defined as the proportion of individuals earning less than 2$ US per day. This allows a precise 
econometric estimate of the impact of remittances in reducing the number of poor workers. 
The results support the assumption that both the level and regularity of remittances reduce 
poverty, mitigate the sensitivity of the share of working poor with respect to macroeconomic 
shocks and finally, act as a substitute for shallowness financial markets.  
The paper contributes to two strands of the literature. One is related to the macroeconomic 
impact of remittances on growth and poverty. The impact of remittances on economic growth 
in receiving countries is a priori ambiguous. Remittances can be essentially spent on 
consumption and generate moral hazard, which is detrimental to growth (Chami et al., 2003). 
But they can also promote investment: in a world characterized by market imperfections and 
liquidity constraints, potential investors and micro entrepreneurs cannot raise the funds which 
would allow them to launch profitable activities (Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009). In this 
context, remittances provide households with available funds, which alleviate credit rationing 
and allow those investments to take place. As a result, the demand for non qualified labor and 
wages increase. It follows that the share of poor workers decreases and growth is promoted. 
The pro-poor effects of remittances have been demonstrated at the cross-country level by 
Adams and Page (2005) on a large sample of developing countries and recently by Acosta et 
al. (2008) in the case of Latin American countries.  
The second strand of the literature is linked to the impact of remittances on labor supply, 
which has been extensively studied at the micro-level. In an outstanding work which based on 
Indian micro data, Jayachandran (2006) demonstrates that the labor supply of the poorest 
individuals is inelastic if workers are closer to subsistence, more credit constrained and, less 
able to migrate.7 As a result, the working poor wages are continually low. Any smoothing 
                                                 
7
 Several papers have analyzed the labor supply elasticity in developing countries. The seminal work of Lewis 
(1954) assumes an horizontal labor supply function at the minimum subsistence level. This form has been 
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mechanism which enhances the labor supply elasticity – when market conditions are not 
favorable – is expected to reduce poverty. For instance, migration could affect the level of 
wage through two channels: the effect of migration itself and an effect via remittance inflows. 
In the first case, migration outflows affect the labor market outcomes by reducing the number 
of available workers in the region of origin. This would imply a higher equilibrium wage all 
else equal. For the second case, remittance inflows are supposed to increase the reservation 
wage of workers and may also increase the demand for labor when they are invested. 
Altogether, it results an upward pressure on the wage what would reduce the share of working 
poor.  
Be it driven by the demand or supply side, the effect of remittances is to reduce the number of 
poor workers. Our results suggest that the reasoning conducted mostly at micro levels can be 
generalized with macro-data. Remittances decrease in a substantial way the share of workers 
below 2 dollars per day, suggesting either that labor market adjustments take place allowing 
poor workers to supply labor in a more elastic way, or that more funds are spent on 
investment which in turns increases the demand for labor.  Moreover, while the level of 
remittances helps alleviating the number of poor workers, their predictability matters. From 
the supply side and in a context of risk adverse households, unpredictable remittances would 
not reduce household labor supply and hence the prevalence of working poor.8 From the 
demand side, unpredictable remittances could reduce the share of poor workers when it is 
admitted that unpredictable remittances are more likely to be invested rather than to be fully 
consumed (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2010a). This suggests that there are two opposite 
                                                                                                                                                        
tackled in three broad directions: negative slope function (Berg, 1961; Huang, 1976), positive slope function 
(Bardhan, 1979) and S-shaped labor supply curve (Dessing, 2002). Recent work highlights that the labor supply 
curve becomes more inelastic in a context of poverty, credit-constraints and high migration costs (Jayachandran, 
2006). This result suggests that for poor constrained workers, the income effect exactly compensates for the 
substitution effect.     
8
 However, a recent paper by Cox-Edwards and Rodriguez-Oreggia (2009) found limited evidence of labor force 
participation effects of persistent remittances. This result challenges the previous finding of Amuedo-Dorantes 
and Pozo (2010b) that workers increase labor supply when remittance inflows are less predictable.  
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forces in the relationship between the unpredictability of remittances and the prevalence of 
working poor.  
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section II reviews the literature and gives 
preliminary evidence on the relationships between remittances and working poor at the 
macroeconomic level. Section III identifies the impact of remittances on the prevalence of 
working poor while controlling for the remittances endogeneity. Section IV tests the 
hypothesis that the impact of remittances on the prevalence of working poor depends on 
several factors: the income volatility, the remittances unpredictability and the financial 
development. Section V concludes.  
1.2. Preliminary evidence and overview of the existing literature 
Figure 1.1 presents the distribution of the regional averages of the percentage of working 
poor. As expected, the figure shows that the regions characterized by the highest prevalence 
of working poor are Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and East Asia and Pacific, with more 
than 60% of people remunerated at less than 2$US per day. The Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA), Europe and Central Asia, and Latin America and Caribbean regions exhibit the 
lowest median values.  
Figure 1.2 presents preliminary evidence suggesting a negative correlation between the 
dependency on remittance inflows and the prevalence of working poor in developing 
countries.  
There are two main channels through which remittances can exert an impact on low wages. 
One channel is related to the labor demand side, through the increase in investment, which is 
covered by remittances. This happens when remittances are used for financing small business 
projects (Woodruff and Zenteno, 2007; Chiodi et al., 2010; Adams and Cuecuecha, 2010). 
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They allow the development of small entrepreneurships, which requires low qualified labor 
force. The demand for unskilled labor increases and wages at the bottom of the distribution 
should increase. To our knowledge, very few papers have investigated the impact of 
remittances on investment at the macro level (one exception is Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 
2009, and is based upon a dataset of 70 developing countries). More evidence is provided at 
the micro level. Dustman and Kirchkamp (2002) and Massey and Parado (1998) analyzed 
respectively the Turkish and Mexican cases. Woodruff and Zenteno (2007) reported that 
remittances are behind 20% of the capital invested in micro firms throughout urban Mexico. 
Chiodi et al. (2010) showed that in rural Mexico, poor rural families resort to remittances as a 
way to mitigate constraints that prevent them from investing in productive assets. Adams and 
Cuecuacha (2010) found that remittance-receiving households in Guatemala spend less at the 
margin on consumption (food) but more at the margin on investment (education and housing). 
The second channel relates to the labor supply side. In the standard neoclassical model of 
labor supply, workers optimize the allocation of their time to work and other activities, 
including leisure. Labor supply depends upon the reservation wage, which relates to how 
much extra earning an individual requires to be induced to give up one unit of leisure.  
The reservation wage is higher when individuals exposed to shocks can save and borrow, 
instead of continuing to work if market conditions deteriorate. Whenever individuals have 
access to formal and informal credit, their labor supply becomes more elastic.  Remittances 
constitute one such informal mechanism and their availability reduces the vulnerability of 
workers, who are closer to subsistence. Another mechanism is the possibility of borrowing or 
drawing on savings, but in developing countries credit markets are underdeveloped and 
characterized by imperfections. As emphasized in Jayachandran (2006), the equilibrium wage 
is lower in an economy without smoothing mechanisms, because more people are obliged to 
work at a lower rate.  
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One key notion is the distance of workers to the minimum level of subsistence. The closer to 
this minimum level are workers, the less elastic their labor supply is. Remittances help the 
poorest and more vulnerable categories of workers by enabling them to quit jobs, which are 
paid at low rates.  
 Micro-evidence supports this assumption. While the impact of remittances on the overall 
labor force participation is mixed,9 there is strong evidence that remittances decrease the 
participation of children, female adults and teenagers (Funkhouser, 2006; Calero et al., 2009; 
Bansak and Chezum, 2009). Children and women accept jobs at low wages, and they 
constitute in most developing countries the most vulnerable segment of the active population. 
This implies that remittances decrease the share of the most vulnerable workers paid at below 
2 dollars per day. 
To our knowledge there are very few studies focusing directly on the impact of migration and 
remittances on the share of workers selling low wages. Jayachandran (2006) highlights two 
crucial results concerning landless. On the one hand, landless, who are the poorest, and hence 
the most liquidity constrained agents, tend to have an inelastic labor supply.  But, on the other 
hand, they are also more likely to migrate in response to bad shocks what contributes to 
reduce the elasticity of wages to labor demand shocks. Most studies focus on the impact of 
remittances on the overall supply of labor, but disregard the distinction between poor workers 
and the others. This paper aims at filing the gap, by using macro data.  
                                                 
9
 This may arise from the fact that the impact is ambiguous if the revenue from the migrant replaces the revenue 
he would have procured without migrating. It may be due also to the difficult task of comparing strictly identical 
individuals and households. For addressing this identification problem, alternative econometric strategies have 
been proposed. Canales (2007) and Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) using different sources find no change 
for Mexican workers, while Rodriguez and Tiongson (2001) and Funkhouser (1992) provide evidence of a slight 
change in the labor force participation using data for Manila and Managa respectively. Gubert (2002) suggests 
that remittances act as an insurance and allow Malian workers to reduce their work. Cox-Edwards and 
Rodriguez-Oreggia (2009) using score matching techniques find little evidence of permanent remittances effect 
on labor force participation. 
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The relationship between remittances, the share of working poor and, financial development 
is a priori ambiguous. Well-functioning financial markets, by lowering transaction costs, may 
help use remittances as a way either to better allocate time to work and leisure, or to finance 
projects that yield the highest returns and foster economic growth. Mundaca (2009) using a 
panel of Latin American and Caribbean countries showed that financial intermediation tends 
to increase the responsiveness of growth to remittances. Once can thus expect a 
complementary relationship between remittances and the financial development in the 
reduction of the prevalence of working poor in receiving countries. Alternatively, remittances 
can compensate for the lack of finance, be it for accommodating bad shocks or for starting 
productive activities. In this case, remittances act as a substitute for the banking system. 
Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) using a broad panel of developing countries found that 
formal credit and remittances are substitute rather than complement; remittances substitute for 
the lack of finance, which implies that their impact on growth is more pronounced whenever 
finance is missing. Following their line of argument, we will test the hypothesis that 
remittances are more efficient in reducing the number of poor workers whenever alternative 
funds are not available.   
1.3. Do remittances reduce the prevalence of working poor? Empirical 
investigation.  
To explore the link between remittances and working poor, we use a large dataset, which 
covers 85 countries over the period 1990-2007. As a starting exercise, we estimate the 
interaction between remittances and the percentage of working poor by running simple OLS. 
We estimate the following model: 
tititititi XRw ,,,1, εηαβθ +++′+=                   (1) 
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where w is the percentage of working poor in the total active population in each country i at 
year t. R is the remittance-to-GDP ratio, X is the matrix of control variables and iα  and tη  
represent the country fixed-effects and the time dummies, respectively. ti,ε  is the idiosyncratic 
error term. Our basic hypothesis is that 01 <θ , in other terms remittance inflows reduce the 
prevalence of working poor. 
Equation (1) includes the following control variables: 
Income volatility (measured as the standard deviation of the real GDP per capita growth rate 
over the last five years) is a proxy for shocks. Following Jayachandran (2006), we expect a 
positive impact of income shocks on the prevalence of working poor since macroeconomic 
volatility decrease the reservation wage (workers are more likely to accept low wages in time 
of negative shocks).  
Initial GDP per capita enters the set of control variables. We expect a negative correlation 
between the level of development and the prevalence of working poor. For instance, it could 
be a proxy for the existence and the compliance toward minimum wages legislation. 
Net emigration rate (measured as the difference between migration outflows and migration 
inflows over the total population) is an indicator of pressure on the labor market. An increase 
in net emigration rate increases the reservation wage, which in turns decreases the prevalence 
of working poor. The inclusion of this variable ensures that the effect of remittances is not 
confounded with the effect due to migration. Moreover, net migration changes both the 
distribution of worker characteristics and the returns to these characteristics. Hanson (2007) 
has shown that labor force participation in high migration Mexican States decreases and that 
average wages in those States are higher in a range between 6% and 9%.  
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Financial development (measured by the private credit-to-GDP ratio) reduces the prevalence 
of low wages via both the labor demand and the labor supply channel. The demand channel is 
promoted by the firms’ access to credit and private investment. The supply channel is based 
upon a wider possibility of drawing on savings and of borrowing, which renders labor supply 
more elastic (Jayachandran, 2006). As for remittances, more access to credit allows poor 
workers to adjust in a more optimal way. If there is a lack of finance, poor workers are 
blocked in poverty traps, as they have no choice but to work for low wages.  
Trade openness in developing countries could decrease the prevalence of working poor by 
increasing the labor demand in the agricultural sector and hence the agricultural wage. The 
same effect exists in the natural resources sector and altogether, the working poor rate is 
lower. The international competition induced by trade openness leads to productivity gains in 
the tradable sector and shifts the level of wage above its previous value.10 Developing 
countries export commodities whose production requires unskilled labor, and unskilled 
workers’ wages in sending developing countries tend to increase.  
Government consumption-to-GDP ratio is a proxy for the share of public employment in 
which the number of working poor is much lower. 
Foreign direct investment net inflows-to-GDP ratio controls for the fact that foreign direct 
investment inflows increase the domestic demand for labor and hence reduce the prevalence 
of working poor.11  
                                                 
10
 It is worth noting that a high level of trade openness means a higher exposition to external risks which could 
translates into a lower reservation wage. However, since we already control for macroeconomic instability, this 
effect is drained-off.  
11
 Chen et al. (2011) showed that FDI inflows increase inter-enterprise wage inequality in China. Their results 
highlighted that FDI lead to a negative spillover in terms of the wage in domestic firms. This arises when 
competition from multinationals may reduce the market share of local firms, which drives such firms under the 
minimum efficiency or even crowds them out. Nunnenkamp et al. (2007) showed that even if FDI inflows 
enhance economic growth and reduce poverty, they also widen income disparities between urban and rural areas 
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Education level (measured as the percentage of people having completed the secondary cycle) 
enters the set of control variables. A higher education level increase the reservation wage, and 
decrease the prevalence of working poor. 
Income inequality (approximated by the Gini coefficient of income distribution) is introduced 
to ensure that the estimated effect of remittances on the prevalence of working poor is net of 
the effect of remittances on income inequality.12 
Inflation rate controls for the fact that low-wage earners suffer more from the loss of real 
wage induced by inflation. They have to increase their labor supply in order to compensate for 
this loss of revenue, even more for working poor, who do not have other way of smoothing 
consumption but to supply more work. 
Rural population rate is negatively correlated with the productivity of workers in rural area. 
Hence a positive association between the rural population and the prevalence of working poor 
is expected. 
The dependent variable is measured as the share of active people who receive as wage less 
than 2 $US and comes from the ILO-KILM dataset.13 Remittances record the money sent by 
workers who live abroad for at least one year.14 Remittance data are drawn from the World 
Bank Tables. Except trade openness, government consumption and per capita income (which 
come from the Penn World Table 6.3. dataset), all remaining control variables are drawn from 
the World Bank Tables. The sample covers at most 85 countries over the period 1990-2007. 
                                                                                                                                                        
in Bolivia. This suggests that FDI inflows can exert a pro-poor effect in receiving countries but at the same time, 
they can induce regional disparities. 
12
 Some recent macroeconomic papers have tested the impact of remittance inflows on the income inequality in 
the receiving countries (Koechlin and Leon, 2007; Chauvet and Mesplé-Somps, 2007; Acosta et al., 2008). 
13
 See appendix for a detailed presentation of this variable. 
14
 We use the narrower definition of remittances by squeezing the compensations of employees and migrant 
transfers. This procedure follows Chami, Fullenkamp and Gapen (2009). 
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Countries list and descriptive statistics are provided in appendix at the end of the paper 
(Tables A1 and A2).  
Table 1.1 displays the results obtained by running OLS. Whatever the specification, be it with 
a smaller number of controls in the first columns or a larger one in the subsequent columns, 
all variables have the expected sign. When all controls are included, higher income volatility, 
larger income inequality and higher rural population rate are associated with a higher number 
of poor workers. Furthermore, the initial level of economic development, the degree of trade 
openness and the level of education (except when the income per capita is excluded from the 
specification) tend to reduce the prevalence of workers paid at below two dollars per day. 
Convergence, competition, and income distribution do influence the share of poor workers in 
the active population. Some coefficients, although non-significant, have the right sign: net 
emigration rate, private credit to GDP ratio, government consumption over GDP, FDI over 
GDP, inflation rate. Those variables might suffer from colinearity when estimated jointly with 
other variables.   
It is worth noting that whatever the specification, remittance inflows reduce the prevalence of 
working poor and this effect is highly significant. The estimated coefficient ranges from -
0.885 (first column) to -0.507 (column 10).  
The main drawback behind these preliminary results is the simultaneity bias resulting from 
the two ways causality running from the prevalence of working poor to remittances and vice 
et versa. If remittances reduce the number of poor workers, it is likely that poverty does 
induce both migration and remittances to compensate for low wages at home. OLS results 
might be therefore biased toward zero and they can underestimate the ‘true’ impact. 
To deal with the endogeneity bias, we use an instrumental variable approach. The instrument 
is the potential earning in the migrants’ host countries, which is proxied by real GDP per 
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capita weighted by the share of each destination country for each sending country.15 This 
procedure follows recent macroeconomic works on remittances which have used the per 
capita income in migrant host countries as the exclusion restriction (Acosta et al., 2008; 
Acosta et al., 2009; Aggarwal et al., 2011). There is now an accepted result showing that 
remittances are positively associated with the economic conditions abroad in the host 
countries (Freund and Spatafora, 2008; Aggarwal et al., 2011). Meanwhile, there is no reason 
to suspect for a direct link between the economic conditions abroad and the prevalence of 
working poor when trade openness and FDI are already controlled for.  
Table 1.2 presents the results of the first-stage equations of remittances. In column 1, the real 
GDP per capita in host countries is used as the instrument. Its coefficient (6.34) turns out to be 
highly significant and positive (the F-test of the instrumentation equation for remittances is 
higher compared to the Stock et al., 2002 rule of thumb of 10), which means that the sum of 
GDP per capita weighted by the shares of destination countries in each origin country is a 
good proxy for remittances. In columns 2 and 4, the results of the second stage equation 
suggest that the effect of remittances on the prevalence of working poor is negative and highly 
significant. The coefficients stand at – 1.2 and – 1.5, respectively. These values are higher (in 
absolute term) than previous OLS coefficients (Table 1.1) given the positive OLS bias.  
Using estimates in Table 1.2, we can compute the change in the prevalence of working poor 
induced by a one standard deviation increase in the remittance-to-GDP ratio (set equal to 
4.6%). The decrease in poor workers yields 6 percentage points (column 2), for an average 
prevalence of working poor standing at 48%. This impact is quite substantial.  
                                                 
15
 The bilateral migration matrix comes from the World Bank web site:  
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPECTS/0,,contentMDK:21154867~
pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:476883,00.html 
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Our results provide strong preliminary evidence that the level of remittances leads to a 
substantial decrease in poverty (see Jadotte, 2009; Justino and Shemyakina, 2010). We turn 
now to the influence of income volatility, be it wage or remittances unpredictability.  
1.4. Testing for heterogeneity in the working poor-remittance nexus. 
As shown in the previous section, remittances reduce the prevalence of working poor. The 
model is based upon the evidence that poor workers cannot adjust their labor supply, because 
they are close to the subsistence level. When labor market conditions deteriorate, they cannot 
substitute more leisure to labor. Having no access to credit – evidence about the lack of 
formal credit in developing countries is widely acknowledged – they cannot borrow the funds 
which would enable them to survive. Remittances act as insurance and allow workers to 
adjust their labor supply. Remittances are often seen as source of stable and regular income. 
What also happens if remittances are unpredictable? Indeed, household’s decision-making 
(labor supply or investment motive) may be impacted by the unpredictability of income 
including remittances. 
We make three conjectures. We assume first that remittances should be more efficient in 
fighting against selling low wages whenever income volatility is higher; second remittances 
should be more efficient if they are provided in a predictable way; lastly, remittances as a 
mechanism to cope with external shocks should be less efficient when formal credit is 
available.  
1.4.1. Remittances and income volatility  
If remittances act as an insurance for accommodating shocks, they should be more efficient 
when income volatility is higher. Put differently, remittances can reduce the sensitivity of low 
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wages with respect to the income volatility. This assumption is tested with the following 
model:  
titititititititi XRRVVw ,,,4,,3,2, * εηαβθθθ +++′+++=                 (2) 
where V stands for income volatility in each country i at year t and is measured by the rolling 
standard deviation of the real GDP per capita growth rate over the last five years.  
If the marginal impact of income volatility on the prevalence of working poor decreases with 
the level of remittances one would get, 02 >θ  and 03 <θ . Moreover, above a given threshold 
denoted R*, remittances are fully stabilizing: 
3
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Table 1.3 presents the results derived from the instrumental variable strategy.16 The diagnostic 
tests in the first-stage regressions do not reject the validity of the IV approach. As expected, 
the interactive term is negative and significant whereas the additive term of GDP per capita 
growth volatility is positive but weakly significant. The threshold level for the remittance 
ratio stands at 7% which implies that for 21% countries in the sample, macroeconomic 
volatility does not increase any more the prevalence of working poor. Remittance inflows are 
large enough to fully absorb the shocks.  
1.4.2. Volatility of remittances  
The impact of both the level of remittances and the unpredictability surrounding those flows 
has already been studied at the micro level by Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2010b) and Cox-
                                                 
16
 We use the same instrument as in Table 1.2 and the interactive term of remittances crossed with the 
macroeconomic volatility is instrumented by the interactive term of the excluded instrument for remittances 
crossed with the GDP per capita growth volatility. 
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Edwards and Rodriguez-Oreggia (2009). The authors investigate how different remittances 
patterns influence the labor supply of recipient household. Our study aims at testing the effect 
of the unpredictability of remittance inflows on the share of working poor and therefore seeks 
to generalize the previous microeconometric findings established for some Latin American 
countries. In this paper, the proxy of the remittances unpredictability is their volatility.17  
The following model is estimated: 
titititititi XRRVw ,,,6,5, ε+η+α+β′+θ+θ=               (3) 
where RV stands for the volatility of remittances in each country i at year t.18 While 6θ  is 
expected to be negative, the sign of 5θ
 
is a priori unknown. From one hand, according to the 
permanent income hypothesis, unpredictable remittances should be invested more than 
predictable remittances, the latter being mostly used for consumption. Through the induced 
additional demand for labor, the impact on workers paid at below 2$ US should be to reduce 
their number, and 5θ should be negative. From the other hand, if remittances are not a way to 
smooth consumption of workers when they are unpredictable,  5θ  could be positive 
(households do not reduce their labor supply). The sign of this coefficient is therefore a matter 
of empirics.  
Results in table 1.4 (first column) are obtained by running our instrumental variable strategy. 
The coefficient associated with the volatility of remittances is positive at the low level of 
                                                 
17
 This choice does not mean that all the volatility of remittances is unpredictable. We assume only that the 
degree of unpredictability tends to increase when remittances become less stable. A more accurate measure of 
the unpredictability involves constructing a model of expectations (or time series models designed for high 
frequency data such as GARCH models) that goes beyond the objectives of the paper. 
18
 The volatility of remittances is computed as the five-year rolling window standard error of the residual 
component of the log of remittances explained by its one-year lagged value and a quadratic time trend. The 
remittance model is estimated for each country separately.  
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significance of 10%. They suggest that the second effect through the labor supply is more 
important than the effect through private investment.  
In a slightly modified version of equation (3), we consider that the volatility of remittances 
enters the equation in a multiplicative way:  
tititititititi XRVRRw ,,,,8,7, * ε+η+α+β′+θ+θ=                   (4) 
We test now the hypothesis that 07 <θ  and 08 >θ . In that setting, 7θ measures the effect of 
the level of remittances when the volatility of remittances is set at 0 whereas tiRV ,87 θθ +  
identifies the marginal effect of remittances for a given level of remittance volatility.19   
Column 2 in table 1.4 presents the results obtained through our instrumental variable 
strategy.20 We find that 07 <θ  and 08 >θ .  
Combining the results of both columns indicate that the volatility of remittances contributes 
not only to increase the prevalence of working poor, but do increase also the marginal impact 
of the level of remittance inflows on the prevalence of poor workers. In other words, 
remittance inflows alleviate the prevalence of poverty but to a lesser extent under a higher 
unpredictability surrounding those inflows. 
1.4.3. Remittances versus finance 
We now investigate whether the effectiveness of remittances in reducing the prevalence of 
poor workers increases with the shallowness nature of the domestic financial system. We 
                                                 
19
 In the model (4), the remittance volatility is not introduced additively among the set of control variables 
because its coefficient would identify the effect of remittance volatility without remittances. What seems 
difficult to assess. 
20
 Remittances volatility is considered as strictly exogenous.  
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adopt a threshold model, which determines endogenously the private credit-to-GDP ratio 
above which the relationship between poverty and remittances inflows vanishes. 
The test for non-linearity is implemented with rolling estimations for different values taken by 
the ratio of private credit. A dummy variable FDd  interacted with the remittance variable is 
specified. FDd  is equal to 1 if the country has a value of the private credit ratio greater than 
*FD
 and 0 otherwise.21 The underlying methodology in the case of endogenous regressors 
has been implemented by Masten et al. (2008) and Chami and Hakura al. (2009). 
We therefore estimate the following equation:  
titititiFDtititi XFDdRRw ,,,11,10,9, * εηαβθθθ +++′+++=               (5) 
                     with [ ]*=
,
FDFDd tiFD ≥1
 
where FD is the private credit-to-GDP ratio in each country i at year t. The hypothesis tested 
is that 09 <θ  and 010 >θ , in other terms the absolute value of  the marginal impact of 
remittances on the share of poor workers decreases with the level of financial development.  
The top 5% and bottom 5% of the observations of the private credit ratio are dropped to 
ensure a feasible identification of the threshold. Private credit-to-GDP thresholds by 
increments of 0.5 percent are explored. Each equation corresponding to a different threshold 
is estimated by the instrumental variable method. The optimal threshold is the one which 
maximizes the F-tests of the remittance and remittances*dFD instrumentation equations for all 
                                                 
21
 We also performed simple estimations by including an interactive term of remittances crossed with the private 
credit ratio. Unfortunately, the coefficient associated with the interactive term was never statistically significant 
different from zero.  
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the models in which 9θ  and 10θ  are individually significant.22 Testing nonlinear effect refers 
simply to the test of the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the interactive variable 10θ  is 
equal to zero.  
The optimal cutoff which maximizes the F-tests statistics is set at a private credit over GDP 
ratio equal to 20%. This is very close to the thresholds values in Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz 
(2009) in their study using the level of economic growth as the dependent variable. More than 
60% of the countries are concerned here by this threshold, and the median value of the private 
credit-to-GDP ratio in the sample stands at 19%. 
Table 1.5 displays the results, which are based upon the two regimes. The first regime 
includes countries in which the level of financial development is under 20%. For countries 
belonging to this regime the marginal impact of remittances is the highest (in absolute value). 
The second regime consists in more financially developed countries (the ratio of private credit 
over GDP is over 20%). In the latter the impact of remittances, although still negative,23 is 
significantly lower in absolute value. This finding supports and extends the thesis, according 
to which there is a substitution effect between remittances and financial development in 
developing countries (see Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009). 
1.5. Conclusion 
Our findings are based upon a large data set which covers a wide range of developing 
countries over an extended period of time, namely 85 countries over 1990-2007. We 
generalize the existing literature which is mainly based on micro studies, and we demonstrate 
                                                 
22
 According to the criterion of the significance of the second stage coefficients ( 9θ  and 10θ ), only two 
thresholds emerged (private credit ratio of 20% and 48%). The threshold of 20% of GDP beats the second one 
for all the values of the F-test couple. 
23
 Indeed, the sum of the two coefficients associated with the remittance variable remains negative (- 3.04 + 1.44 
= - 1.6) and statistically different from 0 (the corresponding P-value of the restriction stands at 0.07). 
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that remittances are key for reducing the number of working poor. For an average prevalence 
of working poor set equal to 48%, a one standard deviation increase in the remittance-to-GDP 
ratio decreases the number of poor workers by a substantial 6 percentage points.  
The efficiency of remittances depends upon the level of income volatility characterizing the 
economy. For a remittance ratio equal to 7% of GDP any increase in the macro-volatility is 
fully compensated, which means that income volatility does not impact any more the 
vulnerability of the poorest in the labor market. The degree of remittance predictability also 
matters. Remittance inflows alleviate the prevalence of poor workers but to a lesser extent 
under a higher unpredictability surrounding those inflows. Finally, we found that remittances 
and the domestic financial system are substitutes. For less financially developed countries the 
marginal impact of remittances in reducing the prevalence of working poor is the highest in 
absolute value. In contrast, in more financially developed countries, where the ratio of private 
credit over GDP is above 20% of GDP, this marginal impact is still negative, but significantly 
lower in absolute value.  
Remittances appear as a strategy for fighting against poverty (see for instance the G8 summit 
declaration of 2009 at Aquila). Their pro poor effects through the reduction of low wages 
could be enhanced by acting on two fronts: the level of remittances and their productive uses. 
In the first case, it would be useful to reduce the transaction costs associated with remitting 
(especially in less financially developed countries where the marginal impact of remittances 
on low wages was found in this paper to be stronger and where the transfer costs are higher). 
In the second case, it is crucial to promote the reinvestment of remittances. Indeed, the 
reinvestment of remittances helps prevent from a sub-optimal equilibrium characterized by 
higher wages and weaker labor participation. The reinvestment of remittances could lead to a 
better equilibrium with higher wage, more labor and capital, triggered by the diffusion effects 
of remittances in the economy. 
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Figure 1.1. Distribution of the prevalence of working poor in the developing regions (1990-2007) 
Note: In box plots, the lower and upper hinges of each box show the 25th and 75th percentiles of the samples, the 
line in the box indicates the respective medians, and the end-points of whiskers mark next adjacent values. EAP: 
East Asia and Pacific, ECA: Europe and Central Asia, LAC: Latin America and Caribbean, MENA: Middle East 
and North Africa, SA: South Asia, SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Source: ILO KILM 6th edition dataset. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1. Remittances and the prevalence of working poor 
48 
 
ALB
ARG
ARM
BDI
BEN
BGD
BOL
BRA
BWA
CIV
CMR
COL
CRI ECUEGY
GHA GMB
GTM
GUY
HND
HTI
IND
IRN
JAM
JOR
KAZ
KEN
KGZ
KHM
LAO LKA
LSO
MAR
MEXMLI
MNG
MOZ
MRT
WIMYS NER
NPL
PAK
PAN
PER
PHL
PRYRUS RWA
SEN
SLVTGO
THA
TUN
TUR
UGA
VEN
YEM
ZMB
-
40
-
20
0
20
40
Pr
e
va
le
n
ce
 
of
 
w
or
ki
n
g 
po
o
r 
re
si
du
a
ls
-5 0 5 10 15
Remittance-to-GDP residuals
Data sources: ILO KILM dataset and World Bank tables
 
Figure 1.2. Correlation between the prevalence of working poor and remittance inflows (1990-
2007). 
Note: Data are averaged over the period 1990-2007.Working poor rate and remittance-to-GDP ratio are residuals 
derived from pooled regressions using annual data of these variables regressed on the same set of control 
variables (as in Tables 1.1 – 1.5). This gives adjusted measures of the prevalence of working poor rate and 
remittance-to-GDP ratio that are purged from any colinearity with the determinants of the prevalence of working 
poor.
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Table 1.1: Remittances and Percentage of Working Poor, OLS-FE results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
                        
Remittance-to-GDP ratio -0.885*** -0.816*** -0.731*** -0.720*** -0.662*** -0.607*** -0.587*** -0.613*** -0.616*** -0.507*** -0.519*** 
 (-4.711) (-3.624) (-3.708) (-3.713) (-3.702) (-4.176) (-4.193) (-4.451) (-4.407) (-3.153) (-3.444) 
Real GDP per capita growth volatility 0.0275  0.0332 0.0337 0.0347 0.100 0.0940 0.143** 0.144** 0.147** 0.143** 
 (0.754)  (0.997) (0.999) (0.861) (1.425) (1.274) (2.008) (2.002) (2.314) (2.104) 
Initial real GDP per capita  -16.23* -17.54** -17.65** -5.382  -9.497* -14.12*** -14.13***  -11.59** 
  (-1.970) (-2.117) (-2.125) (-0.812)  (-1.823) (-2.918) (-2.891)  (-2.203) 
Net Emigration rate    -0.166 -0.334 -0.171 -0.264 -0.448 -0.449 -0.345 -0.454 
    (-0.493) (-1.404) (-0.651) (-1.036) (-1.291) (-1.320) (-1.053) (-1.447) 
Private credit-to-GDP ratio     -0.0425 -0.0726 -0.0340 -0.0696 -0.0707 -0.0841 -0.0500 
     (-0.537) (-1.026) (-0.435) (-1.067) (-1.081) (-1.218) (-0.721) 
Trade openness     -0.0771* -0.0532 -0.0431 -0.0482* -0.0465 -0.0617*** -0.0498** 
     (-1.781) (-1.435) (-1.230) (-1.743) (-1.670) (-2.884) (-2.190) 
Government consumption-to-GDP ratio     4.970 4.657 3.856 0.499 0.309 0.776 -0.0490 
     (1.029) (0.670) (0.548) (0.0774) (0.0474) (0.125) (-0.00780) 
Foreign direct investment-to-GDP ratio     -0.0979 -0.0503 -0.0700 -0.0690 -0.0664 -0.0464 -0.0681 
     (-0.513) (-0.264) (-0.367) (-0.500) (-0.469) (-0.330) (-0.493) 
Education level      -0.343** -0.251 -0.197 -0.170 -0.102 -0.0411 
      (-2.074) (-1.488) (-1.457) (-1.166) (-0.582) (-0.250) 
Income inequality         0.798*** 0.796*** 0.764*** 0.799*** 
        (4.602) (4.583) (4.156) (4.541) 
Inflation rate         0.909 0.310 0.473 
         (0.954) (0.356) (0.537) 
Rural population rate          0.559** 0.416* 
          (2.485) (1.768) 
Intercept 49.02*** 182.1*** 192.7*** 193.8*** 84.69 44.20** 122.1** 133.6*** 133.7*** -9.848 91.17 
 (69.77) (2.695) (2.840) (2.845) (1.437) (2.071) (2.552) (2.736) (2.707) (-0.444) (1.598) 
            
Observations 305 314 305 305 270 231 231 229 227 227 227 
R-squared 0.073 0.140 0.149 0.150 0.123 0.154 0.167 0.310 0.311 0.305 0.323 
Number of countries 83 85 83 83 73 61 61 61 59 59 59 
Notes: Robust T-statistics in parentheses             
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1            
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Table 1.2: Remittances and Working Poor rate, IV-FE results 
  First-stage IV-FE First-stage IV-FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Remittance-to-GDP ratio  -1.499**  -1.258** 
  (-2.089)  (-2.159) 
Real GDP per capita growth volatility 0.00566 0.157** 0.00441 0.151*** 
 (0.272) (2.420) (0.221) (2.836) 
Initial real GDP per capita   -2.841 -12.27** 
   (-1.272) (-2.105) 
Net Emigration rate 0.101 -0.239 0.0739 -0.381 
 (0.626) (-0.515) (0.567) (-1.091) 
Private credit-to-GDP ratio -0.0273 -0.0969 -0.0197 -0.0575 
 (-1.231) (-1.397) (-0.826) (-0.909) 
Trade openness 4.80e-05 -0.0385 0.00159 -0.0318 
 (0.00337) (-0.991) (0.108) (-0.807) 
Government consumption-to-GDP ratio 3.868** 3.706 3.708** 2.081 
 (2.084) (0.669) (2.167) (0.433) 
Foreign direct investment-to-GDP ratio 0.0101 -0.00773 0.00303 -0.0406 
 (0.200) (-0.0492) (0.0505) (-0.255) 
Education level -0.0789 -0.108 -0.0680 -0.0423 
 (-1.188) (-0.540) (-0.948) (-0.227) 
Inflation rate 0.615* 0.942 0.652 0.953 
 (1.879) (0.832) (0.960) (0.519) 
Income inequality 0.0149 0.774*** 0.0235 0.808*** 
 (0.344) (5.191) (0.438) (5.683) 
Rural population rate -0.138 0.173 -0.158 0.120 
 (-1.177) (0.447) (-1.464) (0.352) 
     
Exclusion restriction     
     
log Real GDP per capita in host countries 6.340***  6.695***  
 (4.022)  (4.542)  
     
Observations 216 216 216 216 
R-squared 0.263 0.196 0.271 0.262 
F-test of remittance instrumentation equation 16.18  20.63  
Number of countries 48 48 48 48 
Notes: Robust T statistics in parentheses.      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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Table 1.3: Remittances, income shocks and Working poor rate 
  IV-FE 
    
GDP per capita growth volatility 0.688*** 
 (4.243) 
Remittance * GDP per capita growth volatility -0.0974*** 
 (-2.645) 
Remittance-to-GDP ratio -0.398 
 (-0.537) 
Initial GDP per capita -6.285 
 (-1.155) 
Net Emigration rate -0.501* 
 (-1.657) 
Private credit-to-GDP ratio -0.0392 
 (-0.500) 
Trade openness -0.0527* 
 (-1.648) 
Government consumption-to-GDP ratio 0.956 
 (0.138) 
Foreign direct investment-to-GDP ratio 0.0435 
 (0.226) 
Education level -0.0177 
 (-0.0942) 
Inflation rate 1.962 
 (1.252) 
Income inequality 0.756*** 
 (4.537) 
Rural population rate 0.419 
 (1.048) 
  
Observations 216 
R-squared 0.167 
F-stat of Remittance instrumentation: P-value 0.002 
F-stat of Remittance*Growth volatility instrumentation: P-value 0.030 
Joint significance of GDP volatility coefficients: P-value 0.000 
Remittance threshold for full stabilization 7% 
Number of countries above the threshold 10 
Percentage of countries above the threshold (%) 21% 
Number of countries  48 
Notes: Robust T-statistics in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 1.4: Remittances, remittance unpredictability and Working poor rate  
  IV-FE IV-FE 
 (1) (2) 
      
Remittance-to-GDP ratio -2.128** -2.211** 
 (-2.171) (-2.138) 
Remittance unpredictability 6.636*  
 (1.762)  
Remittance * Remittance unpredictability   2.195* 
  (1.680) 
GDP per capita growth volatility 0.0940 0.0830 
 (1.280) (0.884) 
Initial real GDP per capita -18.05** -15.06 
 (-2.037) (-1.540) 
Net Emigration rate 0.614 0.823 
 (0.888) (1.164) 
Private credit-to-GDP ratio -0.130 -0.0827 
 (-1.295) (-0.951) 
Trade openness 0.00290 -0.00742 
 (0.0416) (-0.116) 
Government consumption-to-GDP ratio 18.92* 16.13** 
 (1.847) (2.048) 
Foreign direct investment-to-GDP ratio -0.192 -0.142 
 (-0.852) (-0.628) 
Education level -0.233 -0.178 
 (-0.967) (-0.754) 
Inflation rate -0.00610 0.649 
 (-0.00552) (0.321) 
Income inequality 0.844*** 0.790*** 
 (3.862) (3.818) 
Rural population rate -0.686 -0.362 
 (-1.035) (-0.606) 
   
Observations 152 152 
R-squared 0.119 0.110 
F-stat remittance instrumentation: P-value 0.034 0.009 
F-stat Remittance* Remittance unpredictability instrumentation: P-
value  0.000 
Joint significance of remittance coefficients: P-value  0.081 
Number of countries 33 33 
Notes: Robust T-statistics in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Table 1.5: Remittances, financial development and Working 
Poor rate, IV-FE results 
    
    
Remittance-to-GDP ratio -3.035** 
 (-2.514) 
Remittances * 1[Credit ≥ 20%] 1.439** 
 (2.019) 
Remittance unpredictability 6.794* 
 (1.910) 
Private credit-to-GDP ratio -0.169* 
 (-1.798) 
Initial real GDP per capita -19.77** 
 (-2.226) 
Real GDP per capita growth volatility 0.162** 
 (2.165) 
Income inequality 0.839*** 
 (3.619) 
Net Emigration rate 0.631 
 (1.117) 
Government consumption-to-GDP ratio 15.20** 
 (2.089) 
Foreign direct investment-to-GDP ratio -0.161 
 (-0.816) 
Inflation rate -0.0131 
 (-0.0127) 
Education level -0.132 
 (-0.661) 
Trade openness -0.0339 
 (-0.535) 
Rural population rate -0.432 
 (-0.766) 
  
Observations 152 
R-squared 0.248 
F-stat Remittance instrumentation: P-value 0.046 
F-stat Remittances * 1[Credit ≥ 20%]: P-value 0.000 
Joint significance of remittance coefficients: P-value 0.038 
Number of countries above the threshold 21 
Percentage of countries above the threshold (%) 64% 
Number of countries 33 
Notes: Robust T-statistics in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Appendix A: Measuring the prevalence of working poor, descriptive 
statistics and list of countries 
 
Working poor definition 
Working poor are defined as employed persons living in households in which per-capita 
income/expenditure is below the poverty line (Majid, 2001; Kapsos, 2005). The poverty is defined at 
the household level while employment status is defined at the individual level. In order to maximize 
comparability across countries, international poverty lines are used, whereby prices in local currencies 
are converted using purchasing power parity exchange rates and adjusting for inflation. Employment 
status is determined at the individual level.  
How to compute working poverty estimates 
If we had direct measures such as the poverty rate of working age population, labor force participation 
rate of poor, unemployment rate of poor, the estimate of the number of working poor would be: 
* *(1 )p poor poor poorw pop LFPR U= −                             (1) 
Where pw , poorpop , poorLFPR  and poorU  are respectively the number of working poor, the working 
age population of poor, the labor force participation of poor and the unemployment rate of poor. 
However, due to the fact that the joint distribution with population share, labor force and 
unemployment rate of poor are not known, the following three assumptions are made: 
- The poverty rate of working age population is equal to that of the population as a whole 
- Labor force participation rate of poor is equal to that of population as a whole 
- Unemployment rate of poor is negligible 
This latter assumption is fully discussed in Majid (2001). 
According to the above assumption, the formula used to compute working poverty is: 
 
*pw povertyrate employed=  
Selected resources 
Majid, N. (2001), The size of the working poor population in Developing Countries, Employment 
Paper, 2001/16, Geneva, ILO 
Kapsos, S. (2004), Estimating Growth Requirements for Reducing Working Poverty: Can the World 
Halve Working Poverty by 2015, Employment Strategy Papers, 2004/14 
ILO (2009) Key Indicators of the Labour Market (KILM), 6th Edition, International Labour 
Organization, www.ilo.org/KILM 
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Table A1: Descriptive statistics      
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Percentage of working poor 385 48.06 31.02 0 95 
Remittance-to-GDP ratio 364 3.22 4.60 0 22.84 
Remittance unpredictability 237 0.28 0.32 0.01 1.55 
log Real GDP per capita in host countries 433 9.65 0.95 6.45 10.71 
log Real GDP per capita 432 8.21 0.83 5.89 9.69 
Real GDP per capita growth volatility 417 6.01 13.09 0.07 115.11 
Net emigration rate 440 1.03 3.15 -24.02 28.39 
Private credit-to-GDP ratio 373 25.64 24.15 1.14 165.96 
Trade openness 431 73.19 38.12 14.78 222.29 
Government consumption-to-GDP 437 19.47 8.74 3.73 57.41 
Net FDI inflows-to-GDP 434 3.08 3.61 -6.95 30.93 
Education level  359 16.86 12.07 0.62 62.93 
     (% of people having completed the secondary level)      
Income inequality (Gini) 397 43.84 9.46 16.80 74.30 
log (1 + inflation/100) 403 0.16 0.32 -0.05 3.01 
Rural population (% total population) 440 50.43 21.66 7.36 93.34 
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Table A2. Countries in the sample (85)     
Albania China Honduras Mongolia Suriname 
Angola Colombia India Morocco Tajikistan 
Argentina Costa Rica Iran Mozambique Thailand 
Armenia Cote d'Ivoire Jordan Namibia Togo 
Azerbaijan Croatia Kazakhstan Nepal Trinidad and Tobago 
Bangladesh Dominican Rep. Kenya Nicaragua Tunisia 
Belarus Ecuador Kyrgyz Rep. Niger Turkey 
Benin Egypt Lao PDR Nigeria Uganda 
Bolivia El Salvador Lesotho Pakistan Ukraine 
Bosnia and Herz. Ethiopia Liberia Panama Venezuela 
Botswana Gambia Macedonia Paraguay Yemen 
Brazil Georgia Madagascar Peru Zambia 
Burkina Faso Ghana Malawi Philippines  
Burundi Guatemala Malaysia Russian Fed.  
Cambodia Guinea Mali Rwanda  
Cameroon Guinea-Bissau Mauritania Senegal  
Cape Verde Guyana Mexico Sierra Leone  
Chile Haiti Moldova Sri Lanka   
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 A version of this chapter was published under the reference: Combes, J-L. and Ebeke, C. (2011) Remittances 
and household consumption instability in developing countries, World Development, 39 (7), forthcoming.  
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2.1. Introduction 
The recent economic crisis has led policymakers and economists to rethink the instruments of 
economic stabilization. One of the most damaging consequences of output shocks is the 
consumption instability, which negatively affects risk adverse agents’ welfare.25 As 
Athahasoulis and van Wincoop (2000) and Pallage and Robes (2003) point out, consumption 
instability can have detrimental consequences for the accumulation of human and physical 
capital. 
Consumption instability is driven by a complex array of factors (Wolf, 2004): economic 
shocks, the determinants of the household income elasticity with respect to shocks and the 
determinants of the household consumption elasticity with respect to household income. 
Several characteristics of countries shape consumption instability. Economic size plays a 
crucial role: large economies with diversified production structures are more immune to both 
sector-specific shocks and—reflecting the negative association between size and openness—
external shocks. Financial development opens new diversification opportunities and dampens 
consumption instability. The effect of shocks on macroeconomic instability depends on the 
extent to which participation in the international goods and asset markets allows for 
specialization and risk diversification. Fiscal policy can be used to offset shocks and smooth 
consumption, but large fiscal imbalances are also a factor of macroeconomic instability. 
Fiscal policy instability may in fact be linked to consumption instability through the 
connection between public and household budgets (Herrera and Vincent, 2008). 
It is surprising that remittances are not addressed in the literature examining consumption 
instability, even though several papers have recently analyzed the potential stabilizing impact 
                                                 
25
 The literature on macroeconomic determinants of output instability in developing countries has pointed out 
four main factors: financial sector development (Easterly et al., 2000; Ahmed and Suardi, 2009); openness (Kose 
et al., 2003; Di Giovanni and Levchenko, 2009); and fiscal policy (Fatas and Mihov, 2003). 
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of migrants' remittances (Chami et al., 2009a; Bugamelli and Paternò, 2009, 2011; IMF, 2005, 
and World Bank, 2006). The literature has focused on the low procyclicality and perhaps the 
counter-cyclicality of remittances with respect to GDP. Unlike other private capital flows, 
remittances tend to be hedges against shocks. 
Two mechanisms through which remittances may affect household consumption instability 
can be put forward. First, remittances might act as an ex-ante risk management mechanism 
(risk avoidance). For instance, the remittance-receiving households in Burkina Faso and 
Ghana have houses built of concrete rather than mud and have greater access to 
communications, making them less prone to natural shocks. Moreover, Ethiopian remittance-
receiving households rely more on cash reserves than the sale of productive assets during food 
crisis episodes (Mohapatra et al. 2009). Remittances constitute a resilience factor at the 
household level that contributes to protecting the productive capacity through ex-ante 
investments, thereby smoothing income and promoting economic growth. 
Second, remittances may reduce household consumption instability through their contribution 
to ex-post risk management (insurance). According to Mohapatra et al. (2009), remittances 
rise when the recipient economy suffers a natural disaster. Yang (2008) also provides cross-
country evidence on the response of international flows to hurricanes and concludes that for 
poorer countries, increased hurricane exposure is associated with greater remittance flows as 
well as greater foreign aid. By contrast, other private flows (commercial lending, FDI, and 
portfolio investment) actually decline in response to hurricane exposure. 
The stabilizing effect of remittances may be nonlinear. In other words, the marginal 
stabilizing impact may be stronger in some countries than in others for several reasons. On the 
one hand, remittances may smooth consumption more in less financially developed countries 
because the marginal benefit of remittances received by households increases with lower 
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levels of financial development.26 On the other hand, there is some evidence that the 
macroeconomic effects of remittances in the recipient economies may depend on the size of 
the remittance flows. Several explanations have been proposed. Chami et al. (2008), using a 
stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model with endogenous labor supply, showed that a 
high remittance-to-GDP ratio may actually enhance output instability due to the negative 
impact of these flows on the labor supply of remittance-dependent households. Chami et al. 
(2009a) have used a cross-countries approach to highlight the diminished stabilizing effect of 
remittances on output when the flows exceed a 2% of GDP threshold. According to Abdih et 
al. (2008), a high remittance-to-GDP ratio may actually lead to more corruption. Other 
authors have shown that higher levels of remittances lead to the appreciation of the real 
exchange rate (Dutch Disease) in developing countries (Bourdet and Falck, 2006; Amuedo-
Dorantes and Pozo, 2004; Lartey et al., 2008). 
Therefore, this paper tries to answer several questions concerning the contribution of 
remittances to household consumption instability. (i) Do remittances significantly reduce the 
level of household consumption instability? (ii) What are the types of shocks that remittances 
insure against? (iv) Do the households’ financial constraints reinforce the stabilizing effect of 
remittances? (v) Is there a threshold level of remittances beyond which their stabilizing 
impact diminishes? 
A large cross-sectional panel of developing countries was constructed. To deal with the 
endogeneity of remittances, the System-GMM-IV was used in this paper. It allows 
instrumentation of remittances by their lagged value as well as two external instruments: the 
remittances ratio received by neighbor countries and the weighted GDP per capita of 
                                                 
26
 Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) have tested the nonlinear impact of remittances on growth conditional to the 
financial development. They found that remittances increase economic growth more in less financially 
developed countries. 
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migrants’ host countries. First, we found that remittances significantly reduce household 
consumption instability. Second, remittances appear to be a hedge against natural disasters, 
agricultural shocks, discretionary fiscal policy, financial and systemic banking crises and 
exchange rate instability. Third, remittances work better in the less financially developed 
countries. Fourth, when remittances are too high, their stabilizing impact on consumption is 
weakened. These results are robust to alternative measures of remittances and financial 
development. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 is devoted to the econometric 
investigation of the relationship between remittances and household consumption instability. 
In Section 3, the hypothesis of the insurance role played by remittances when households are 
faced with various types of shocks is tested. The issue of nonlinear effects in the impact of 
remittances on consumption instability is addressed in Section 4. Robustness tests are 
presented in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes. 
2.2 Do remittances reduce household consumption instability? 
2.2.1. The econometric model 
The following dynamic panel model that captures the impact of remittances on consumption 
instability was estimated: 
 ττττττ εηνφβρσασ ,,1,1,, = iiiiicci RX ++++′++ −      (1) 
where ci τσ ,  is the standard deviation of the real consumption per capita growth rate estimated 
over five years. For the purposes of the rest of the paper, we define this variable to be 
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consumption instability.27 Table 2.1 presents the evolution of consumption instability. Sub-
Saharan Africa is most affected by the consumption instability. Moreover, a declining trend in 
consumption instability can be observed from 1980–1985 to 2000–2004. 
Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of regional averages of consumption instability and the 
remittances ratio. It seems difficult to conclude that there is a negative correlation between 
remittances and consumption instability, given that the regions with low (high) remittances 
are not always those with high (low) consumption instability. However, Sub-Saharan Africa is 
characterized by both low levels of remittances and high consumption instability. These 
observations could be a symptom of the conditional effects of remittances on consumption 
instability that this econometric analysis attempted to reveal. 
i  and τ  represent the country and the nonoverlapping five-year period, respectively. iν  and 
τη  represent the country and period fixed effects, respectively. The former was included to 
control for time invariant heterogeneity, and the later was included to control for common 
shocks at each period among countries in the sample. ε  is the idiosyncratic error term. It is 
worth noting that estimation using panel data allows for the exploitation of the time series 
nature of the relationship between remittances and consumption instability. Since the 
magnitude of remittance inflows has changed substantially over time, this is an important 
advantage. The data were organized into a panel consisting of at most 87 countries over the 
period 1975–2004. The data were averaged over nonoverlapping five-year periods so that—
data permitting—there are six observations per country (1975–1979, 1980–1984, 1985–1989, 
1990–1994, 1995–1999, and 2000–2004).  
                                                 
27
 Two arguments justify the use of the standard deviation of growth rates as a measure of instability. First, given 
that macroeconomic variables are often nonstationary, computing the growth rate is a way to remove the trend. 
Second, it is now common in the macroeconomic consequences of remittances literature to approximate 
instability by the standard deviation of the growth rate (e.g. IMF, 2005; Chami et al., 2008; Bugamelli and 
Paternò, 2009b). 
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R  is the remittances variable, measured as the ratio of remittances to GDP. We followed the 
World Bank by defining this variable as the sum of workers’ remittances and compensation of 
employees. Moreover, we primarily used the sum of these two variables because for many 
developing countries the statistical distinction between the two can be highly problematic 
(Bugamelli and Paternò, 2011). Nevertheless, following the narrow definition of remittances 
(Chami et al., 2009b)—which excludes compensation of employees —an alternative measure 
was employed in Section 5. Whenever the ratio of remittances to GDP seemed more relevant 
to capturing the economic importance of these flows in a country, an alternative measure of 
remittances per capita was used in Section 5. 
 X is a matrix of control variables that includes the following:28 
    • Per capita income growth instability. This variable is measured by the standard deviation 
of the real GDP per capita growth rate over five-year subperiods; we expected a positive 
marginal impact that catches aggregate shocks on consumption instability for this variable 
(Herrera and Vincent, 2008). 
    • Per capita income. Consumption instability is expected to be lower in more developed 
countries (Auffret, 2003; Bekaert et al., 2006). We included the logarithmic term GDP per 
capita at the beginning of each period. 
    • Financial development. The degree of consumption smoothing could depend on the depth 
and the efficiency of financial markets (Bekaert et al., 2006; Ahmed and Suardi, 2009). It 
seems plausible that consumption smoothing is strongly determined by the availability of 
credit; hence, the ratio of bank-provided private sector credit to GDP was assumed to be a 
measure of financial development. However, as a robustness check in Section 5, we also 
                                                 
28
 The definition of variables, sources of data and descriptive statistics are presented in Appendix. 
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defined financial development as the ratios of deposits to GDP and broad money (M2) to 
GDP. 
    • Trade and financial openness. The literature on trade openness and macroeconomic 
instability likewise combines theoretical ambiguity with varied empirical findings. Enhanced 
real integration can lead to greater sectional specialization but also provides greater 
diversification across demand sources (Di Giovanni and Levchenko, 2009). On the one hand, 
financial openness increases the degree of exposure to world financial crises. On the other 
hand, financial openness offers new portfolio diversification opportunities. Trade openness 
was measured as the ratio of exports and imports of goods and services to GDP. Financial 
openness was measured as the Chinn-Ito index (2008), rescaled to obtain only positive values. 
This index is introduced in a quadratic form to capture a threshold effect (Kose et al., 2003). 
    • Government size. In developing countries, large government size (measured by the ratio 
of government consumption to GDP) could generate macroeconomic instability and economic 
inefficiencies. We therefore expected a positive correlation between this variable and 
consumption instability (Bekaert et al., 2006).29  
    • Foreign aid. Foreign aid may enhance the risk management mechanism. Moreover, 
countercyclical aid plays an insurance role. Aid is measured by the ratio of official 
development assistance to GDP. 
    • Lagged level of consumption instability. This variable catches the strong inertia which 
characterizes the dynamics of consumption instability. 
If remittances increase as the vulnerability of the economy to shocks is increasing, the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator for 1φ  is biased upward. Moreover, the OLS 
estimator is inconsistent because the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error 
                                                 
29
 This effect strongly differs from what we can expect in developed countries where government spending is 
often countercyclical rather than procyclical, as it is in developing countries. 
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term due to the presence of fixed effects. Hence, an econometric strategy based on 
instrumental variables must be implemented. The equation in levels and the equation in first 
differences are combined in a system and estimated with an extended System-GMM estimator 
that allows for the use of lagged differences and lagged levels of the explanatory variables as 
instruments (Blundell and Bond, 1998).30 The GMM estimator controls for the endogeneity of 
the remittances and other explanatory variables.31 
Two external instruments were added: the ratio of remittances to GDP for all other recipient 
countries located in the same region and the log-weighted GDP per capita for each of the 
migrant host countries (Aggarwal et al., 2011; Acosta et al., 2009).32 External instruments 
weaken the potential “weak instruments” problem that often arises in the context of traditional 
GMM estimation. 
Two specification tests were used to check the validity of the instruments. The first was the 
standard Sargan/Hansen test for overidentifying restrictions. The second test examined the 
hypothesis that there is no second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals. 
The diagnostic tests do not invalidate the quality of the instrumentation within the System-
GMM framework. 
                                                 
30
 The paper uses the System-GMM estimator developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) for dynamic panel data 
with the Windmeijer (2005) correction for finite sample bias. 
31
 In all specifications, only period dummies and initial GDP per capita are taken as strictly exogenous. 
32
 Chami et al. (2008) first computed this instrument for migrants’ remittances. They retained the ratio of 
remittances to GDP for all other recipient countries as an instrument. We followed their work, but we retained 
the remittances of all other neighbors. This variable captures various trends in remittances throughout regions of 
the world, including changes in transactions costs, and at the same time should not directly affect consumption 
instability. The instrument excludes the remittance-to-GDP ratio of the country in question, thereby freeing it of 
a direct causal link with other domestic macroeconomic and policy variables that also influence consumption 
instability. We also computed the GDP per capita in the migrants’ host countries by weighting the GDP per 
capita of all other countries by the share that each of these countries represents in the emigration of workers of 
developing countries. The bilateral migration matrix used to make calculations was drawn from the World Bank 
web site: 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPECTS/0,,contentMDK:21154867~
pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:476883,00.html 
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2.2.2. The preliminary results 
The results are presented in Table 2.3. The baseline model, estimated using both OLS with 
country fixed effects (column 1) and the System-GMM (column 2), included the lagged 
values of the dependent variable, trade openness, government consumption, initial level of 
development and migrants’ remittances. The two biases associated with the OLS estimator 
when applied to a dynamic model were confirmed. The coefficient of the lagged consumption 
instability is biased towards 0 and the coefficient of the remittance variable suffers from an 
upward bias.33 As expected, remittances significantly reduced consumption instability. Trade 
openness, government consumption and lagged dependent variables amplify consumption 
instability. By contrast, per capita income negatively and significantly affects consumption 
instability. The signs of the control variables are consistent with early studies (Bekaert et al., 
2006; Herrera and Vincent, 2008). 
The next step consisted of adding a battery of control variables to check the robustness of 
these results to changes in the following model specifications (see columns 3-9): financial 
development, financial openness, foreign aid, and GDP per capita instability. Whatever 
controls are introduced, the coefficient for migrants’ remittances remains strongly significant, 
negative and relatively stable. Financial development contributes to consumption smoothing 
(column 3). It appears that GDP per capita instability is a significant source of consumption 
instability. As in Kose et al. (2003), financial openness is related to consumption instability in 
an inverted U relationship; the benefits of financial integration only appear beyond a given 
threshold (columns 6 and 9). Foreign aid does not significantly reduce consumption instability 
(columns 7, 8, and 9). 
                                                 
33
 The coefficient obtained with the OLS estimator is, in absolute value, 50% of the corresponding coefficient 
obtained with system-GMM. Even when the model is estimated with the full set of control variables (column 8), 
this bias still remains. 
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2.3. What shocks are mitigated by remittances? 
The following equation was estimated to test the hypothesis that remittances insure differently 
against natural disaster, agricultural and discretionary fiscal policy shocks, financial and 
banking crisis, nominal exchange rate shocks and inflation shocks (Sh): 
( ) ( ) ττττττττττ−ττ ε+η+ν+β′+δ+δ+×φ+×φ+φ+ρσ+ασ ,,,2,1,,3,,2,11,, = iiiiiiiiiiicci XMShMRShRR
   (2) 
In other words, the aggregate shock (GDP per capita instability) was broken-down into 
several sources of GDP instability.34 The strategy consisted of identifying the stabilizing 
impact of remittances against specific shocks (Sh) while controlling for the impact of other 
shocks (M).35 This strategy allowed ranking the stabilizing impact on various shocks. 
1φ captures the stabilizing impact of remittances (R) when Sh and M both equal 0. There is no 
specific claim for the sign of 1φ , given that in a world without shocks (M = Sh = 0) the 
insurance role of remittances could disappear. By contrast the insurance role of remittances 
implies a negative sign for 2φ  and 3φ . The destabilizing effect of shocks on consumption 
means that 1δ  and 2δ  are both positive. When 1δ and 2φ  have opposite signs, a threshold level 
of remittances arises: 
2
1*
,21
,
, 0= φ
δ
−=⇒=φ+δ
∂
σ∂
τ
τ
τ RR
Sh ii
c
i
 
where *R measures the minimum remittance ratio required for a full absorption of the shocks. 
                                                 
34
 We thank an anonymous referee who suggested expanding the set of shocks by including financial crisis, 
inflation and exchange rate shocks. 
35
 For each type of shock, M is the residual of an OLS regression with two fixed effects (country and period) for 
GDP per capita instability on the corresponding shock (Sh). Although M is a generated variable, there is no 
problem of statistical inference, given that this variable is a residual (Pagan, 1984). 
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The natural disaster data were drawn from Center for Research on the Epidemiology of 
Disasters (CRED), Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT).36 CRED defines a disaster as a 
natural situation or event, which overwhelms local capacity, necessitating a request for 
external assistance (Noy, 2009; EM-DAT Glossary of terms).37 We considered all disaster 
events taken together within a country in a year rather than each of them examined separately. 
Indeed, different regions in a country can be affected by different types of disasters in a given 
year; because remittances data is available only at annual frequency and at the country level, 
we would not be able to separate the response of remittances to a specific disaster (Mohapatra 
et al., 2009). The reported measure of the total number of people affected is used. The number 
of people affected is divided by the total population in the year prior to the disaster year (Noy, 
2009; Mohapatra et al., 2009). 
Agricultural, nominal exchange rate and inflation shocks were measured by the standard 
deviations over five years of agricultural value added over GDP, nominal effective exchange 
rate and consumer price index growth rates, respectively. Fiscal shocks were measured by the 
standard deviation of the residual component of the log difference of government 
consumption from an econometric model of the former over the log difference of GDP, with a 
time trend and inflation in a quadratic form (Fatas and Mihov, 2003).38 We took advantage of 
the recent database of Laeven and Valencia (2010) to model financial and banking crises. We 
                                                 
36
 The Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) has collected and made publically 
available worldwide data on the occurrence and effects of natural disasters from 1900 to the present. The 
database is compiled from various sources, including UN agencies, nongovernmental organizations, insurance 
companies, research institutions and press agencies. The EM-DAT data are publicly available on CRED's web 
site at: www.cred.be. 
37
 These disasters can be grouped into several categories: meteorological disasters (floods, wave surges, storms, 
droughts, landslides and avalanches); climatological disasters (disasters caused due to long run or seasonal 
climatic variability such as drought, extreme temperatures and wild fire); and geophysical disasters (earthquakes, 
tsunamis and volcanic eruptions). 
38
 Current output growth was instrumented with two lags of GDP growth and lagged inflation. We included 
inflation to ensure that the results were not driven by high-inflation episodes in which the co-movement between 
real government spending and output might be due to monetary instability rather than fiscal policy. Inflation 
squared was included to control for a possible nonlinear relationship between inflation and spending. The model 
was estimated for each country separately. 
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used both a dummy variable for the occurrence of a crisis and a continuous variable for output 
losses due to the crisis (see appendix data definition for more details). 
The results are presented in Table 2.4. In most cases, after controlling for the stabilizing 
impact of remittances on other shocks, the coefficients associated with the interaction terms 
(remittances crossed with each type of shock) are negative and highly significant. The 
additively introduced shocks variables are, as expected, positively and significantly related to 
consumption instability. Inflation is the sole exception (column 7). Moreover, whatever the 
specifications, the coefficients of specific shocks and of remittances interaction terms are 
jointly significant. Therefore, we were able to compute the threshold level of remittances 
ratios that fully absorb the shocks. The range of the thresholds runs from 5% of GDP for the 
exchange rate shocks to 16% for the agricultural shocks. It appears that the full absorption of 
natural disasters (column 1) and agricultural shocks (column 2) requires much higher levels of 
remittances: 10% and 16%, respectively. A partial explanation for this finding can be put 
forward. Natural disasters and agricultural shocks hit a large fraction of the population in 
developing countries and are more recurrent. Hence, the required level of remittances is 
higher. This fact is reinforced by the importance of the financial constraints that characterize a 
number of countries in the developing world. 
In column 8, we test the stabilizing impact of remittances in the presence of aggregate 
instability (GDP per capita instability). The result indicates that the positive effect of GDP per 
capita instability on consumption instability decreases with the level of remittance inflows. 
Nevertheless, we notice that a huge ratio of remittances (21% of GDP) is required to fully 
stabilize consumption in the case of aggregate volatility. 
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2.4. Heterogeneities in the levels of financial development and remittances: 
testing for nonlinearities 
This section is devoted to the identification of potential heterogeneities in the relationship 
between remittances and consumption instability. First, we focus on the stabilizing impact 
conditional on the financial constraints. Second, we analyze whether the level of remittances 
could modify the marginal impact of remittances on consumption instability. 
2.4.1. Do remittances stabilize more in less financially developed countries? 
We first estimated the following model: 
 
( ) τττττττττ εηνβδφφρσασ ,,,,,2,11,, = iiiiiiiicci XFDFDRR +++′++×+++ −   (3) 
where FD , a proxy for the level of financial development, represents the ratio of bank credit 
to GDP39. X ′  is the vector of control variables. The hypothesis is that 01 <φ  and 02 >φ ; so, 
the impact of migrants’ remittances τφφ ,21 iFD+  is more stabilizing at low levels of financial 
development. Moreover, when 1φ  and 2φ  have opposite signs, a threshold effect arises: 
2
1*
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c
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The results are presented in Table 2.5. In column 1, few control variables are introduced. The 
nonlinear relationship hypothesis is not rejected. The marginal stabilizing impact of 
remittances decreases with the level of financial development. This result holds whatever the 
set of control variables (column 2 with GDP per capita instability and column 3 with GDP per 
                                                 
39
 In Section 5, we mobilize alternative measures of financial development to check the robustness of the 
nonlinearity assumption. 
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capita instability and financial openness). Moreover, the test of the joint significance of 1φ  
and 2φ  rejects the hypothesis that there is no nonlinearity. It also appears that the higher the 
level of private credit available, the lower the consumption instability. From column 3, the 
threshold level of private credit that ensures the marginal impact of remittances on 
consumption instability is negative stands at 30% of GDP. Also, 78% of the countries have 
levels consistent with an overall stabilizing impact of remittances on consumption. 
While a reinforced stabilizing effect for remittances in less financially developed countries is 
intuitive, the opposite conclusion (remittances leading to an instability of consumption in high 
financially developed countries) is more striking. Three partial explanations can be proposed. 
First, remittances may be strongly procyclical in highly financially developed countries and so 
exacerbate business cycles and fuel consumption instability. However, recent papers seem to 
invalidate this conjecture (Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009). Second, the insurance role of 
remittances may be reduced in highly financially developed countries because households can 
resort to the banking system to smooth their consumption. Moreover, in this context, 
remittances could then primarily finance the purchase of land and housing and therefore 
contribute to a boom in the real estate sector. Hence, remittances inflows may affect the 
consumption patterns of both the remittance-receiving and nonremittance-receiving 
households in the community. This mechanism is reinforced when banks recognize 
remittances as a form of collateral, which can increase the availability of loans.40 
An alternative model for this nonlinearity that needed to be tested was implemented with 
rolling estimations for the different values taken by the ratio of private credit. A new variable, 
FDd , in interaction with the remittances variable was specified; FDd  is equal to 1 if the 
country has a private credit ratio greater than *FD  and 0 otherwise. This methodology for 
                                                 
40
 We thank an anonymous referee for providing us with explanations of this result. 
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threshold determination in the case of endogenous regressors in a System-GMM framework 
has previously been implemented by Masten et al. (2008) and Chami et al. (2009a).41 The 
following equation is specified: 
 
( ) ττττττ−ττ ε+η+ν+β′+δ+×φ+φ+ρσ+ασ ,,,,2,11,, = iiiiFDiiicci XFDdRR  (4) 
            with [ ]*= FDFDdFD ≥1 . 
The top 5% and bottom 5% of the observations of the private credit ratio were dropped to 
ensure feasible identification of the threshold. Private credit thresholds were explored in 
increments of 0.5 percent. Each equation corresponding to a different threshold was estimated 
by the System-GMM method. Under the System-GMM framework, the optimal threshold is 
the one that maximizes the overidentification Hansen test p-value. Testing nonlinear effects 
simply refers to the test of the null hypothesis that the coefficient for the interactive variable 
2φ  is equal to zero. The results of the simulations are presented in Figure 2.2. The first graph 
shows the evolution of the coefficient 2φ  (the 95% confidence interval for the coefficient is 
shown by dotted lines) and the second graph shows the statistical significance of this 
coefficient. The third graph gives the Hansen test p-value for each model. 
As expected, in most cases 2φ  is positive. The optimal cutoff, which maximizes the Hansen 
test p-value, is a private credit ratio of 20.03%. The corresponding estimation is shown in 
Table 2.6. All the diagnostic tests associated with the System-GMM estimator validate the 
specification. 
The role of migrants’ remittances in enhancing the ability of households to smooth 
consumption is effective up to a private credit ratio of 20.03% (which is obtained in 55% of 
                                                 
41
 Another approach might consist of estimation using the Hansen methodology with the assumption that the 
threshold variable is exogenous. Private credit ratio cannot be considered as strictly exogenous, however. 
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the countries). However, this value for the private credit ratio threshold is different from that 
estimated in model 5, in which we found a value of 30%. This difference arises because 
rolling estimations allow for the determination of an optimal threshold identified among a 
wide range of potential thresholds. So, this result is preferred to the previous one. 
2.4.2. Does the stabilizing impact of remittances depend upon the level of remittances? 
We tested the hypothesis of a threshold for remittances beyond which the impact on 
consumption instability may be weakened. 
We used the same methodology to allow for the endogenous determination of the threshold. 
The following equation was specified: 
 ( ) τττττ−ττ ε+η+ν+×φ+φ+β′+ρσ+ασ iiriiiicci dRRX 211,=   (5) 
            with [ ]*= RRdr ≥1 . 
The variable rd  is equal to 1 if the country has a value of remittances greater than *R  and 0 
otherwise. The results are presented in Figure 2.3. 
The optimal value of the remittances ratio is 5.5%. Table 2.7 presents the estimation of the 
model on the basis of the endogenously determined threshold. 
When remittances exceed 5.5% of GDP (13 countries, 17% of the sample), the marginal 
stabilizing impact becomes weaker.42 Compared to the 2% threshold computed by Chami et 
al. (2009) from an equation of output instability, the results suggest a high value of remittance 
ratio at which a much weaker stabilizing effect on consumption is observed. The permanent 
                                                 
42
 The stabilizing impact is weaker in the following countries: Albania, Armenia, Cape Verde, Dominica, 
Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Jordan, Lesotho, Moldova, Morocco, Swaziland and Vietnam. These 
countries exhibit a median value for consumption instability that is 1.5 times larger than the median value for the 
rest of the sample. 
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income hypothesis, which posits that consumption is less volatile than income, can provide an 
explanation. So, remittances need to be very high to lead to consumption instability, but a 
much lower level of remittances is sufficient to generate GDP instability. 
2.5. Robustness checks 
Two robustness checks were implemented. First, the stabilizing contribution of remittances 
conditional on the level of financial development was reexamined with alternative measures 
of the level of financial development (Table 2.8). Two commonly used indicators were tested: 
the bank deposits ratio (column 1) and the broad money ratio (M2/GDP, column 2). Whatever 
indicators used, the result that the marginal stabilizing impact of remittances decreases with 
the level of financial development still held. Moreover, the level of financial development 
negatively affected consumption instability in all specifications. 
Second, two alternative measures of remittances were employed: real remittances per capita 
(log-scaled) and remittances net of employee compensation (% of GDP).43 The results are 
presented in the Table 2.9. The first three columns concern the real remittances per capita. In 
column 1, it appears that the stabilizing impact of remittances on consumption is still 
preserved even with the alternative measure. In column 2, the decreasing marginal stabilizing 
impact of remittances with increased financial development seen previously still holds. In 
column 3, the contribution of remittances as an insurance mechanism caught by the 
coefficient of the interaction term of remittances with GDP per capita instability remains 
highly significant. The last three columns repeat the same exercise with remittances net of 
employee compensation. The results are qualitatively unchanged. 
 
                                                 
43
 Remittances in nominal US dollars were converted to constant dollars by dividing the series by the consumer 
price index of each country. 
Chapter 2. Remittances and household consumption instability 
75 
 
2.6. Concluding remarks 
This chapter analyzed the relationship between migrants’ remittances and consumption 
instability. Using a large sample of developing countries over the period 1975–2004 and 
controlling for the endogeneity of remittances, the econometric results suggest that 
remittance-recipient countries exhibit on average lower consumption instability. Remittances 
appear to be a hedge against various types of macroeconomic instability: natural disaster, 
agricultural shocks, discretionary fiscal policy, systemic banking crisis and exchange rate 
instability. However, the results highlight some important heterogeneities among recipient 
countries: the marginal stabilizing impact of remittances significantly decreases with the 
levels of financial development and remittances ratios. More precisely, the stabilizing impact 
is weakened when the private credit ratio exceeds 20% of GDP and when the remittance ratio 
is above 6% of GDP.  
The stabilizing impact of remittances enters the debate about the effect of economic financial 
globalization on macroeconomic volatility and welfare. Previous papers have primarily 
focused on the effect of financial and trade openness on consumption instability (Rose and 
Spiegel, 2009; Kose et al., 2003; Dell'Ariccia et al., 2008; Di Giovanni and Levchenko, 
2009). In this paper, we examined another aspect of economic globalization by looking at the 
effects of remittances on consumption instability. The paper suggests that some countries 
enjoy much greater stabilization from remittance inflows than others. This complexity must 
be factored into any analysis of the developmental implications of remittances and cautions 
against naïve recommendations in favor of huge remittance inflows in all situations. 
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Table 2.1: Household consumption instability in developing countries 
 Five-years subperiods 
Regions 1975–1979 1980–1984 1985–1989 1990–1994 1995–1999 2000–2004 Average 
East Asia and Pacific 2.87 4.70 5.52 3.33 4.80 1.96 3.80 
Europe and Central 
Asia 
.. .. 3.85 9.23 7.82 4.81 6.28 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 
7.39 7.62 6.03 6.02 5.06 3.56 5.90 
Middle East and North 
Africa 
6.19 4.92 6.38 6.29 4.29 3.09 5.01 
South Asia 6.35 3.66 2.47 3.10 5.80 2.83 4.01 
Sub-Saharan Africa 8.32 7.96 10.11 9.49 7.03 6.38 8.16 
Average 7.18 6.97 7.70 7.41 6.11 4.62 6.50 
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Table 2.2 : Descriptive statistics 
 
Variables 
 
Obs 
 
Mean 
 
Std. Dev 
 
Min 
 
Max 
1st order  
autocorrelation 
coefficient 
Instability of household consumption per capita 434 6.49 5.42 0.20 43.67 0.56* 
Remittances (% GDP) 513 3.98 8.30 0 80 0.92* 
Remittances net of compensations (% GDP) 550 2.31 4.52 0 33.15 0.90* 
Real remittances per capita $US 452 79.13 179.42 0 1345.62 0.64* 
Private credit ratio 523 22.35 18.93 0.41 145.31 0.89* 
Private banks deposit (% GDP) 528 26 .84 20.20 0 121.23 1.08* 
M2 (% GDP) 626 34.44 24.47 4.10 198.24 1.07* 
GDP per capita instability 600 4.09 3.37 0.25 32.19 0.31* 
Discretionary fiscal policy 425 10.74 11.44 0.77 91.69 0.58* 
Agricultural value added instability 553 9.92 8.07 0.48 61.38 0.38* 
Inflation instability 521 63.50 523.70 0.13 9803.13 0.07 
NEER instability 519 11.85 17.78 0.61 208.60 0.10* 
Natural disasters 738 1.82 4.05 0 31.76 0.17* 
Financial and banking crisis (output losses %) 750 3.43 15.00 0 129.55 0.01 
Financial and banking crisis (dummy variable) 750 0.13 0.34 0  1 -0.07 
Initial GDP per capita (log) 625 6.77 1.06 4.44 9.02 0.98* 
Trade openness 645 73.27 39.43 2.35 226.87 0.92* 
Financial openness 629 1.51 1.18 0.18 4.53 0.81* 
Government consumption (% GDP) 627 15.68 6.80 2.34 54.37 0.83* 
Aid (% GNI) 632 8.01 9.38 -0.02 58.05 0.81* 
* significant at 5%  level. 
Countries (87) : Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, 
Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, 
Lebanon, Lesotho, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, 
Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Russia, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Slovak Rep., South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian A.R., Tajikistan, Tanzania, 
Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe.  
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Table 2.3: Impact of remittances on consumption instability 
 OLS-FE       OLS-FE  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
Remittances (% GDP) -0.119*** -0.242*** -0.230*** -0.261*** -0.241*** -0.272*** -0.236*** -0.166*** -0.278** 
 (2.73) (3.72) (3.29) (4.42) (3.64) (2.84) (2.78) (4.33) (2.28) 
Private credit ratio (% GDP)   -0.052*  -0.057* -0.045* -0.037 -0.008 -0.030 
   (1.69)  (1.85) (1.73) (1.14) (0.35) (0.87) 
GDP per capita instability    0.407*** 0.486** 0.537*** 0.405** 0.327** 0.467** 
    (2.87) (2.55) (2.83) (2.44) (2.16) (2.64) 
lag dependent variable 0.017 0.233* 0.235 0.263* 0.230 0.171 0.193 0.051 0.141 
 (0.22) (1.67) (1.41) (1.89) (1.24) (1.00) (1.52) (0.55) (0.99) 
Initial GDP per capita 1.128 -1.628*** -1.140** -1.603*** -1.047* -1.076* -0.207 0.573 -0.467 
 (0.80) (3.10) (2.01) (3.29) (1.97) (1.82) (0.26) (0.26) (0.43) 
Trade openness 0.023 0.058** 0.062** 0.061*** 0.063** 0.050* 0.040 0.026 0.036 
 (1.42) (2.50) (2.42) (2.75) (2.55) (1.84) (1.37) (1.32) (1.03) 
Government cons. (% GDP) 0.246* 0.653*** 0.584** 0.632*** 0.524** 0.470 0.538** 0.193 0.553 
 (1.88) (3.61) (2.47) (3.28) (2.09) (1.52) (2.10) (1.64) (1.59) 
Financial openness      4.683**  0.474 3.998* 
      (2.09)  (0.34) (1.88) 
(Financial openness)²      -0.859*  0.074 -0.776* 
      (1.94)  (0.20) (1.87) 
Aid (% GDP)       0.160 0.171 0.140 
       (1.51) (1.61) (0.98) 
Constant -5.247 3.644 2.007 1.993 0.529 -0.505 -4.638 -4.241 -4.843 
 (0.56) (1.02) (0.51) (0.60) (0.15) (0.10) (1.00) (0.29) (0.84) 
Observations 300 294 265 294 265 265 263 269 263 
Countries 89 87 77 87 77 77 77 79 77 
AR(1):p-value  0.004 0.008 0.004 0.026 0.049 0.013  0.078 
AR(2):p-value  0.213 0.322 0.163 0.329 0.254 0.271  0.200 
Hansen p-value  0.814 0.681 0.647 0.437 0.161 0.631  0.304 
Instruments  18 19 19 20 25 22  26 
Note: The estimation method is a two-step System-GMM with Windmeijer (2005) small sample robust correction. Time effects are 
included in all the regressions. T-statistics are below the coefficients. Instability is the five-year standard deviation of the growth rate 
of the corresponding variable. Data are averaged over six nonoverlapping five-year periods between 1975 and 2004. The dependent 
variable is consumption instability. *** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1 
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Table 2.4: Remittances, various shocks and consumption instability: Testing for the insurance role 
 Natural 
disasters 
Agricultural 
shock 
Fiscal 
shock 
Financial and 
banking crisis a 
Financial and 
banking crisis b 
Exchange rate 
shock 
Inflation 
shock 
Aggregate 
shock 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Remittances (% GDP) -0.053 0.022 0.133 -0.069 -0.156 -0.178** -0.136** 0.025 
 (0.85) (0.33) (1.38) (0.46) (1.11) (2.21) (2.42) (0.41) 
Remittances × Shock -0.015*** -0.011*** -0.026*** -0.010*** -0.629** -0.023** 0.000 -0.028** 
 (2.97) (4.58) (4.18) (3.13) (2.30) (2.32) (0.01) (2.64) 
Remittances ×  ‘Other shocks’ -0.027** -0.023** 0.000 -0.002 -0.015 -0.024 -0.042***  
 (2.40) (2.35) (0.02) (0.03) (0.32) (1.56) (3.58)  
Shocks 0.154* 0.179*** 0.188* 0.079*** 3.218*** 0.109* 0.000 0.605*** 
 (1.68) (4.09) (1.83) (4.85) (3.07) (1.72) (0.25) (3.16) 
‘Other shocks’ 0.432** 0.449*** 0.373* 0.375* 0.442** 0.387** 0.580***  
 (2.45) (2.65) (1.70) (1.85) (2.18) (2.13) (2.91)  
Private credit ratio (% GDP) -0.053** -0.037 -0.042* -0.046* -0.046 -0.062 -0.049* -0.042* 
 (2.20) (1.59) (1.73) (1.84) (1.31) (1.61) (1.67) (1.68) 
lag dependent variable  0.279 0.108 0.223 0.260 0.203 0.177 0.325 0.225 
 (1.46) (0.67) (1.26) (1.30) (1.00) (1.07) (1.38) (1.40) 
Initial GDP per capita -0.216 -1.082* -0.462 -0.724 -1.296 -1.070** -0.865 -0.744 
 (0.21) (1.93) (0.76) (1.17) (1.62) (2.04) (1.42) (1.53) 
Trade openness 0.051*** 0.038* 0.045** 0.039 0.057 0.058** 0.044 0.046* 
 (2.70) (1.76) (2.29) (1.45) (1.43) (2.25) (1.62) (1.83) 
Government consumption (% GDP) 0.273 0.380** 0.176 0.223 0.440 0.635* 0.250 0.380 
 (1.38) (2.22) (0.76) (0.81) (1.17) (1.80) (1.19) (1.41) 
Financial openness 2.456 3.955** 1.537 3.180* 2.599 3.808 2.891* 3.436* 
 (1.45) (2.22) (0.84) (1.69) (1.04) (1.58) (1.75) (1.82) 
(Financial openness) ² -0.455 -0.775** -0.309 -0.583* -0.444 -0.680 -0.433 -0.651* 
 (1.33) (2.25) (0.84) (1.68) (0.88) (1.49) (1.25) (1.71) 
Constant -1.499 1.942 1.790 2.666 3.566 -1.571 3.525 -1.377 
 (0.17) (0.50) (0.28) (0.48) (0.68) (0.32) (0.58) (0.29) 
Observations 265 256 264 265 265 258 255 265 
Countries 77 77 77 77 77 70 74 77 
Joint significance of ‘Shocks’ coeff. (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.066 0.044 0.055. 0.022 
Remittance ratio required for a ‘full stabilization’ 10.059 16.216 7.129 7.729 5.114 4.780 .. 21.389 
Number of countries concerned  5 2 9 7 15 14 .. 1 
AR(1):p-value 0.028 0.089 0.032 0.031 0.036 0.024 0.049 0.025 
AR(2):p-value 0.122 0.213 0.743 0.069 0.164 0.093 0.151 0.148 
Hansen p-value: 0.259 0.563 0.315 0.080 0.135 0.554 0.436 0.231 
Instruments 29 30 31 30 30 33 33 28 
Note: The estimation method is a two-step System-GMM with Windmeijer (2005) small sample robust correction. Time effects are included in all the regressions. T-statistics are below the coefficients. 
Instability is the five-year standard deviation of the growth rate of the corresponding variable. Data are averaged over six nonoverlapping five-year periods between 1975 and 2004. The dependent variable is 
consumption instability. 
a
 represents the consolidated output losses (in % of country total output) due to the financial and systemic banking crisis (Laeven and Valencia, 2010). 
b
 represents a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if a there is banking or financial crisis in each country over each of the five-year subperiod (Laeven and Valencia, 2010).  
*** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1 
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Table 2.5: Remittances, financial constraints and household instability 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Remittances (% GDP) -0.279*** -0.337*** -0.427*** 
 (3.80) (5.04) (4.49) 
Remittances × Private credit ratio 0.008** 0.012*** 0.014** 
 (2.11) (2.81) (2.48) 
Private credit ratio (% GDP) -0.064** -0.081** -0.083** 
 (2.14) (2.52) (2.20) 
GDP per capita instability  0.498*** 0.543*** 
  (2.67) (2.96) 
lag dependent variable 0.267* 0.255 0.165 
 (1.71) (1.52) (1.01) 
Initial GDP per capita -0.969* -0.842* -0.907 
 (1.75) (1.69) (1.50) 
Trade openness 0.059** 0.062*** 0.057* 
 (2.63) (2.79) (1.92) 
Government consumption (% GDP) 0.471** 0.395** 0.451 
 (2.39) (2.03) (1.28) 
Financial openness   4.344** 
   (2.32) 
(Financial openness)²   -0.874** 
   (2.30) 
Constant 2.293 0.860 -0.999 
 (0.58) (0.24) (0.21) 
Observations 265 265 265 
Countries 77 77 77 
Joint significance of remittances’ coef. (p-value) 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Private credit turning-point (% GDP) 34.226 28.330 30.566 
Countries above the threshold of private credit. 11 22 17 
Percentage of countries above the threshold 14 28 22 
AR(1):p-value 0.006 0.014 0.053 
AR(2):p-value 0.349 0.459 0.368 
Hansen p-value 0.812 0.615 0.287 
Instruments 21 22 26 
Note: The estimation method is two-step System-GMM with Windmeijer (2005) small sample 
robust correction. Time effects are included in all the regressions. T-statistics are below the 
coefficients. Instability is the five-year standard deviation of the growth rate of the corresponding 
variable. Data are averaged over six nonoverlapping five-year periods between 1975 and 2004. The 
dependent variable is consumption instability. *** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1 
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Table 2.6: Remittances, financial constraints and consumption 
instability: Nonlinear System-GMM method 
  
Remittances (% GDP) -0.197** 
 (2.07) 
Remittances × dFD = 1[FD ≥ 20.03 %] 0.206** 
 (2.28) 
Private credit ratio (% GDP) -0.044 
 (1.58) 
GDP per capita instability 0.563*** 
 (3.03) 
lag dependent variable 0.230 
 (1.42) 
Initial GDP per capita -0.936** 
 (2.01) 
Trade openness 0.046* 
 (1.76) 
Government consumption (% GDP) 0.466 
 (1.41) 
Financial openness 4.216* 
 (1.98) 
(Financial openness)² -0.784* 
 (1.90) 
Constant -1.714 
 (0.31) 
Observations 265 
Countries 77 
Joint significance of remittances (p-value) 0.047 
Threshold of private credit ratio 20.031 
Countries above the threshold 35 
Percentage of countries above the threshold 45 
AR(1):p-value 0.036 
AR(2):p-value 0.267 
Hansen p-value 0.394 
Instruments 30 
Note: The estimation method is two-step System-GMM with 
Windmeijer (2005) small sample robust correction. Time effects are 
included in all the regressions. T-statistics are below the coefficients. 
Instability is the five-year standard deviation of the growth rate of 
the corresponding variable. Data are averaged over six 
nonoverlapping five-year periods between 1975 and 2004. The 
dependent variable is consumption instability. *** p<0.01,** 
p<0.05,* p<0.1. 
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Table 2.7: Threshold effects in the relationship between 
remittances and consumption instability: Nonlinear System-
GMM method 
  
Remittances (% GDP) -1.067** 
 (2.31) 
Remittances × dR = 1[R ≥ 5.5 %] 0.824** 
 (2.06) 
Private credit ratio (% GDP) -0.049** 
 (2.43) 
GDP per capita instability 0.485*** 
 (2.90) 
lag dependent variable 0.134 
 (0.94) 
Initial GDP per capita -0.938* 
 (1.67) 
Trade openness 0.054** 
 (2.44) 
Government consumption (% GDP) 0.336 
 (1.27) 
Financial openness 3.045 
 (1.44) 
(Financial openness)² -0.564 
 (1.31) 
Constant 2.871 
 (0.62) 
Observations 265 
Countries 77 
Joint significance of remittances (p-value) 0.027 
Threshold of remittances ratio 5.5% 
Countries above the threshold 13 
Percentage of countries above the threshold 17 
AR(1):p-value 0.052 
AR(2):p-value 0.511 
Hansen p-value 0.300 
Instruments 26 
Note: The estimation method is two-step System-GMM with 
Windmeijer (2005) small sample robust correction. Time effects are 
included in all the regressions. T-statistics are below the coefficients. 
Instability is the five-year standard deviation of the growth rate of 
the corresponding variable. Data are averaged over six 
nonoverlapping five-year periods between 1975 and 2004. The 
dependent variable is consumption instability. *** p<0.01,** 
p<0.05,* p<0.1. 
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Table 2.8: Remittances and consumption instability: Alternative measures of 
financial development 
 (1) (2) 
   
Remittances (% GDP) -0.676** -0.407** 
 (2.04) (2.50) 
Remittances × Bank deposits ratio 0.010*  
 (1.84)  
Bank deposits ratio (% GDP) -0.068**  
 (2.19)  
Remittances × M2 ratio  0.005** 
  (2.02) 
M2 (% GDP)  -0.045** 
  (2.09) 
GDP per capita instability 0.573*** 0.663*** 
 (3.56) (3.53) 
lag dependent variable 0.128 0.133 
 (1.01) (1.01) 
Initial GDP per capita -1.181*** -1.176*** 
 (2.69) (3.81) 
Trade openness 0.074** 0.067*** 
 (2.47) (3.28) 
Government consumption (% GDP) 0.242 0.234 
 (1.04) (1.41) 
Financial openness 3.612* 3.266* 
 (1.76) (1.74) 
(Financial openness) ² -0.681 -0.621 
 (1.64) (1.66) 
Constant 3.567 3.579 
 (0.87) (0.99) 
Observations 265 294 
Countries 77 87 
Joint significance of remittances (p-value) 0.119 0.044 
Turning point of financial development 65.13 81.68 
Number of countries above the threshold 2 4 
AR(1):p-value 0.066 0.055 
AR(2):p-value 0.911 0.590 
Hansen p-value 0.458 0.600 
Instruments 27 27 
Note: The estimation method is two-step System-GMM with Windmeijer (2005) 
small sample robust correction. Time effects are included in all the regressions. T-
statistics are below the coefficients. Instability is the five-year standard deviation of 
the growth rate of the corresponding variable. Data are averaged over six 
nonoverlapping five-year periods between 1975 and 2004. The dependent variable 
is consumption instability. *** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1. 
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Table 2.9: Remittances and consumption instability: Alternative measures of remittances 
 real remittances per capita (log)  Remittances net of compensations (% GDP) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Remittances -1.125** -1.297** 2.781***  -0.713** -0.540** 0.617** 
 (2.35) (2.10) (2.72)  (2.49) (2.07) (2.46) 
Remittances × Private credit ratio  0.035**    0.013**  
  (2.50)    (2.37)  
Remittances × GDP per capita instability   -0.426**    -0.105** 
   (2.30)    (2.26) 
Private credit ratio (% GDP) -0.005 -0.082** -0.039  -0.005 -0.063* -0.072 
 (0.17) (2.30) (0.72)  (0.21) (1.86) (0.92) 
GDP per capita instability 0.534*** 0.540*** 1.257***  0.559*** 0.605*** 0.661** 
 (4.08) (3.65) (2.98)  (4.62) (3.60) (2.44) 
lag dependent variable 0.087 0.070 0.339**  0.254* 0.126 0.346 
 (0.53) (0.36) (2.18)  (1.78) (0.82) (1.23) 
Initial GDP per capita 0.474 0.303 -0.243  -0.745* -0.473 2.015 
 (1.12) (0.77) (0.11)  (1.92) (1.22) (0.58) 
Trade openness 0.015 0.039 0.054  0.036 0.049* 0.031 
 (0.68) (1.60) (1.64)  (1.61) (1.67) (0.93) 
Government consumption (% GDP) -0.051 -0.222 0.038  0.124 0.095 0.041 
 (0.29) (0.93) (0.13)  (0.78) (0.51) (0.12) 
Financial openness -0.029 -0.388 1.405  1.425 4.335** 0.637 
 (0.02) (0.21) (0.75)  (0.76) (2.14) (0.42) 
(Financial openness) ² -0.033 -0.060 -0.522  -0.130 -0.889** -0.300 
 (0.10) (0.15) (1.31)  (0.33) (2.11) (0.79) 
Constant 2.736 5.719 -6.309  3.559 1.189 -13.438 
 (0.92) (1.07) (0.50)  (1.13) (0.27) (0.53) 
Observations 256 256 256  273 273 273 
Countries 75 75 75  76 76 76 
Joint significance of remittances (p-value) .. 0.044 0.029  .. 0.066 0.049 
AR(1): p-value 0.101 0.252 0.034  0.009 0.085 0.093 
AR(2): p-value 0.440 0.200 0.416  0.159 0.200 0.273 
Hansen p-value 0.758 0.691 0.773  0.519 0.556 0.417 
Instruments 20 22 28  22 24 26 
Note: The estimation method is two-step System-GMM with Windmeijer (2005) small sample robust correction. Time effects are included in all the regressions. T-statistics are below the 
coefficients. *** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1. 
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Note: In box plots, the lower and upper hinges of each box show the 25th and 75th percentiles of the samples, 
the line in the box indicates the respective medians, and the end-points of whiskers mark next adjacent values. 
EAP: East Asia and Pacific, ECA: Europe and Central Asia, LAC: Latin America and Caribbean, MENA: 
Middle East and North Africa, SA: South Asia, SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (2009). 
Figure 2.1. Consumption instability and remittances in developing regions, 1975–2004. 
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Figure 2.2. Evolution of the coefficient associated with the interactive term of remittances 
crossed with the private credit ratio: Nonlinear System-GMM Estimation 
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Figure 2.3: Evolution of the coefficient associated with the nonlinear term in remittances: 
Nonlinear System GMM Estimation 
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Appendix B. Data definitions and sources of variables  
 
Consumption instability: Standard deviation of the real household consumption per capita growth rate 
estimated over a nonoverlapping five-year period. Household consumption per capita was drawn from World 
Bank tables, World Development Indicators (2009). 
Gross domestic product per capita: Logarithm of the GDP per capita. Data are in constant 2000 U.S. dollars 
(World Development Indicators, 2009). 
Trade openness: Sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross domestic 
product (World Development Indicators, 2009). 
Remittances: Ratio of workers’ remittances and compensation of employees to GDP. Workers' remittances and 
compensation of employees comprised current transfers by migrant workers and wages and salaries earned by 
nonresident workers. Workers’ remittances were classified as current private transfers from migrant workers 
who were residents of the host country to recipients in their country of origin. They included only transfers made 
by workers who have been living in the host country for more than a year, irrespective of their immigration 
status. Compensation of employees is the income of migrants who had lived in the host country for less than a 
year. Migrants’ transfers were defined as the net worth of migrants that is transferred from one country to 
another at the time of migration for those who are expected to remain in the host country for more than one year. 
(World Development Indicators, 2009). 
Private credit ratio: Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP ratio (Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A. and 
Levine, R., 2000, Financial institutions and markets across countries and over time: data and analysis, World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4943, May 2009). 
Bank deposits ratio: Deposits by deposit money banks to GDP ratio (Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A. and Levine, 
R., 2000, Financial institutions and markets across countries and over time: data and analysis, World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper No. 4943, May 2009).  
Financial openness: Defined as 2+KAOPEN, where KAOPEN is the Chinn-Ito Financial Openness Variable 
(Chinn and Ito, (2008), “A New Measure of Financial Openness”). This index takes on higher values for 
countries more open to cross-border capital transactions. KAOPEN utilizes four major categories of restrictions 
on external accounts: (1) the presence of multiple exchange rates; (2) restrictions on the current account 
transactions; (3) restrictions on the capital account transactions; (4) requirements for surrender of export 
proceeds. 
Aid: Ratio of foreign aid to Gross National Income (GNI). Aid includes both official development assistance 
(ODA) and official aid. Ratios are computed using values in U.S. dollars (World Development Indicators, 2009). 
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Government consumption: Ratio of government consumption divided by the GDP (World Development 
Indicators, 2009). 
Discretionary fiscal policy: Standard deviation of the residual component of the log difference of government 
consumption from an econometric model of the former over the log difference of GDP, with a time trend and 
inflation in a quadratic form (Fatas and Mihov, 2003). Current output growth was instrumented with two lags of 
GDP growth and lagged inflation. We included inflation to ensure that the results were not driven by high-
inflation episodes in which the co-movement between real government spending and output might be due to 
monetary instability rather than fiscal policy. Inflation squared was included to control for a possible nonlinear 
relationship between inflation and spending. The model was estimated for each country separately. 
GDP per capita growth instability: Standard deviation of GDP per capita growth rate estimated over 
nonoverlapping five-year periods (World Development Indicators, 2009). 
Inflation instability: Standard deviation of the consumer price index growth rate estimated over nonoverlapping 
five-year periods (World Development Indicators, 2009). 
NEER instability: Standard deviation of the nominal effective exchange rate index growth rate estimated over 
nonoverlapping five-year periods (World Development Indicators, 2009). 
Natural disasters: The reported measure of the total number of people affected by natural disasters. The number 
of people affected is divided by the total population in the year prior to the disaster year (Center for Research on 
the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT)). 
Agricultural instability: Standard deviation of the agricultural value added growth rate estimated over 
nonoverlapping five-year periods (World Development Indicators, 2009). 
Financial and systemic banking crisis: Two conditions needed to be met for a banking crisis to be considered 
systemic: (1) significant signs of financial distress in the banking system (as indicated by significant bank runs, 
losses in the banking system, and bank liquidations); and (2) significant banking policy intervention measures in 
response to significant losses in the banking system (liquidity support, bank restructuring, bank nationalizations, 
guarantees on liabilities, asset purchases, deposit freezes and bank holidays) (Laeven and Valencia, 2010). 
Financial and systemic banking crisis, Output losses: Computed as the cumulative sum of the differences 
between actual and trend real GDP over the period [T, T+3], expressed as a percentage of trend real GDP, where 
T the starting year of the crisis. Trend real GDP is computing by applying an HP filter (with λ=100) to the log of 
real GDP series over [T-20, T-1] (Laeven and Valencia, 2010). 
 94 
 
Chapter 3. Do remittances dampen the effects of natural disasters on output 
volatility? 
 
Chapter 3. Do remittances dampen the effects of natural disasters on the output growth volatility 
95 
 
3.1. Introduction 
The question of the costs of natural disasters becomes crucial following the fear about the 
consequences of the global warming which could amplify the occurrence of extreme climatic 
events particularly in the tropical zones (IPCC Report, 2007). These climatic events combined 
with geophysical disasters are a major concern in developing countries due to their lower 
degree of resilience to shocks (Kahn, 2005; Noy, 2009; Cuaresma, 2010). For instance, Naude 
(2010) using the CRED statistics, shows that Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia recorded 
between 1974 and 2003, the largest number of people affected by natural disasters. Natural 
disasters are shown to permanently and negatively affecting growth in developing countries 
through lower investments in education (Cuaresma, 2010) and by pushing households into 
poverty trap (Carter et al., 2007).  
According to some recent evidences (Haiti) and existing papers, natural disasters tend to 
significantly increase remittances, whereas foreign aid seems less sensitive to disaster shocks 
(Yang, 2008b; Mohapatra et al., 2009; David, 2010). Whether the altruistic response of 
migrants in the aftermath of natural disasters is generally observed, little is known about the 
effectiveness of remittances in the macroeconomic stabilization in this context. It’s worth 
noting that the increase in remittances after a disaster does not always imply a stabilizing 
impact. Indeed, remittances will be stabilizing if they react immediately to the shock. 
Moreover, the size of remittance inflows matters: excessive remittances could generate 
inflation and real exchange appreciation in a context of destroyed productive capacities. The 
dependence on remittances can also lead to the well-known problem of ‘Samaritan 
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dilemma’44: they might reduce the private demand for insurance and thereby they increase the 
costs of natural disasters.  
This paper is the first cross-country study, to our knowledge, quantifying the stabilizing role 
played by remittances in developing countries facing natural disasters. While previous studies 
in the literature have highlighted the role of some factors shaping the macroeconomic effects 
of disasters,45 it is surprising to see that remittances are omitted in the debate regarding the 
strategies available to cope with natural disaster shocks. Rather than focusing on the effects of 
natural disasters on economic growth, this paper examines their consequences on the volatility 
of economic growth. It therefore tests two hypotheses: (i) remittances on average dampen the 
destabilizing effect of natural disasters and (ii) beyond a given threshold the stabilizing role of 
remittances disappears. 
Two mechanisms through which the stabilizing effect of remittances holds can be pointed-
out: by providing a form of private insurance (ex post risk management strategy) and/or by 
promoting ex ante risk preparedness (ex ante risk management strategy). For the later case, 
several channels can be raised (Mohapatra et al., 2009). Remittances can favor the 
diversification of activities. They can affect the choice of the localization of the productive 
activities toward less prone disaster areas. They can also help finance the acquisition of new 
technologies more resistant to natural shocks (seeds, housing built of concrete …). 
Remittances could not only reduce the magnitude of natural disasters but also, for a given 
number of people affected, they lower the resulting output volatility. 
                                                 
44
 The literature on the ‘Samaritan dilemma’ in the context of natural disasters includes among others, Raschky 
and Weck-Hannemann (2007); Cavallo and Noy (2009) and Kunreuther and Pauly (2009). 
45
 See Noy (2009) on the discussion of the role of education, financial development, fiscal and trade policies, 
financial openness, and foreign reserves; Raschky (2008) for the role of domestic political institutions and 
Ramcharan (2007) for a discussion on the role of the exchange rate regime. 
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However, these stabilizing effects could be mitigated by the inflation generated by large 
remittance inflows and by the moral hazard effect that large remittance inflows can exert on 
recipient households (‘Samaritan dilemma’). 
These hypotheses are tested on a large sample of developing countries (113) observed over 
the period 1980-2007 and by using dynamic panel data estimators. The results highlight a 
positive and significant impact of natural disasters on output growth volatility. It appears that 
remittances dampen the marginal destabilizing effect of natural disasters. This effect is 
maximized for remittance ratios belonging to the interval 8% - 17 % of GDP. However, above 
this high threshold, remittance inflows reinforce the positive impact of disasters on 
macroeconomic instability. 
The remainder of the chapter is the following. Section 2 presents the econometric models, the 
data, the method and discusses the preliminary results. Section 3 checks the robustness of 
these results. Section 4 concludes. 
3.2. Econometric Specifications and Preliminary Results 
3.2.1. Models 
The following models are specified to test the impact of natural disasters conditional on the 
level of remittance inflows. 
The first model describes the impact of natural disasters on output growth volatility. 
 
ττττττ εηθβρσσ ,,1,1,, iiiiii uDX ++++′+= −        (1) 
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where τσ ,i  is the output per capita growth volatility, X the matrix of control variables and D 
the indicator of the magnitude of natural disasters occurred in each country. iu  represents the 
country fixed-effects and τη  the period dummies. i , τ  are respectively the country and the 
non-overlapping 5-year sub-period over 1980-2007.46 τε ,i  is the idiosyncratic error term. The 
hypothesis tested is that 01 >θ . 
The second model reports the stabilizing contribution of remittances on output. We follow the 
standard specifications by including remittances linearly (Bugamelli and Paternò, 2011; 
Chami et al., 2009): 
 
ττττ−ττ ε+η++θ+β′+ρσ=σ ,,2,1,, iiiiii uRX               (2) 
 
where R represents the remittance- to-GDP ratio. The hypothesis tested is that 02 <θ . 
The third model reports again the stabilizing contribution of remittances but controlling for 
the disaster variable. 
 
τττττ−ττ ε+η++θ+θ+β′+ρσ=σ ,,4,3,1,, iiiiiii uRDX    (3) 
 
The expected signs are 03 >θ  and 04 <θ . If remittances reduced the magnitude of the 
natural disasters, one would observe a decrease in absolute term, of the coefficient of 
remittances. More precisely, one would have: 24 θ<θ . Indeed, 2θ  captures the total 
stabilizing effect of remittances (their direct and indirect impacts on output growth volatility). 
                                                 
46
 The last sub-period is however defined over 3 years rather than 5 due to the lack of available data in the Penn 
World 6.3 dataset. 
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When the disaster variable is introduced besides remittances, the residual impact of 
remittances ( 4θ ) now measures only the direct effect that does not pass through the reduction 
of the magnitude of disasters. Furthermore we expect 3θ  > 1θ . This happens because 
remittances can generate countercyclical remittance inflows (Yang, 2008b; Mohapatra et al., 
2009; David, 2010). Controlling for remittances ensures that the impact of natural disasters 
does not include a stabilizing component due to a surge of countercyclical remittance inflows.  
Finally the fourth model catches the interaction between remittances and natural disasters.  
 
τττττττ−ττ ε+η++∗θ+θ+θ+β′+ρσ=σ ,,,7,6,5,1,, iiiiiiiii uRDRDX    (4) 
 
The main hypothesis tested is that the impact of natural disasters on output per capita growth 
volatility is less positive as the level of remittances increases. More precisely, we expect that 
05 >θ  and 07 <θ . No specific claim regarding the sign of  6θ , the impact of remittances 
without natural disasters, is formulated.  
Given that 5θ and 7θ  have opposite signs, a threshold level of remittances arises: 
7
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*R measures the minimum remittance ratio required for a full absorption of the effect of 
natural disasters.  
The lagged output per capita growth volatility is included to capture the inertia in the 
dependent variable (Yang, 2008a). The matrix of standard control variables includes the 
following variables. Trade openness would have a positive effect on output growth volatility 
given that trade openness can enhance sectorial specialization what increases the degree of 
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exposure to external shocks (Di Giovanni and Levchenko, 2009). Terms of trade volatility is 
also a potential candidate for enhancing macroeconomic instability. The government size may 
positively contribute to macroeconomic instability in developing countries (Bekaert et al. 
2006). Finally, as shown by Fatas and Mihov (2003), the discretionary fiscal policy is 
assumed to fuel output growth volatility. The term discretionary fiscal policy refers to 
changes in fiscal policy that do not represent reaction to economic conditions. 
3.2.2. Data and sample 
Following existing studies (Chami et al., 2008; Bugamelli and Paternò, 2011, Chami et al., 
2009), the dependent variable is computed as the standard deviation of the GDP per capita 
growth rate over each sub-period. GDP per capita growth rate is drawn from the Penn World 
Tables 6.3. The remaining variables are computed as 5-year averages over each sub-period.  
Natural disaster data are drawn from Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters 
(CRED), Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT).47 CRED defines a disaster as a natural 
situation or event which overwhelms local capacity, implying a request for external assistance 
(Noy, 2009; EM-DAT Glossary of terms).48 We consider all disaster events taken together 
within a country in a year rather than each of them examined separately. Indeed, it’s difficult 
to assume that the stabilizing role of remittances differs among types of disasters: what 
matters for the migrant is the magnitude of the disaster and not its type. The total number of 
people affected over the sub-period over the population at each of the beginning sub-period is 
                                                 
47
 The Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) has collected and made publically 
available data on the occurrence and effects of natural disasters from 1900 to the present with a worldwide 
coverage. The database is compiled from various sources, including UN agencies, non-governmental 
organizations, insurance companies, research institutions and press agencies. The EM-DAT data is publicly 
available on CRED's web site at: www.cred.be. 
48
 These disasters can be grouped into several categories, of which meteorological disasters (floods, wave surges, 
storms, droughts, landslides and avalanches), climatological disasters (disasters caused due to long run or 
seasonal climatic variability such as drought, extreme temperatures and wild fire) and geophysical disasters 
(earthquakes, tsunamis and volcanic eruptions).   
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used as a magnitude indicator.49 Two main arguments justify the choice for this variable 
(Loayza et al., 2009). Firstly, the measurement error associated with the proportion of people 
affected seems lower than that associated with a variable reporting the damage costs in US 
dollars. Secondly, the endogeneity concerns are more plausible with the damage costs which 
are closely related to macroeconomic instability and growth.50 
The remittance variable records current transfers to nonresidents by migrants who are 
employed in, and considered a resident of, the countries that host them. The variable is 
normalized by country initial GDP.51 Data are drawn from the IMF Balance of Payments 
Yearbook (various editions). 
Trade openness and government size are the ratios of exports and imports and government 
consumption to GDP, respectively (Penn World Table 6.3). The volatility of the terms of trade 
is the standard deviation of the terms of trade growth rate (World Economic Outlook, IMF). 
Discretionary fiscal policy is measured as the standard deviation of the residual component of 
the log difference of government consumption from an econometric model of the former over 
the log difference of GDP, a time trend and inflation in a quadratic form (Fatas and Mihov, 
2003). 52  
                                                 
49
 The sum of people affected and killed is also used as an indicator of the natural disaster magnitude and results 
remain the same. Tables are available upon request. 
50
 Output growth volatility can decrease the factors accumulation and therefore the mean growth rate (Ramey 
and Ramey, 1995). Hence, the damage costs which are proportional to the level of accumulation would be lower 
in countries with high macroeconomic volatility. 
51
 Dividing remittances by the level of GDP at each of the beginning of 5-year sub-period allows neutralizing the 
effects of natural disasters on the denominator.  
52
 We instrument for current output growth with two lags of GDP growth and lagged inflation. We include 
inflation to ensure that our results are not driven by high inflation episodes in which the co-movement between 
real government spending and output might be due to monetary instability rather than fiscal policy. Inflation 
squared is included to control for a possible nonlinear relationship between inflation and spending. The model is 
estimated for each country separately. 
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The sample comprises at most 113 developing countries and is unbalanced (for a maximum of 
observations stood at 403). The list of countries and descriptive statistics of all the variables 
used are presented in appendix. 
Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of unweighted regional averages of natural disasters 
(percentage of people affected), remittance ratio and the output growth volatility. It appears 
that the three regions mostly affected by natural disasters are East Asia and Pacific (EAP), 
South Asia (SA) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). In terms of remittance inflows, the top three 
recipients are Europe and Central Asia (ECA), the Middle East and North Africa region 
(MENA), and EAP. Finally in terms of output growth volatility, MENA, SSA, and ECA 
regions exhibit the highest levels of volatility over the entire period 1980-2007.  
Figure 3.2 presents preliminary elements suggesting the existence of a non-linear impact of 
natural disasters on output growth volatility conditional on the level of remittances. The 
sample is divided into two sub-samples around the median value of remittances (2% over the 
period). Two scatter plots are computed with the magnitude of natural disasters on the x-axis 
and the output growth volatility on the y-axis.53 Only the left hand panel (low level of 
remittances) shows a positive relationship between output growth volatility and natural 
disasters. This result justifies the econometric estimations aimed at testing the existence of a 
non-linear impact of disasters.  
3.2.3. Estimation method 
If remittances increase when the recipient economy experiences a strong output growth 
volatility, estimation of the remittance impact by the Ordinary Least Squares estimator (OLS) 
                                                 
53
 Output growth volatility and natural disasters are residuals derived from pooled regressions using five-year 
averages of these variables regressed on the same set of control variables (government consumption, trade 
openness, terms of trade shocks, discretionary fiscal policy). This gives adjusted measures of output growth 
volatility and natural disasters that are purged from any collinearity with standard output growth volatility 
determinants.  
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is biased. Moreover, the OLS estimator is inconsistent since the lagged dependent variable is 
introduced besides country fixed-effects. The System-GMM estimator must be implemented. 
The equations in levels and the equations in first differences are combined in a system and 
estimated with an extended System-GMM estimator which allows for the use of lagged 
differences and lagged levels of the explanatory variables as instruments (Blundell and Bond, 
1998).54 The GMM estimations control for the endogeneity of the remittances and other 
explanatory variables.55  
Two specification tests check the validity of the instruments. The first is the standard 
Sargan/Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions. The second test examines the hypothesis 
that there is no second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals. The 
diagnostic tests do not invalidate the quality of the instrumentation with the System-GMM 
framework.56  
3.2.4. Preliminary results 
Table 3.1 reports the results of the estimations of equations 1-4. The first column highlights a 
positive and significant impact of natural disasters on the output growth volatility. The 
dynamic specification is not rejected given the significant effect of the lagged output growth 
volatility. It also appears that terms of trade volatility, government consumption and the 
discretionary fiscal policy determine as expected, positively and significantly output growth 
volatility. Column 2 reveals a stabilizing effect of remittances on output. In column 3, both 
remittances and natural disasters are introduced. As expected, it appears that the destabilizing 
                                                 
54
 The paper uses the System-GMM estimator developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) for dynamic panel data 
with the Windmeijer (2005) correction for finite sample bias.  
55In all specifications, period dummies, terms of trade volatility, discretionary fiscal policy, trade openness and 
natural disasters are taken as strictly exogenous. Government size and the lagged dependent variable are 
predetermined while remittances and remittances crossed with natural disasters are taken as endogenous. 
56
 To deal with the well-known problem of instrument proliferation raised by the system-GMM estimator 
(Roodman, 2009), the matrix of instruments is collapsed and the number of lags is limited at 3. 
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effect of natural disasters increases slightly while the stabilizing effect of remittances is 
slightly lower.57  
In column 4, the interaction of natural disasters and remittances is included. As expected, its 
sign is negative and significant while the coefficient of natural disasters introduced additively 
remains positive and significant.58 However, the remittance coefficient is no longer significant 
when the model allows the interaction term. This can be explained by the fact the coefficient 
identifies the impact of remittances without natural disasters. In this situation the stabilizing 
impact appears less effective. 
The table shows the remittance level required for a full absorption of disaster shocks. It stands 
at 6% of GDP on average. This concerns 26% of countries over the entire period. 
3.3. Robustness Checks 
The robustness of the previous results is tested in three ways. Firstly, more control variables 
are added to the models. Secondly, alternative measures of disasters are used and thirdly, the 
threshold level of remittances that fully absorbs the impact of disasters is endogenously 
determined by a non-linear recursive System-GMM method. 
3.3.1. Adding more control variables 
Several control variables are added to the analysis to reduce the omitted variable bias. The 
initial level of population (drawn from the World Bank Tables) is introduced because small 
countries are those that receive more remittance over GDP and are those with a weak ability 
of risk sharing. Financial openness is also introduced to ensure that the stabilizing effect of 
                                                 
57
 It also emerges that trade openness variable has a positive and significant impact in this specification. 
58
 Table 3.1 also shows the joint significant test probability associated with the natural disaster coefficients. The 
null hypothesis that they are not significant is rejected. 
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remittances doesn’t reflect the adjustment through financial openness.59 Two indicators of 
financial openness are tested. The first one is the sum of assets and liabilities over GDP drawn 
from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) and the second one is the index computed by Chinn and 
Ito (2008).The initial level of development is included because poor countries are often those 
characterized by a high level of macroeconomic volatility, and by the same time are those 
which receive large inflows of remittances.  
Financial development is included to ensure that the effect of remittances is not driven by the 
correlation between financial development and remittances. Indeed, there are now some 
evidences that remittances are positively correlated with the level of financial development in 
the receiving countries given that a high level of financial development decreases the 
transaction costs associated with the transfers of money (Freund and Spatafora, 2008). The 
level of financial development is defined as the ratio of deposit money banks credit to the 
private sector divided by country GDP (World Bank Tables).   
Finally, foreign aid-to-GDP ratio is added to ensure that the results are not driven by the 
positive correlation between foreign aid and remittances in poor countries. Foreign aid data 
are drawn from the World Bank Tables. 
Table 3.2 resumes the results obtained. It appears that whatever the control variables 
introduced, the non-linear effect of natural disasters conditional on the level of remittance 
inflows always holds. Moreover, the threshold level of remittances required for a full 
absorption of the disaster shocks stays around 6% in all the specifications. The results also 
indicate that the control variables introduced do not add something new to the analysis in the 
extent to which they are generally not statistically significant. This validates the choice of the 
basic determinants of output growth volatility retained early. 
                                                 
59
 Indeed, remittance inflows might be determined by financial openness through the reduction of transaction 
costs. 
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3.3.2. Alternative measures of disasters 
Two alternative measures of the percentage of people affected are tested. The first measure 
allows giving more weights to the last observations inside each of the 5-year sub-periods. 
Giving more weights to last observations ensures that the impact of the disaster is not altered 
or attenuated by macroeconomic adjustments that follow the disaster events in each of the 
sub-periods. The results obtained by this exercise would be therefore interpreted as the upper 
bound estimates of the impact of natural disasters on output growth volatility. The following 
formula is used to weight the observations of disasters: 
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where t is a time trend defined in each sub-period, np the number of people affected at each 
year and pop the population size.  
The second measure that we use for natural disasters is the logarithmic transformation of the 
original values of disasters. Following Loayza et al., (2009) the logarithmic transformation of 
the disaster variable helps dealing with the positively skewed distribution of the disaster 
measure as well as the bias due to extreme values. The following log transformation is applied 
to the data: 
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Table 3.3 reports the results obtained. The first three columns present the results obtained 
with the weighted measure of disasters. The positive and significant impact of natural 
disasters on output growth volatility still remains and appears much higher than that obtained 
in Table 3.1. In column 3.3, the result that remittance inflows dampen the effects of natural 
disasters on output growth volatility is confirmed again through the negative sign taken by the 
coefficient of the interactive term. 
The last three columns of Table 3.3 describe the results obtained with the log transformation 
of natural disasters. Again, the same story holds. Natural disasters are positively and 
significantly associated with macroeconomic volatility (columns 3.4 and 3.5). In column 3.6, 
the coefficient of the interactive term remains negative and statistically significant. 
3.3.3. Endogenous determination of the remittance threshold 
An alternative model to test the non linearity is implemented with rolling estimations for 
different values taken by the ratio of remittances. A dummy variable Rd  in interaction with 
the disaster variable is specified. Rd  is equal to 1 if the country has a value of remittance ratio 
greater than *R  and 0 otherwise. This methodology for threshold determination in the case of 
endogenous regressors in a System-GMM framework has been previously implemented by 
Masten et al. (2008).60 The following equation is specified: 
ττττττ−ττ ε+η++∗θ+θ+θ+β′+ρσ=σ ,,10,9,8,1,, iiRiiiiii udDRDX      (5) 
             with [ ]*=
,
RRd iR ≥τ1   
 
                                                 
60
 Another approach might consist in an estimation using the Hansen methodology and assuming that the 
threshold variable is exogenous. However, in our case the remittance ratio is not considered as strictly 
exogenous. 
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The top 5% and bottom 5% of the observations of the remittance ratio are dropped to ensure a 
feasible identification of the threshold. Remittance thresholds by increments of 0.5 percent are 
explored. Each equation corresponding to a different threshold is estimated by the System-
GMM method. The optimal threshold is the one which maximizes the over identification 
Hansen test p-value. Testing nonlinear effect refers simply to the test of the null hypothesis 
that the coefficient on the interactive variable 10θ  is equal to zero.  
The optimal cutoff which maximizes the Hansen test p-value is a level of remittance ratio 
equal to 8% GDP. Only 18% of the countries are concerned by this threshold (compared to 
26% in the previous results). 
The corresponding estimation is shown in Table 3.4 column [4.1]. All the diagnostic tests 
associated with the System-GMM estimator validate the specification. The Table reports a 
significant and negative impact of the interactive term and a positive and significant effect of 
the additive term of natural disasters. This uncovers the existence of two regimes. The first 
regime characterized by low amount of remittance (under 8%) and a high level of marginal 
impact of natural disasters. The second regime is characterized by lower marginal impact of 
natural disasters.61  
If we take two countries in the first regime (remittances less than 8% of GDP), one without 
experiencing a disaster and the second with the median value of natural disasters (2% of 
people affected), the predicted output growth volatility gap between the two countries is 
0.32% (2*0.16) which represents 11% of the median value of the output growth volatility of 
the sample (2.90%). In the second regime, the same increase of natural disasters doesn’t affect 
                                                 
61
 Indeed, the sum of the two coefficients associated with the disaster variable remains positive (0.163 - 0.159 = 
0.004) and statistically equals to 0 (the corresponding p-value of the restriction stands at 0.88). 
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the output growth volatility given the zero marginal impact estimated. Therefore, remittances 
induce a stabilizing gain of 11% between the two regimes. 
Another question that can be raised following these results concerns the permanent stabilizing 
impact of remittances above 8% of GDP.  
Indeed, a recent strand of the literature highlights that remittances can fuel macroeconomic 
instability for high levels of the ratio (Chami et al., 2009). The well-known ‘transfer problem’ 
is straightened when natural disaster shocks strongly destroy the productive capacity and at 
the same time, large remittance inflows increase domestic demand and then inflation and real 
exchange rate.  
Knowing the previous threshold of remittances at 8%, the same estimation method is 
implemented to identify a second structural break above 8%. The following equation is 
estimated: 
 τττττττ−ττ ε+η++∗θ+∗θ+θ+θ+β′+ρσ=σ ,,14,13,12,11,1,, iiRUiRLiiiiii udDdDRDX  (6) 
              with [ ]*%8=
,
RRd iR
L <≤ τ1  and [ ]*= , RRd iRU ≥τ1  
 
Results are reported in column [4.2] in Table 3.4. 11θ  identifies the marginal impact of natural 
disasters for remittance ratio below 8%. The estimated value stands at 0.187. 1311 θ+θ  
measures the marginal impact of natural disasters when remittances are comprised between 
8% and the new optimal threshold estimated at 17%. The value obtained of the impact is 
0.187-0.185 = 0.02 and is not statistically different from zero. This result suggests that 
remittances are fully stabilizing for 14 countries inside this interval. But when the flows 
exceed 17%, the marginal destabilizing impact of disasters is enhanced 
( 509.0322.0187.01411 =+=θ+θ ). This concerns only 6 countries in the sample.  
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3.4. Concluding remarks 
This chapter showed the macroeconomic stabilizing effect of remittances in countries affected 
by natural disasters, in the majority of cases. However, large remittance inflows contributed to 
increase the output volatility induced by natural disasters, but for few numbers of countries (6 
over 113).  
The first policy implication is that emergency measures undertaken in the aftermath of natural 
disasters should restore the financial networks through which remittances transit when these 
networks have been disrupted. The second implication is that policymakers should be aware 
that very large remittance inflows could be a major macroeconomic problem which requires 
some adjustment policies even in the aftermath of natural disasters. For the medium term, 
policies aimed at promoting the investment of remittances into productive uses that are more 
resilient to shocks must be encouraged. 
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Figure 3.1. Distribution of natural disasters, remittances and output per capita growth volatility 
over regions (1980-2007). 
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Figure 3.2. Output growth volatility and natural disasters 
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Table 3.1: Remittances, people affected and output growth volatility. 
Period 1980-2007 
Unit of observation: Non-overlapping 5-year averages 
 [1.1] [1.2] [1.3] [1.4] 
     
People affected (%) 0.013*  0.015* 0.065** 
 1.79  1.91 2.21 
People affected * Remittances    -0.011** 
    1.97 
Remittances (%GDP)  -0.167** -0.144* 0.206 
  2.05 1.73 1.26 
Output growth volatility (t-1) 0.155** 0.156** 0.155** 0.084 
 2.24 2.09 2.01 1.23 
Trade openness 0.006 0.020 0.011** 0.001 
 0.86 1.01 2.52 0.06 
Terms of trade volatility 0.062*** 0.069*** 0.067*** 0.065*** 
 3.94 5.32 5.87 4.03 
Government consumption (%GDP) 0.203** 0.054** 0.061*** 0.312*** 
 2.38 1.99 2.63 2.64 
Discretionary fiscal policy 0.091** 0.084*** 0.083** 0.086*** 
 2.04 2.59 2.39 2.65 
Intercept -2.836* -0.090 0.191 -5.150** 
 1.66 0.07 0.26 2.14 
No observations 402 403 402 402 
No countries 113 113 113 113 
P-value of joint significance of disaster coefficients    0.084 
Remittance threshold for full stabilization    6 % 
Countries concerned    30 
Percentage of countries    26 % 
First order serial correlation p-value 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.005 
Second order serial correlation p-value 0.063 0.185 0.192 0.211 
Hansen OID test p-value 0.405 0.593 0.393 0.690 
No instruments 20 17 17 25 
Note: The estimation method is two-step System GMM with Windmeijer (2005) small sample robust correction. Time effects are included 
in all the regressions. t-statistics are below the coefficients. Volatility measures are the five-year standard deviation of the growth rate of the 
corresponding variables. Dependent variable: Standard-deviation of output per capita growth rate. *** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1 
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Table 3.2. Natural disasters, remittances and output growth volatility: More controls 
Period 1980-2007 
Unit of observation: Non-overlapping 5-year averages 
 [2.1] [2.2] [2.3] [2.4] [2.5] [2.6] [2.7] 
        
People affected (%) 0.063* 0.057* 0.063** 0.056** 0.072** 0.060** 0.072** 
 1.93 1.94 2.15 2.10 1.96 2.17 2.05 
People affected * Remittances -0.011* -0.011* -0.011* -0.009* -0.012* -0.010* -0.012* 
 1.77 1.75 1.93 1.80 1.66 1.79 1.73 
Remittances (%GDP) 0.187 0.153 0.209 0.194 0.187 0.145 0.199 
 0.99 0.85 1.33 1.19 1.01 1.05 1.05 
Output growth volatility (t-1) 0.080 0.058 0.103 0.089 0.070 0.055 0.072 
 1.14 0.91 1.47 1.32 0.92 0.74 0.98 
Trade openness 0.012 -0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 
 1.33 0.02 0.13 0.15 0.06 0.15 0.00 
Terms of trade volatility 0.067*** 0.075*** 0.064*** 0.062*** 0.073*** 0.070*** 0.072*** 
 4.36 6.16 4.07 3.75 4.02 4.11 3.82 
Government consumption (%GDP) 0.318*** 0.240*** 0.343*** 0.328*** 0.273** 0.246 0.267** 
 2.59 2.76 2.76 2.88 2.30 1.57 2.29 
Discretionary fiscal policy 0.089** 0.098*** 0.088*** 0.081** 0.107*** 0.091*** 0.105*** 
 2.51 3.03 2.72 2.39 2.76 2.96 2.69 
Initial level of population (log) 0.353       
 1.52       
Financial development  0.022      
  1.59      
Financial openness (L and M-F)   -0.005   -0.002  
   1.49   0.46  
Financial openness (C and I)    -0.115   -0.139 
    0.48   0.55 
Foreign aid (% GDP)     -0.033 0.067 -0.033 
     0.47 0.67 0.52 
Initial GDP per capita (log)     0.807 1.456* 0.807 
     1.23 1.76 1.23 
Intercept -11.567* -4.308** -5.381** -5.242** -10.390* -15.479* -10.213 
 1.91 2.21 2.29 2.25 1.68 1.87 1.64 
No observations 402 397 399 399 395 392 392 
No countries 113 112 112 113 112 111 112 
P-value of joint significance of disaster coefficients 0.153 0.147 0.096 0.098 0.113 0.082 0.086 
Remittance threshold for full stabilization 6% 5% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 
Countries concerned 31 33 31 28 30 28 30 
Percentage of countries 27% 29% 28% 25% 28% 25% 27% 
First order serial correlation p-value 0.007 0.006 0.008 0.006 0.004 0.010 0.004 
Second order serial correlation p-value 0.210 0.203 0.217 0.223 0.212 0.174 0.222 
Hansen OID test p-value 0.598 0.795 0.696 0.711 0.857 0.746 0.864 
No instruments 27 29 27 27 27 31 28 
Note: The estimation method is two-step system GMM with Windmeijer (2005) small sample robust correction. Time effects are included in all the regressions. t-statistics are below the 
coefficients. Volatility measures are the five-year standard deviation of the growth rate of the corresponding variables. Dependent variable: Standard-deviation of output per capita growth 
rate. *** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1 
 
Chapter 3. Do remittances dampen the effects of natural disasters on the output growth volatility 
118 
 
Table 3.3. Alternative measures of disasters   
Period 1980-2007 
Unit of observations: Non-overlapping 5-year averages 
 [3.1] [3.2] [3.3] [3.4] [3.5] [3.6] 
       
People affected (%), weighted 0.023* 0.030* 0.085**    
 1.68 1.88 2.35    
People affected * Remittances   -0.028*    
   1.89    
log (1+People affected ratio)    1.728* 1.964* 7.198** 
    1.68 1.77 2.13 
log (1+ People affected)* Remittances      -1.169* 
      1.73 
Remittances (% GDP)  -0.138* 0.155  -0.145* 0.182 
  1.67 1.58  1.74 1.52 
Output growth volatility (t-1) 0.154** 0.153** 0.197** 0.157** 0.155** 0.121* 
 2.48 1.98 2.29 2.29 2.01 1.81 
Trade openness -0.013 0.011** -0.003 0.005 0.011** -0.002 
 0.66 2.55 0.27 0.80 2.56 0.22 
Terms of trade volatility 0.061*** 0.065*** 0.045*** 0.061*** 0.067*** 0.057*** 
 3.13 5.71 2.79 3.95 5.91 3.25 
Government consumption (% GDP) 0.171** 0.059*** 0.276** 0.220*** 0.061*** 0.342** 
 2.08 2.62 2.14 2.60 2.62 2.42 
Discretionary fiscal policy 0.096** 0.082** 0.078** 0.091** 0.083** 0.088*** 
 2.25 2.38 2.28 2.01 2.39 2.88 
Intercept -1.150 0.253 -4.211* -3.177* 0.175 -5.690** 
 0.46 0.35 1.65 1.88 0.24 2.13 
No observations 402 402 402 402 402 402 
No countries 113 113 113 113 113 113 
P-value of joint significance of disaster coefficients 
  0.055   0.089 
Remittance threshold for full stabilization   3%   6% 
Countries concerned   49   28 
Percentage of countries   43%   25% 
First order serial correlation p-value 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.004 
Second order serial correlation p-value 0.064 0.198 0.226 0.064 0.191 0.218 
Hansen OID test p-value 0.468 0.403 0.739 0.314 0.387 0.773 
No instruments 25 17 23 19 17 24 
Note: The estimation method is two-step system GMM with Windmeijer (2005) small sample robust correction. Time effects are 
included in all the regressions. t-statistics are below the coefficients. Volatility measures are the five-year standard deviation of the 
growth rate of the corresponding variables. Dependent variable: Standard-deviation of output per capita growth rate. *** 
p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1 
 
Chapter 3. Do remittances dampen the effects of natural disasters on the output growth volatility 
119 
 
Table 3.4: Threshold levels of remittances: Non-linear system-GMM analysis  
Period 1980-2007 
Unit of observation: Non-overlapping 5-year averages 
 [4.1] [4.2] 
   
People affected (%) 0.163** 0.187* 
 2.51 1.83 
People affected * dR=1[R≥8%] -0.159**  
 2.40  
People affected * dR=1[8%≤R<17%]  -0.185* 
  1.71 
People affected * dR=1[R≥17%]  0.322* 
  1.68 
Remittances (%GDP) 0.146 -0.487 
 1.36 1.43 
Output growth volatility (t-1) 0.197** 0.085 
 2.12 0.92 
Trade openness -0.010 -0.000 
 0.76 0.01 
Terms of trade volatility 0.053*** 0.047*** 
 3.97 2.89 
Government consumption (%GDP) 0.348* 0.170 
 1.81 0.85 
Discretionary fiscal policy 0.103*** 0.110*** 
 3.63 3.77 
Intercept -6.995* -1.613 
 1.77 0.41 
No observations 402 402 
No countries 113 113 
P-value of joint significance of disaster coefficients 0.042 0.100 
Countries concerned for R≥8% 20  
Countries concerned for R≥17%  6 
First order serial correlation p-value 0.026 0.020 
Second order serial correlation p-value 0.145 0.119 
Hansen OID test p-value 0.933 0.639 
No instruments 24 23 
Note: The estimation method is two-step system GMM with Windmeijer (2005) small sample robust 
correction. Time effects are included in all the regressions. t-statistics are below the coefficients. 
Volatility measures are the five-year standard deviation of the growth rate of the corresponding variables. 
Dependent variable: Standard-deviation of output per capita growth rate. *** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* 
p<0.1 
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Appendix C: Descriptive statistics and list of countries in the sample 
Table C1 : Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
GDP per capita growth volatility 765 4.99 4.87 0.15 41.44 
People affected (% initial population) 698 8.76 18.12 0 159.14 
log (1+ people affected/initial population) 698 0.07 0.14 0 0.95 
Weighted measure of people affected (%) 698 3.62 9.53 0 110.71 
Remittance-to-initial GDP ratio (%) 430 5.23 8.26 0 89.30 
Trade openness 780 79.54 41.69 1.75 266.42 
Terms of trade growth volatility 691 11.58 13.62 0 176.79 
Government consumption-to-GDP ratio (%) 780 22.31 12.17 3.38 72.30 
Discretionary fiscal policy 760 11.01 13.31 0.03 155.92 
Aid-to-GDP ratio (%) 607 11.07 14.07 -0.20 86.72 
log (initial real GDP per capita) 643 8.08 0.88 5.08 10.15 
Assets and Liabilities-to-GDP ratio (%) 708 142.91 147.57 13.09 1908.76 
Chinn-Ito index 714 1.64 1.30 0.17 4.50 
log (initial level of population)  698 15.42 2.07 9.50 20.98 
Financial development 701 28.47 24.67 0.95 191.83 
 
Table C2 : List of countries in the sample (113) 
Albania Chile Guinea Macedonia Paraguay Syria 
Algeria China Guinea-Bissau Madagascar Peru Tajikistan 
Angola Colombia Guyana Malawi Philippines Tanzania 
Argentina Comoros Haiti Malaysia Poland Togo 
Azerbaijan Congo, Rep. Honduras Mali Romania Tunisia 
Bangladesh Costa Rica India Mauritania Russia Turkey 
Belize Cote d'Ivoire Indonesia Mauritius Rwanda Uganda 
Benin Djibouti Iran Mexico Sao Tome and Principe Ukraine 
Bolivia Dominica Jamaica Moldova Senegal Uruguay 
Bosnia and Herz. Dominican Rep. Jordan Mongolia Seychelles Vanuatu 
Botswana Ecuador Kazakhstan Morocco Sierra Leone Venezuela 
Brazil Egypt Kenya Mozambique Solomon Islands Yemen 
Bulgaria El Salvador Kiribati Namibia South Africa Zambia 
Burkina Faso Ethiopia Kyrgyz  Nepal Sri Lanka  
Burundi Gabon Lao PDR Nicaragua St. Kitts and Nevis 
Cambodia Gambia Latvia Niger St. Lucia  
Cameroon Georgia Lebanon Nigeria St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
Cape Verde Ghana Lesotho Pakistan Sudan  
Central African Rep. Grenada Libya Panama Suriname  
Chad Guatemala Lithuania Papua New Guinea Swaziland  
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 A version of this chapter is forthcoming at Louvain Economic Review 
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4.1. Introduction 
Several arguments are evoked to explain the positive impact of trade openness on government 
size. Firstly, external openness increases the risks of macroeconomic volatility in small open 
economies (Easterly et al., 2000; di Giovanni and Levchenko, 2009). Governments react to 
this by increasing the share of the public sector to insulate the economy against the external 
shocks (Rodrik, 1998). Secondly, external openness increases the government size through 
the ‘voracity effect’. This effect happens when an increase in the commodity price that a 
country exports leads to a more than proportional increase in the government spending 
(Tornell and Lane, 1999). Collier and Gunning (1999) seek to explain this effect by two 
factors: firstly, asymmetrical effects on fiscal policy of errors of optimism and pessimisms in 
the case of specific shock do matter. Secondly, the free-riding behaviors observed among the 
different ministries for attracting the resources generated by the positive external shocks can 
play a role. Talvi and Vegh (2005) conclude that political pressures in open economies lower 
the efforts for tax revenue mobilization, increase the level of government spending and 
therefore, aggravate the fiscal deficit. Combes and Saadi-Sedik (2006) showed that the 
positive effect of trade openness on fiscal deficit is generally observed in the case of natural 
trade openness (openness only due to structural factors) rather than in the case of trade-
oriented policies.  
Dreher et al. (2008) using a broadly measure of economic globalization conclude that the 
economic globalization does not influence government expenditures in a notable way. On the 
one hand, integration to the world economy can induce a welfare-state retrenchment in order 
to put the budget on the sustainable path and to build credibility (‘discipline effect’). On the 
other hand, this globalization-induced welfare state retrenchment is potentially mitigated by 
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citizens’ preferences to be compensated for the risks of globalization (‘compensation 
hypothesis ’). 
Although the analysis of the relationship between the globalization and fiscal policy has been 
extensively studied, it is worth noting that little is said about the potential effect of another 
dimension of economic globalization that takes a crucial importance nowadays. Migrant 
remittances (the money sent back at home by international migrants) generated by large 
migration waves represent a large and stable source of external development finance received 
by developing countries (Ratha, 2005). According to the World Bank, remittances have 
exceeded 300 billion of US dollars in 2008 and they represent today more than the double of 
foreign aid. While many studies have examined the macroeconomic effects of remittances on 
the macroeconomic volatility (Bugamelli and Paternò, 2011; Chami et al., 2009b), on growth 
(Pradhan et al., 2008; Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009; Catrinescu et al., 2009; Chami et al., 
2009a) and competitiveness (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2004; Acosta et al., 2009), few 
studies have investigated their effects on fiscal policy. Some papers included analyses of the 
impacts of remittances on debt sustainability (Abdih et al., 2009) on fiscal revenue (Chami et 
al., 2008) and two papers focused on the effect of remittances on government spending. Kapur 
and Singer (2006) showed that remittance inflows tend to reduce government consumption in 
developing countries and pointed-out the validation of the substitution effect between the 
private insurance provided by remittances and the public insurance initially provided by 
government spending. Shabbaz et al. (2008) found the same result for the case of Pakistan.  
This paper enters this new literature on the consequences of remittances on the public policy 
in the receiving economies. The hypothesis that remittances modify the relationship between 
openness to trade and government size is tested. Indeed, if remittances are relatively 
countercyclical (as it has been recently shown by Frankel, 2011) or stable over time, they can 
provide a form of private insurance against various types of external shocks and hence 
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increase the welfare-state retrenchment in developing countries. Government could therefore 
reduce their role of insurer of last resort when countries receive stabilizing remittance inflows.  
The paper revisits the Rodrik’s (1998) hypothesis that more open economies have large 
government size. The paper proposes a theoretical discussion and an econometric test to show 
the magnitude with which remittances modify the elasticity of government consumption with 
respect to trade openness. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical model of the 
relationship between external risk, remittances and government spending. It appears that the 
equilibrium solution with remittances is characterized by a relatively lower level of 
government spending compared to a situation without remittances. In section 3, the 
countercyclicality of remittance inflows is measured by computing panel-data coefficients of 
the cyclicality of remittances vis-à-vis the real GDP cycle. We use the local Gaussian 
weighted ordinarily least squares (hereafter LGWOLS) to compute time-varying coefficients 
of remittance cyclicality for each countries in the sample. The results highlight a surge in the 
remittance countercyclicality during the 1990s and a significant and robust effect of trade 
openness on the countercyclicality of remittances. In section 4, the empirical test of the 
contribution of remittance inflows on the marginal impact of trade openness on government 
spending is proposed. Using a large sample of developing countries, and after factoring in the 
endogeneity of openness and remittances, the results indicate a decreasing marginal 
contribution of trade openness to government spending as the level of remittance inflows 
increases. In section 5, the predicted coefficients of remittance cyclicality derived from the 
LGWOLS method are used to test the hypothesis that countercyclical remittances help 
decrease the impact of trade openness on government size. Section 6 concludes on policy 
implications. 
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4.2. A simple theoretical model of remittances, external risk and 
government size 
The departure point for this theoretical analysis is Rodrik (1998). He showed how openness to 
trade increases the insurance role played by the governments through public spending. His 
model is amended here to include remittances.  
4.2.1. The no-remittance case 
We consider an economy which exports a fix quantity of good x and produces two other 
goods: a good supplied by the public sector and a similar good supplied by the private sector. 
The total labor endowment is normalized at 1 with λ  the share of labor employed in the 
public sector and λ−1  the remaining share in the private sector. Denotes pi  the export price 
expressed in terms of quantity of imports. pi  is therefore the index of terms of trade and is a 
random variable with a mean mpi  and a variance 
2σ . The tradable good x is not consumed 
domestically and the foreign good is not produced at home. Hence, the trade balance is always 
at its equilibrium and the economy imports the quantity xpi . These imports are the inputs for 
the private sector in the production of the ‘private good’. The production function in the 
private sector is supposed linear in the labor and is written as follows: 
( )λpi −= 1xf                                                    (1) 
The supply function in the public sector is given by ( )λh  with 0>′h  and 0<′′h . The 
Government determines the size of the public sector before the realization of pi . Moreover, 
the goods produced by the public and the private sectors are substitute in the consumption63 
                                                 
63
 Indeed, households can arbitrate between the public and the private sector for the choice of services such as 
security, school, energy, health care facilities … (see Abdih et al., 2008).  
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and the Government’s problem consists of the maximization of the utility of a representative 
agent: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]λpiλλλ −+≡ 1max xhuEV                      (2) 
with ( )•u , the utility function of the representative agent, ( ) 0>•′u  and ( ) 0<•′′u . 
Following a second-order Taylor’s approximation of ( )λV  around mpi , we obtain the 
following expression:  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) 22211
2
11 σλλpiλλpiλλ xxhuxhuV mm −−+′′+−+=                   (3) 
It appears that the expected utility of the representative agent decreases with openness and the 
variance of terms of trade. The first order condition with respect to λ leads to: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) 011
2
1 22222
=•′′−−−′



•′′′−+•′ uxxhuxu m λσpiλλσ                   (4) 
When the agent is prudent ( )( )0>•′′′u , the term in the brackets is always positive and given 
that ( ) 0>′ λh , we conclude that the optimal size of the public sector rises with the risk 
associated with trade openness 22σx . Indeed, if we consider two situations, one in which the 
external risk is null ( )022 == xR σ  and the other case in which the external risk is strictly 
positive ( )022 >xσ , we get the following results: 
Case 1: 0=R  and ( ) xh mpiλ =′ 1  
Case 2: 0>R  and ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )•′′′−+•′
•′′−
+=′
uxu
ux
xh m
2
2
22
2
22
2
1
2
1
1
λσ
λσ
piλ  
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Knowing that  ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
0
1
2
1
1
2
2
22
2
22
<
•′′′−+•′
•′′−
uxu
ux
λσ
λσ
 since ( ) 0<•′′u , we get the following equality: 
( ) ( )12 λλ hh ′<′ . 
Given the concave nature of the function h, we can conclude that 12 λλ > . In other terms, the 
size of the public sector is higher in the case of existing external risk than in the case without 
an external risk. 
4.2.2. The remittance case 
Suppose now that the representative agent can receive remittances from abroad ( )pir  and that 
they move countercyclically. More precisely, suppose that remittance inflows are 
countercyclical vis-à-vis the terms of trade: ( ) 0<′ pir   et ( ) 0>′′ pir .64 The expected utility 
function is re-written as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]piλpiλλ rxhuEW +−+≡ 1                              (5) 
Using a second order Taylor’s approximation of ( )λW  around mpi , we obtain : 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )mm rxhuW piλpiλλ +−+= 1  
                      ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )mmm rxhurx piλpiλpiλσ +−+′′′+−+ 112
1 22
        (6) 
                                                 
64
 Indeed, remittances are more likely to react to the consequences that the terms of trade can exert on the agent’s 
income rather than to terms of trade shocks themselves. The idea that remittances react to terms of trade shocks 
is basically a simplification in the theoretical model which is coherent with the empirical analysis that will be 
performed in Section 3. More precisely, in section 3, coefficients of remittance cyclicality are derived from the 
LGWOLS method in which remittance cycle is regressed on real GDP cycle instrumented by the terms of trade 
shocks. This is therefore close to the assumption raised in this theoretical model.  
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When the expression (6) is compared with (3), it can be observed that remittances dampen the 
impact of the external risk on the agent’s utility.65 The first-order condition with respect to λ  
gives: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 011
2
1 222
=•′′′+−−−′



•′′′′+−+•′ urxxxhurxu mmm piλσpiλpiλσ         (7) 
From the equation (7), the optimal size of the public sector in the case of existing external risk 
( )022 >xσ  and remittance inflows, is determined by the following equality: 
Case 3 : 0>R , 0>r ,  and ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )•′′′′+−+•′
•′′′+−
+=′
urxu
urxx
xh
m
m
m
2
3
2
3
2
3
1
2
1
1
piλσ
piλσ
piλ  
Knowing that ( ) 0<′ mr pi , we have : ( ) ( )23 λλ hh ′>′ .66 What leads to 23 λλ < . 
The following result holds: The size of the public sector is lower in a small open economy 
which receives countercyclical remittances compared to the zero-remittance case. The fiscal 
retrenchment due to remittances is measured as: 023 <− λλ . 
This prediction has important policy implications insofar as it enters the dilemma that 
characterizes developing countries: integrating the global economy to take advantage of the 
gain of the globalization, providing social safety nets and insuring against the vagaries of 
globalization and at the same time, reducing the size of the public sector through fiscal 
consolidations. This ‘impossible trinity’ (fiscal consolidation, macroeconomic insurance 
through government spending and globalization) is broken-down if we consider that 
households can receive remittance inflows from abroad. By providing a form of private 
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 Remember that ( ) 0<′ pir  et ( ) 0>′′ pir  
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insurance they can therefore reduce the role of insurer of last resort that the governments play 
in small open economies.  
The next section tests empirically the countercyclicality of remittance inflows in a large 
sample of developing countries. 
4.3. Time-varying measure of remittance cyclicality  
This section is devoted to the measure of the time-varying cyclicality of remittances and to 
assess the impact of external openness on it. The hypothesis tested is that external openness is 
associated with more countercyclical remittances because the later compensates for the risks 
associated with the former.  
4.3.1. The cyclicality of remittance in the literature 
The empirical literature analyzing the cyclical properties of remittances consists of an 
evaluation of the cyclicality of remittances with respect to GDP cycle. The results are 
however mixed. For some authors, remittance inflows react countercyclically vis-à-vis the 
real GDP cycle (see Sayan, 2006 for the case of the low and lower middle income countries). 
Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz (2007) however concluded that remittances are procyclical with 
respect to the business cycle in Sri Lanka. Acosta et al. (2008) showed that the 
countercyclicality of remittances appears to increase with income, being highest among 
upper-middle income countries. This result is close to the one of Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz 
(2009) who found that remittances were more procyclical in countries with shallower 
financial systems. Neagu and Schiff (2009) addressed the question of the cyclicality of 
remittances and found that remittances are pro-cyclical in 65% of cases in the period 1980-
2007 on the basis of 116 developing countries. Finally, Gupta et al. (2009) showed that 
remittance de-trended inflows for Sub-Saharan Africa are positively correlated with GDP 
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growth during the period 1980-1995 but remittances appear countercyclical with respect to 
GDP growth during the last decade. 
4.3.2. How to compute time-varying country-specific indicators of cyclicality?  
All previous studies analyzing the cyclicality of remittances vis-à-vis the GDP have derived 
one single coefficient of the cyclicality of remittances for countries or for regions over the 
time. This constitutes a clear limitation insofar as the cyclicality of remittances is not 
necessary an invariant phenomenon. The cyclicality of remittances could vary for example in 
one country if the synchronicity of the business cycles of the receiving and the source 
countries varies over the time. The cyclicality may also be different among various stages of 
migration. Indeed, one could expect more countercyclical remittances at the beginning of the 
migration history and procyclical ones afterwards. This happens when remittances are 
primarily used for consumption purposes in the first stage and used for investment in the later 
stage.  
Another difference between our study and the previous ones is that the coefficients of the 
cyclicality of remittances vis-à-vis the GDP are identified by resorting to an instrumental 
variable strategy. This is justified by the fact that remittance inflows could react to the 
business cycle in the receiving country but also, remittances could affect the economic 
activity (GDP growth) at home as it has been shown in the literature (Pradhan et al. 2008; 
Catrinescu et al., 2009; Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009). This reverse causality could induce 
a bias in the estimation of the cyclicality of remittances.  
The GDP cycle is therefore instrumented by three variables which constitute plausible 
exclusion restrictions: the one-year lagged value of the GDP cycle, one-year lagged value of 
the domestic investment rate and contemporaneous terms of trade growth rate. Several 
arguments can be evoked to justify the choice of these variables. Firstly, the lagged values of 
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GDP cycle and investment rate would be correlated with the contemporaneous business cycle 
but not necessarily with remittances of the current period. Secondly, the terms of trade shocks 
have been highlighted as among the major determinants of GDP shocks in developing 
countries (Mendoza, 1997; Bleaney and Greenaway, 2001 et Aghion et al., 2009). It seems 
difficult to assess that terms of trade shocks will directly induce changes in the amount of 
remittances other than through the domestic income channel.  
Generally, one would like estimate the following model for each country i: 
( ) ( ) tititititititi ry ,,31,,2,,, loglog υθθθ ++∆+′=∆ −Z             (8) 
( ) ( ) ( ) tititititititi arayar ,,31,,2,,1, logloglog ε++∆+∆=∆ −    (9) 
where ∆log (r) and ∆log (y) are the growth rate of real remittances and real GDP, 
respectively.67 Z represents the matrix of instruments for the real GDP growth rate (one-year 
lagged value of GDP growth rate, one-year lagged value of the gross domestic investment and 
the contemporaneous terms of trade growth rate). Moreover, the model includes the lagged 
value of the remittance growth rate for at least two reasons. Firstly, by this way, we assume 
the existence of a stochastic trend in the remittance series and secondly, the lagged value of 
remittance growth rate controls for dynamic properties of the remittance growth rate. υ and ε 
are the error terms. i refers to the country and t to the year. 
tia ,1  measures the cyclicality of remittances. Note that a positive tia ,1  means that remittances 
increase when the economy is in expansion, i.e. remittances are procyclical and the opposite 
holds for countercyclical remittances. Equation (8) refers to the first-stage instrumentation 
equation of the real GDP growth rate whereas equation (9) represents the structural model of 
                                                 
67
 Remittances series in US dollars are divided by the US deflator to convert them into real terms. The remittance 
series comprise the sum of workers’ remittances and compensations of employees drawn from the World Bank 
Tables. The two items are used because for many countries, the distinction between the two is difficult 
(Bugamelli and Paternò, 2011). The paper retains only countries with at least 10 consecutive annual data of 
remittances over the period of analysis (1970-2008). The real GDP data also come from the World Bank Tables. 
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the cyclicality of remittances. In these equations, all the coefficients are both country-specific 
and time-varying. This is the value-added of this approach. But how can we compute time-
varying country-specific parameters tia ,1 ? 
Several approaches can be used. One for example can use the ten-year centered window 
regressions to estimate the value of the parameter tia ,1 at each year t and for each country i. 
This method however suffers from serious shortcomings. First, by definition, we lose the first 
five years and the last four years of data for each country. Second, because the method 
involves estimating a coefficient by discarding at each time period one old observation and 
taking into account a new one, the coefficient can vary substantially when the new 
observation is very different from the one it replaces. This implies that the series may be 
jagged and affected by noise and transitory changes (Aghion and Marinescu, 2008); 
moreover, a sudden jump in the series would not be coming from changes in the immediate 
neighborhood of date t, but from changes 5 years before and 4 years after. 
To deal with the shortcomings of the 10-years rolling window method, one can use smoothing 
such that all observations are used for each year, but those observations closest to the 
reference year are given greater weight. The local Gaussian Weighted Ordinarily Least 
Squares (LGWOLS) is one way of achieving this. It consists of computing all the time-
varying country-specific parameters in equations (8) and (9) coefficients by using all the 
observations available for each country i and then performing one regression for each date t, 
where the observations are weighted by a Gaussian centered at date t : 
( ) ( ) tititititititi ry ,,31,,2,,, loglog υθθθ ++∆+′=∆ −Z  
( ) ( ) ( ) tititititititi arayar ,,31,,2,,1, logloglog ε++∆+∆=∆ −  
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In practice, we use σ = 5. The choice is made to obtain sufficient smoothing of the estimates. 
This value has been also preferred by Aghion and Marinescu (2008). The strength and the 
orthogonality of the instruments Z are evaluated according to tests of significance of the 
instrumental variables in the first-stage and according to the Hansen over-identification test. 
The approach retained here therefore proceeds in two steps. Firstly, the cyclicality of 
remittances is evaluated by estimating for each country the equation (10) and secondly, we 
will use these indicators of cyclicality to examine the impact of trade openness on the 
countercyclicality of remittances. 
4.3.3. Results 
Evolution of the cyclicality of remittances 
The results of the instrumentation of the real GDP growth are resumed in Figure 4.1. The 
figure reports the percentage of countries every year, for which the F-statistic in the first-stage 
regressions is significant (at least at 10%) as well as the percentage of cases with F-statistics 
above the rule of thumb of 10 (Staiger and Stock, 1997). It appears that the F-statistics 
associated with the instrumentation equations are significant in around 60% of cases. About 
half of these 60% corresponds to F-statistics above the rule of thumb of 10. 
Figure 4.2 reports the percentage of cases with a Hansen test statistic exhibiting a p-value 
above 10% (the null hypothesis is the orthogonality of Z). The results indicate that in general, 
the instruments retained for the real GDP growth rate are not significantly correlated with the 
error term in the second stage. 
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Given the relatively comfortable results associated with the diagnostic tests, we can now turn 
to the main results regarding the computation of the cyclicality of remittances.  
Figure 4.3 reports the percentage of cases for which remittances appear countercyclical as 
well as the percentage of cases in which the negative coefficient of the GDP growth rate is 
statistically significant. Two important results emerge. Firstly, the negative correlation of 
remittances vis-à-vis the GDP growth rate in the receiving countries has increased since the 
mid of 1990s and represent on average, about 50% of the countries. Our results highlight that 
remittances are more countercyclical than what has been found in previous papers. Secondly, 
the countercyclical behavior of remittances is statistically significant for about one-third of 
these 50% of cases. Whether this percentage of significant cases seems relatively low, this 
does not necessarily invalidate the idea that remittances may dampen the effects of external 
risk on government size. Indeed, we can conclude that remittances are often acyclical in the 
majority of cases and even acyclical remittances have potentially a stabilizing impact 
compared to procyclical remittances. Moreover, we will further in the paper take into account 
the heterogeneity in the significance of the parameters of the cyclicality of remittances by 
using the bootstrap procedure. 
Does trade openness increase the countercyclicality of remittances? 
The panel data of the cyclicality of remittances are used to investigate whether remittances are 
more likely to appear countercyclical as the degree of trade openness increases within 
countries. If external openness leads to some important risks that developing countries have to 
deal with, one would observe more countercyclical remittances in more open economies.  
To test this hypothesis, an econometric model is specified with the cyclicality of remittances 
as a dependent variable and trade openness in the list of explanatory variables. The model also 
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controls for some other factors that could shape the cyclicality of remittances. The following 
model is used: 
tiitititi uopa ,,,,1 ' εθβ +++= X)       (11) 
with tia ,1
)
, the variable measuring the cyclicality of remittances, op the trade openness variable 
(drawn from the Penn World Tables 6.3., PWT) and X the matrix of potential control 
variables. ui represents the country fixed-effects and εi,t is the error term. The initial level of 
GDP per capita (the lagged value of GDP per capita in log drawn from PWT 6.3.) is 
introduced to control for the level of economic development. The lagged value of financial 
development (M2 over GDP), the inflation rate, public investment, the release of socio-
economic information by the public authorities (Williams, 2009) and the number of natural 
disaster events occurred in each country are also added. Excepting the release of information, 
natural disasters, GDP per capita and trade openness, all the others variables are drawn from 
the World Bank Tables. 
Financial development must be negatively correlated with the countercyclicality of 
remittances if we hypothesize that remittances play an insurance role in less financially 
developed countries. However, as it has been pointed-out by Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz 
(2009), remittance inflows could exhibit a more procyclical behavior in less financially 
developed countries when they are used to finance productive activities in presence of credit 
constraints. Regarding the inflation rate, one could expect that remittances will exhibit a 
strong countercyclicality in a context of high inflation if the migrants respond to the collapse 
of the purchasing power of their siblings. We also expect a procyclical behavior of 
remittances in countries that release more essential socio-economic information to the public. 
Indeed, the transparency helps migrants who want to invest in their countries of origin by 
providing them with essential information. We thus expect a positive correlation between the 
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release of economic information and the procyclicality of remittances. The public investment 
ratio could be positively associated with remittances sent for financing private investment.68 
Finally, natural disasters measured as the number of disaster events would be associated with 
more countercyclical remittances given that altruistic migrants react strongly to natural 
disasters occurred in their countries of origin (Yang, 2008; Mohapatra et al., 2009, and David, 
2010). Data on natural disasters are drawn from the Center for Research on the Epidemiology 
of Disasters (CRED) – Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT). 
The equation (11) is estimated over the period 1970-2008 with annual data. The hypothesis 
tested is that 0<θ . In other terms, trade openness increases the countercyclicality of 
remittances. Descriptive statistics and the list of country in the sample are presented in 
appendix.  
The results of the estimations are presented in Table 4.1. Whatever the control variables that 
are introduced, the results suggest a negative and statistically significant impact of trade 
openness on the cyclicality of remittances. This result validates the hypothesis that 
remittances are more likely to play an insurance role in more open economies by insulating 
the private sector against the external risks. Regarding the other determinants of the 
cyclicality of remittances, the results uncover a significant association between natural 
disasters, inflation rate and the countercyclicality of remittances. In contrary, more public 
investment and financial development are associated with procyclical remittances.69 
To sum up, this section has highlighted two important results: on average, remittances are 
countercyclical and this countercyclicality increases with the level of trade openness. The next 
                                                 
68
 Data on public investment are drawn from IMF World Economic Outlook database (2010). 
69
 However, the low value taken by the coefficient of determination suggests that the results would be taken with 
some hindsight. This can be explained by at least two reasons. Firstly, there are some unobservable time-varying 
variables that can determine the cyclicality of remittances but for which we didn’t control for. Secondly, we are 
explaining a variable which changes year by year with some explanatory variables which change slightly over 
the time (openness, financial development, income).  
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sub-section tests the hypothesis that the level of remittances really matters in the relationship 
between government size and trade openness and section 5 directly investigates the effect of 
countercyclical remittances on this relationship. 
4.4. Remittances, openness and government size: Econometric analysis 
4.4.1. The econometric model 
This section presents the econometric model that is specified to measure the impact of 
remittance inflows on the sensitivity of government consumption ratio with respect to trade 
openness. The hypothesis tested is that the effect of openness on government consumption 
will be less positive at high levels of remittances. The following equation is estimated: 
( ) τττττττττ εηαθθθβρ ,,,3,2,1,1,, iiiiiiiii ropoprgg +++×+++′+= − X                   (12) 
where g represents the government consumption ratio, X is the matrix of control variables 
(GDP per capita, demographic dependency ratio, urbanization rate, inflation rate and 
population size). op is the indicator of trade openness and r the remittance variable. iα  and τη  
are respectively the country fixed-effects and the period dummies. τε ,i  is the error term. All 
the time-varying variables are expressed in their natural logarithmic form. The model includes 
the lagged value of government consumption to capture the inertia in the government 
spending ratio. 
The hypothesis tested is that the marginal impact of trade openness on government 
consumption ( )τθθ ,32 ir+  is less positive at high levels of remittances. More precisely, our 
claim is that 02 >θ  and 03 <θ . Because the two coefficients are expected to exhibit opposite 
signs, a threshold level of remittances arises:  
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*r  measures the minimum remittance ratio (expressed in log terms) required for a full 
absorption of the effect of trade openness.  
4.4.2. The sample and the variables 
The sample includes 66 developing countries observed over 8 non-overlapping periods 
consisting of 5-year intervals, over 1970-2008. This sample of countries is the same as the one 
used to compute the coefficients of cyclicality.  
Government consumption data are normalized by country GDP and were drawn from the 
Penn World Table 6.3.70 We follow the World Bank in defining remittances as the sum of 
workers’ remittances and employees’ compensations. We use the sum of these two items 
because for many developing countries the statistical distinction between the two could be 
highly problematic (Bugamelli and Paternò, 2011). Two alternative measures are used: real 
remittances per capita and remittances normalized by country GDP. Trade openness is defined 
as the sum of exports and imports of goods and services over GDP. Data come from the Penn 
World Table 6.3. Data for all the remaining explanatory variables are drawn from the World 
Bank Tables. 
4.4.3. Estimation method 
The System-GMM estimator is used to estimate the parameters of equation (12). Two reasons 
justify this choice. Firstly, since the equation (12) is autoregressive and includes country-fixed 
effect, OLS estimator is biased and this bias is particularly important in the case of short time 
                                                 
70
 Government consumption ratio is used as the indicator of government size due to the lack of available data on 
the composition of government expenditures. Moreover, this variable has been used by Rodrik (1998) in his 
analysis of the effect of trade openness on government size. Due to the absence of effective systems of social 
security in developing countries, governments often use government consumption to mitigate negative shocks 
(for example by hiring more people in the administration or by increasing demand for furniture supplied by the 
private sector). These activities are captured in the government final consumption. 
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dimension as in our case (8 sub-periods). Secondly, the System-GMM estimator allows to 
correct the endogeneity of the explanatory variables. The equation in levels and the equation 
in first differences are combined in a system and estimated with an extended GMM estimator 
system which allows for the use of lagged differences and lagged levels of the explanatory 
variables as instruments (Blundell and Bond, 1998). The paper uses the Windmeijer’s (2005) 
correction of standard errors for finite sample bias. Two specification tests check the validity 
of the instruments. The first is the standard Sargan/Hansen test of over-identifying 
restrictions. The second test examines the hypothesis that there is no second-order serial 
correlation in the first-differenced residuals. The number of lags of the explanatory variables 
used as instruments is usually limited to reduce the ‘over-fitting’ bias (Roodman, 2009). 
4.4.4. Results 
The results are reported in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3. The model is primarily estimated using 
remittances per capita (Table 4.2) and using remittances as share of GDP, afterwards (Table 
4.3). In all these estimations, the diagnostic tests associated with the system-GMM estimator 
are conclusive.  
In Table 4.2, the results suggest a positive and significant impact of trade openness on the 
government consumption ratio. Given that all the explanatory variables are expressed in 
logarithm terms, the parameters reported approximate the elasticities. In a situation of zero 
remittances, the impact of trade openness on the government consumption is represented by 
the coefficient of the additive term of openness and stands between 0.1 and 0.2. On the basis 
of the results obtained with the full set of control variables (column 6), a 10% increase in 
openness is associated with a 1% increase in the government consumption ratio over GDP.71 
When trade openness is interacted with remittances per capita, its impact on government 
spending is negative and statistically significant.  
                                                 
71
 This result is not highly different to what was found by Rodrik (1998). He estimated an elasticity around 0.2. 
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The other result that is reported in the Table 4.2 suggests a positive impact of the additive 
term of remittances on the government consumption ratio. This coefficient identifies the effect 
of remittances on government spending in a context of autarky (openness equals zero). In this 
specific case, remittances are not used as a compensation mechanism against external risks 
but finance investments on education or other forms of demand for public services which 
therefore increase government size. 
The level of remittances per capita required to fully offset the effect of trade openness on 
government spending is evaluated between 20 and 40 $US per capita. About 50% of the 
sample is concerned (country-year observations). On the basis of the results obtained in 
column 6, some basics simulations can be performed. In a situation with zero remittance 
inflows, the impact of openness on government consumption can be obtained with the 
following calculation. The median value of government consumption and trade openness 
ratios are 16% and 59%, respectively. A country for which trade openness moves from its 
median value toward 80% (an increase of 35%) would observe an increase of the government 
consumption ratio by about 0.5 percentage point of GDP – (0.101×0.35×0.16) ×100 –, a shift 
in the government consumption ratio from 16 to 16.5%. However, if the same country 
receives a level of remittances per capita corresponding to the median value in the sample (12 
$US) for which the logarithm is 2.5, this country will observe a variation of the government 
consumption of 0.17 percentage point of GDP–  [(0.101×0.35) – (0.028×0.35×2.5)]×0.16×100  
– a shift from 16% to 16.17%. The reduction of government size enabled by remittances in 
this example is about 0.33 percentage point of GDP. 
To check the robustness of this result, the same model is estimated using the remittance-to-
GDP ratio. Results are reported in Table 4.3 and appear broadly consistent with the previous 
ones. Again, trade openness determines positively the government consumption, and this 
effect is strongly dampened by remittance inflows. Results indicate that the threshold level of 
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remittances required for a full absorption of the effects of trade openness on the government 
size stands around 4.5 and 8% of GDP. On the basis of the parameters estimated with the full 
set of control variables (column 6), the threshold of remittances stands at 6% and concerns 
46% of the sample of country-year observations.  
Perhaps a better sense of the quantification of this result can be obtained from the following 
calculation. A country for which trade openness moves from the median value to 80% (a 35% 
increase) would observe a shift of the government consumption ratio of about 0.8 percentage 
point of GDP ((0.137×0.35×0.16)×100). However, if the same country receives the median 
value of the remittance ratio (2.4% of GDP) for which the logarithm stands at 0.9, the 
variation in percentage point of GDP of the government consumption ratio would only be 
around 0.4 ([(0.137×0.35) – (0.079×0.35×0.9)]×0.16×100). The reduction in the government 
consumption enabled by remittance inflows is 0.4 in this example, a value close to what was 
found in the case of the results with remittances per capita. 
4.5. Remittance cyclicality, openness and government size 
This section extends the previous one by directly investigating whether countercyclical 
remittances reduce the positive impact of trade openness on government consumption. The 
time-varying coefficients measuring the cyclicality of remittances are used and the following 
equation is specified: 
( ) τττττττττ εηαθθθβρ ,,1,6,5,14,1,, iiiiiiiii aopopagg +++×+++′+= − ))X                (13) 
The hypothesis tested is that 06 >θ  so that the effect of trade openness on the government 
consumption is less positive in the case countercyclical remittances ( 0
,1 <τia
) ). It is worth 
noting that the additive term of trade openness does not identify the effect of openness on 
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government consumption in a situation without remittances, but the effect in the case of 
acyclical remittances ( 0
,1 =τia
) ). 
The results of the estimation of the equation (13) are presented in Table 4.4. As expected, the 
interaction of trade openness with the indicator of the cyclicality of remittances exhibits a 
positive and significant coefficient. This result suggests that countercyclical remittances (a 
negative value of τ,1ia
) ) significantly reduce the elasticity of government consumption with 
respect to trade openness. The opposite holds for procyclical remittances.  
Since the coefficients measuring the cyclicality of remittances have been previously 
‘generated’ from an econometric model, using them as explanatory variable in equation (13) 
can bias the results. To take into account the bias due to generated regressors, the model (13) 
is estimated anew and the standard-errors of the coefficients associated with the cyclicality of 
remittances are corrected using a bootstrap procedure with 100 replications. The procedure is 
applied to the model including the full set of control variables. Results show that the 
significance of the parameters is not altered by this correction (Table 4.5).  
4.6. Concluding remarks 
This chapter showed robustly that remittance inflows dampen the positive effect of trade 
openness on government spending in developing countries. Moreover, this effect is likely to 
be observed in the case of countercyclical remittance inflows. Starting from a simple 
theoretical model, then on the basis of econometric investigations factoring in the endogeneity 
of remittances, the results indicate that when remittances exceed 6% of GDP, they fully 
absorb the positive effect of trade openness on government consumption.  
Because this result is theoretically justified by assuming countercyclical remittance inflows, 
the paper proposes an empirical evaluation of the countercyclicality of remittances by 
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computing time-varying country-specific indicators of remittance cyclicality for each country 
and at each year using Local Gaussian Weighted Ordinarily Least Squares estimations. The 
results indicate a surge in the countercyclicality of remittances during the mid of 1990s. It 
also appears that trade openness increases the inflow of more countercyclical remittances, 
supporting the idea of an insurance role played in small open economies. The econometric 
analyses also do not reject the hypothesis that countercyclical remittances induce a fiscal 
retrenchment in more open economies.  
This paper showed how the relationship between globalization and fiscal policy differs among 
countries with differences in their balance of payment characteristics. Remittance inflows 
reduce the role of insurer of last resort often played by governments in developing countries.  
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Figure 4.1. Testing the strength of the instruments: summary of first-stage results 
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Figure 4.2. Testing the orthogonality of the instruments: summary of first-stage results 
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Figure 4.3: Evolution of the countercyclicality of remittances 
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Table 4.1: Trade openness and the procyclicality of remittances: OLS with country fixed-effects estimator. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Trade openness -2.347** -2.900*** -2.702*** -2.886*** -2.780** -2.256** -1.980* -2.226* 
 (2.49) (2.86) (2.70) (2.71) (2.37) (2.18) (1.70) (1.80) 
Lagged GDP per capita  -0.650 0.098 -0.278 -0.518 1.793 1.104 1.808 1.600 
 (0.54) (0.07) (0.21) (0.36) (1.09) (0.80) (1.11) (0.90) 
Inflation rate  -3.126*** -3.172*** -2.875*** -3.409*** -3.229*** -3.341*** -3.208*** 
  (2.83) (2.96) (2.63) (3.01) (2.93) (3.09) (2.99) 
Lagged Financial development   0.545    1.799* 1.916* 
   (0.76)    (1.84) (1.96) 
Release of information    2.638    -1.382 
    (0.50)    (0.24) 
Public investment     2.520***  2.621*** 2.189*** 
     (3.78)  (4.08) (3.31) 
Natural disasters      -0.373*** -0.269** -0.336** 
      (2.91) (1.97) (2.33) 
Intercept 17.367* 28.104** 28.513** 30.202** 10.700 18.752 1.108 4.526 
 (1.86) (2.35) (2.45) (2.41) (0.75) (1.52) (0.08) (0.30) 
Observations 1839 1696 1683 1568 1453 1696 1440 1315 
Countries 67 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 
R² 0.005 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.019 0.014 0.026 0.026 
Note: T-statistics in parentheses. All the explanatory variables are expressed in their logarithmic form. For the inflation rate, we use the log of 
100+the inflation rate. Financial development is the logarithm of M2 in percentage of GDP. Natural disasters record the number of natural disaster 
events in each country each year (CRED-EM-DAT). The models include country fixed-effects. The release of socio-economic information by 
Governments is drawn from Williams (2009). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4.2: Remittances per capita, Openness and Government consumption 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Trade openness 0.135** 0.108* 0.116* 0.137** 0.116* 0.101* 
 (2.16) (1.81) (1.84) (2.12) (1.67) (1.71) 
Trade openness*Remittances -0.041** -0.033** -0.037** -0.041** -0.033* -0.028* 
 (2.38) (2.12) (2.08) (2.41) (1.91) (1.93) 
Remittances per capita 0.142** 0.107** 0.132* 0.141** 0.117* 0.103** 
 (2.01) (2.01) (1.85) (2.02) (1.78) (2.02) 
Government consumption (t-1) 0.903*** 0.832*** 0.914*** 0.907*** 0.906*** 0.805*** 
 (7.69) (10.52) (8.39) (7.39) (7.76) (6.37) 
Inflation 0.168*** 0.133*** 0.158*** 0.167*** 0.137*** 0.097*** 
 (2.59) (2.58) (2.72) (2.58) (2.84) (2.61) 
GDP per capita  0.065    0.079 
  (1.17)    (1.03) 
Urbanization rate   -0.052*   -0.117* 
   (1.89)   (1.90) 
Population    -0.002  0.010 
    (0.26)  (0.66) 
Demographic dependency ratio      -0.166 0.275 
     (1.19) (1.20) 
Intercept -0.984** -1.053 -0.716 -0.961* -0.182 -1.683 
 (2.03) (1.64) (1.42) (1.83) (0.30) (1.15) 
       
Observations 396 396 396 396 391 391 
Countries 66 66 66 66 65 65 
Joint significance prob.a 0.026 0.100 0.092 0.024 0.158 0.129 
Joint significance prob.b 0.044 0.080 0.100 0.039 0.141 0.097 
Remittances per capita c 26 $US 26.5 $US 23 $US 28 $US 34 $US 38 $US 
Countries above the threshold 40 40 41 38 35 31 
Percentage of countries above 61% 61% 62% 58% 54% 48% 
AR(1):p-value 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004 
AR(2):p-value 0.774 0.774 0.780 0.760 0.855 0.771 
Hansen OID test: prob. 0.762 0.661 0.690 0.736 0.302 0.441 
Instruments 32 37 33 33 25 47 
Note : All the variables are expressed in natural logarithm. Period dummies are included in all the specifications. 
Robust T-statistics in parentheses. Urbanization rate, population, dependency ratio and period dummies are 
taken as strictly exogenous. The remaining control variables are taken as predetermined and the matrix of 
instruments is collapsed and the maximum number of lags is fixed at 5. The estimation method is the two-step 
System-GMM method with the Windmeijer (2005) correction for finite sample bias. Data are computed as 5-
year averages corresponding at 8 nonoverlapping sub-periods.  
a
 Joint significance probability of coefficients associated with remittances and remittances crossed with trade 
openness. 
b
 Joint significance probability of coefficients associated with trade openness and remittances crossed with trade 
openness. 
c
 Threshold level of remittance (expressed in per capita $US terms) at which the effect of trade openness on 
government consumption is equal to zero.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Chapter 4. Remittances, openness and government size 
152 
 
Table 4.3: Remittances (%GDP), Trade openness and Government consumption 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Trade openness 0.148** 0.188** 0.127* 0.220*** 0.119* 0.137* 
 (2.05) (2.50) (1.72) (2.66) (1.90) (1.82) 
Trade openness*Remittances -0.094** -0.093** -0.086* -0.101** -0.089* -0.079* 
 (2.31) (1.97) (1.93) (2.18) (1.75) (1.66) 
Remittances (%GDP) 0.349** 0.336* 0.315 0.377* 0.343 0.299 
 (1.97) (1.66) (1.63) (1.90) (1.60) (1.48) 
Government consumption (t-1) 0.925*** 0.922*** 0.929*** 0.934*** 0.927*** 0.898*** 
 (9.08) (7.73) (10.16) (10.38) (9.47) (8.69) 
Inflation 0.139** 0.171** 0.128** 0.144** 0.121** 0.111* 
 (2.36) (2.50) (2.02) (2.22) (2.17) (1.71) 
GDP per capita  -0.042*    -0.011 
  (1.94)    (0.34) 
Urbanization rate   -0.052**   -0.025 
   (2.16)   (0.82) 
Population    0.021*  0.007 
    (1.77)  (0.46) 
Demographic dependency ratio      0.079 -0.044 
     (0.62) (0.18) 
Intercept -1.028* -0.980 -0.702 -1.728** -1.128 -0.535 
 (1.79) (1.63) (1.21) (2.46) (1.54) (0.42) 
       
Observations 395 395 395 395 390 390 
Countries 66 66 66 66 65 65 
Joint significance prob.a 0.011 0.031 0.020 0.017 0.100 0.143 
Joint significance prob.b 0.038 0.029 0.100 0.020 0.118 0.117 
Remittances (%GDP) c 5% 7.5% 4.5% 9% 4% 6% 
Countries above the threshold 33 22 33 19 35 30 
Percentage of countries above 50% 33% 50% 29% 54% 46% 
AR(1):p-value 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
AR(2):p-value 0.694 0.671 0.709 0.599 0.794 0.779 
Hansen OID test: prob. 0.801 0.468 0.767 0.895 0.683 0.634 
Instruments 28 41 29 25 27 35 
Note: All the variables are expressed in natural logarithm. Period dummies are included in all the specifications. Robust 
T-statistics in parentheses. Urbanization rate, population, dependency ratio and period dummies are taken as strictly 
exogenous. The remaining control variables are taken as predetermined and the matrix of instruments is collapsed and 
the maximum number of lags is fixed at 5. The estimation method is the two-step System-GMM method with the 
Windmeijer (2005) correction for finite sample bias. Data are computed as 5-year averages corresponding at 8 
nonoverlapping sub-periods.  
a
 Joint significance probability of coefficients associated with remittances and remittances crossed with trade openness. 
b
 Joint significance probability of coefficients associated with trade openness and remittances crossed with trade 
openness. 
c
 Threshold level of remittance (expressed in %GDP) at which the effect of trade openness on government consumption 
is equal to zero.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4. Remittances, openness and government size 
153 
 
Table 4.4. Remittance cyclicality, Openness and Government Consumption  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Trade openness -0.026 -0.023 -0.025 -0.029 0.019 
 
(0.62) (0.55) (0.50) (0.66) (0.28) 
Trade openness*Remittance cyclicality 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.004** 0.004*** 
 
(2.08) (2.00) (2.03) (2.25) (2.61) 
Remittance cyclicality -0.013** -0.012** -0.014* -0.016** -0.019** 
 
(2.06) (2.03) (1.94) (2.23) (2.57) 
Government consumption (t-1) 0.634*** 0.642*** 0.621*** 0.591*** 0.465*** 
 
(4.56) (5.28) (3.93) (3.83) (3.59) 
Inflation -0.016 -0.003 -0.024 -0.017 -0.028 
 
(0.31) (0.06) (0.49) (0.30) (0.51) 
GDP per capita -0.018 0.034 -0.015 -0.017 0.057 
 
(0.74) (1.48) (0.60) (0.49) (1.24) 
Urbanization rate  -0.109***   -0.095* 
 
 (2.67)   (1.79) 
Population   0.013  0.057 
 
  (0.54)  (1.24) 
Demographic dependency ratio     0.066 0.374 
 
   (0.55) (1.21) 
Intercept 1.351*** 1.231*** 1.275** 1.236 -0.528 
 
(2.77) (2.78) (2.15) (1.48) (0.28) 
 
     
Observations 384 384 384 380 380 
Countries 66 66 66 65 65 
Joint significance prob.a 0.113 0.127 0.104 0.079 0.033 
Joint significance prob.b 0.114 0.135 0.126 0.079 0.010 
AR(1):p-value 0.018 0.012 0.024 0.028 0.042 
AR(2):p-value 1.000 0.993 0.985 0.900 0.996 
Hansen OID test: prob. 0.362 0.563 0.335 0.219 0.644 
Instruments 20 21 25 21 27 
Note: All the variables are expressed in natural logarithm. Period dummies are included in all the 
specifications. Robust T-statistics in parentheses. Urbanization rate, population, dependency ratio and 
period dummies are taken as strictly exogenous. The remaining control variables are taken as 
predetermined and the matrix of instruments is collapsed and the maximum number of lags is fixed at 5. 
The estimation method is the two-step System-GMM method with the Windmeijer (2005) correction for 
finite sample bias. Data are computed as 5-year averages corresponding at 8 nonoverlapping sub-periods.  
a
 Joint significance probability of coefficients associated with remittance cyclicality and remittance 
cyclicality crossed with trade openness. 
b
 Joint significance probability of coefficients associated with trade openness and remittance cyclicality 
crossed with trade openness. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4.5: Bootstrapped standard-errors 
 
Variable 
Coefficient observed 
(column 5, Table 4.6) 
Bias Bootstrapped 
standard-error 
    
Remittance cyclicality -0.019* 0.0167 0.0111 
Openness*Remittance cyclicality 0.0045* -0.0038 0.0027 
    
Note: The bootstrap procedure uses 100 replications 
* p<0.1. 
Chapter 4. Remittances, openness and government size 
155 
 
Appendix D: Descriptive statistics and list of countries in the sample 
 
 
 
 
 
Table D1: Descriptive statistics 
Variables Obs Mean Std-dev. Minimum Maximum 
      
 Annual data 
      
Cyclicality of remittances 1910 2.62 13.94 -26.49 124.76 
Terms of trade growth rate 1755 -0.01 0.13 -0.98 1.42 
Lagged Gross domestic investment ratio 2350 20.83 7.65 -23.76 70.81 
Remittance growth rate 1943 0.08 0.42 -3.24 3.89 
GDP growth rate 2434 0.04 0.05 -0.70 0.33 
Release of information by Governments 2405 0.58 0.13 0.08 0.86 
Public investment ratio  1759 1.69 0.89 -5.33 4.55 
Inflation rate 2306 4.76 0.32 4.48 10.11 
Trade openness 2546 4.06 0.60 2.17 5.47 
Financial development (M2 (% GDP)) 2466 3.32 0.61 -0.09 9.31 
      
 5-year averages 
      
Trade openness 536 4.07 0.59 2.37 5.36 
Remittances per capita a 449 2.17 2.02 -2.91 6.35 
Remittances (% GDP) a 442 1.05 0.88 0 4.40 
Cyclicality of remittances 420 2.53 13.58 -26.30 108.05 
Government consumption 536 2.79 0.49 0.76 4.11 
Inflation a 484 4.76 0.27 4.57 7.73 
Urban 544 3.53 0.60 1.26 4.53 
Population 536 9.16 1.75 4.03 14.09 
Dependency ratio 536 3.79 0.12 3.37 3.97 
GDP per capita 536 8.04 0.81 6.40 9.86 
      
Note : All the variables are expressed in their logarithmic form except the release of information index, natural 
disasters, remittance and GDP growth rates and the cyclicality of remittances. 
a
 series expressed as the logarithm of 1 + the original values of the series to deal with zeroes and negative 
values. 
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Table D2. List of countries (67) 
Algeria Dominican Republic Lesotho Philippines 
Argentina Ecuador Madagascar Rwanda 
Bangladesh Egypt Malawi Senegal 
Benin El Salvador Malaysia Seychelles 
Bolivia Ethiopia Mali South Africa 
Botswana Fiji Mauritania Sri Lanka 
Brazil Gabon Mauritius Sudan 
Burkina Faso Gambia Mexico Swaziland 
Cameroon Ghana Morocco Tanzania 
Cape Verde Guatemala Mozambique Thailand 
Chile Guinea Namibia Togo 
China Haiti Nicaragua Tunisia 
Colombia Honduras Niger Turkey 
Comoros India Pakistan Uganda 
Congo, Rep. Indonesia Panama Venezuela 
Costa Rica Jordan Paraguay Zimbabwe 
Cote d'Ivoire Kenya Peru 
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 A version of this chapter is forthcoming at the Journal of Development Studies 
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5.1. Introduction 
International migration constitutes one of the biggest aspects of the current economic 
globalization. One of the main consequences of migration is remittances, in others words the 
money sent back to home by migrants. Remittances constitute a significant amount of the 
resources received by developing countries, and some scholars argue that remittances are an 
external and stable source of funding for development (Ratha, 2005). To put some numbers in 
perspective, the level of remittances attained 338 billion US dollars in 2008. And despite the 
recent worldwide crisis, remittances have shown a stronger comparative resilience than the 
other types of financial flows received by developing countries. Moreover, for a number of 
countries, remittances represent the most important source of external funding, exceeding the 
levels of foreign aid or foreign direct investment (Ratha, 2009). The level of remittances 
exceeds that of aid in the whole developing world and they represent the second largest 
external source of funding after foreign direct investment.  
The literature on the contribution of remittances to development can be split into two broad 
camps: on one side, the club of optimists and on the other side, the club of sceptics. Taking an 
optimistic view, remittances contribute to the development of recipient countries by relieving 
households’ financial constraints, and by protecting them against several types of shocks. 
Overall, remittances enhance economic growth, reduce poverty and help cope with shocks 
(Adams, 2005; Yang, 2008; Gupta et al., 2009; Giuliano et al., 2009; Bugamelli and Paternò, 
2011; Chami et al., 2009). 
For the sceptics, remittances are simultaneously a gift and a curse. By leading to an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate, or by reducing labor force participation in recipient 
country households, remittances do not contribute to economic development in the long run 
(Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2004; Chami et al., 2003; Chami et al., 2005). The main 
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motivation of these “sceptical” papers is to show that remittances are not a panacea, and that 
sometimes they may harm sustainable economic growth. For example, Catrinescu et al. 
(2009) seek to explain the ambiguity among studies on the impact of remittances on economic 
growth by relating the effect of remittances to the quality of domestic institutions in recipient 
countries. Specifically, they show that remittances are more likely to contribute to longer-term 
growth when the remittance receiving countries’ political and economic policies and 
institutions create the incentives for financial and business investment and savings from 
remittances.  
Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2004), using a sample of Caribbean and Latin American 
countries, showed that a rise in remittances is associated with an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate. Chami et al. (2003) and Chami et al. (2005) pointed out that remittances create 
a moral hazard problem between the migrant and the recipient household when the latter has 
the incentive to reduce its labor force participation while increasing its leisure time.  
A recent part of this literature explores the negative side-effects of remittances by questioning 
the contribution of these flows to economic policy. Shabbaz et al. (2008) investigate the 
relationship between the surge in remittances and government spending in Pakistan. They 
tested the hypothesis that remittances reduce the size of government by insulating both 
government and domestic population from the vagaries of the global economy. This idea has 
been documented in Kapur and Singer (2006).  
Abdih et al. (2008) using a large sample of developing countries, and after factoring in the 
endogeneity of remittances, have shown that remittances reduce institutional quality in 
recipient countries. This arises because the access to remittance income makes government 
corruption less costly for domestic households to bear; consequently corruption is likely to 
increase.  
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Grabel (2009) pointed out that remittances may create a ‘public moral hazard’ on the part of 
developing country governments. That is, by partially resolving bottlenecks, remittances may 
actually encourage states in the developing world to ignore their traditional responsibilities 
because they assume that remittances will fill various voids. 
Chami and Fullenkamp (2009) propose a more severe analysis of the effects of remittances in 
recipient countries. They argue that if conditions are bad at home, families send more 
members abroad and use remittance income to compensate for the lack of government 
services. Therefore, they lose interest in pressuring the government to deliver better services, 
and the quality of government declines because the government does not feel compelled to 
provide services as it realizes that households can fend for themselves. 
This paper extends the previous analyses on the relationship between remittances and 
government behavior in recipient countries. We investigate what happens on the part of the 
public sector when remittances flow into countries characterized by bad governance. We test 
the hypothesis of the existence of a ‘public moral hazard problem’ by examining the effects of 
remittances inflows on the levels of public social spending when the government is not 
accountable. The hypothesis is validated when remittance inflows reduce government 
spending on social sectors. We propose the hypothesis that this behavior is more likely to be 
observed in countries when the public sector is not accountable.  
This can be explained by at least three arguments. Firstly, remittances constitute a form of 
private subsidy, and therefore bad governments can easily reduce public subsidies on these 
sectors. Secondly, access to remittances income makes a reduction of government subsidies 
less costly for domestic households to bear, a situation that might be exploited by rogue 
governments to divert resources. Thirdly, access to remittances income might reduce the 
incentive for recipients’ households to exert accountability on governments. It is then 
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plausible that individuals do not exert pressure on government for change simply because they 
can resort to remittances to solve their problems. Therefore, it is as if people renounce 
pressure for change more easily if they can receive an external assistance like remittances. 
This is also a form of moral hazard problem on the part of households which translates into a 
public moral hazard problem. 
A large sample of developing countries is retained in order to test the impact of remittances 
on social public subsidies. The period of analysis is 1996-2007 and the unit of observation is 
the country. This period is retained for a number of reasons. As in Abdih et al. (2008), we use 
as my main dimensions of governance and accountability, all the indicators provided by 
Kaufmann et al. (2009) in the World Bank Governance Indicators dataset.  
We take advantage of the panel data structure of the dataset to estimate the effect of 
remittances on public social spending. Because remittances are plausibly endogenous and 
because public spending on social sectors is strongly autoregressive, the system-GMM 
estimator is useful to permit the reduction of the bias associated with the estimation of the 
autoregressive models as well as to instrument remittances with their lagged values. For 
robustness checks, we also present the results obtained from an augmented system-GMM 
estimator which includes an external instrument for remittances and which allows a common 
factor representation, and results from the difference-GMM estimator. 
The results of the econometric analyses do not reject the hypothesis of this paper. It appears 
that remittances reduce public spending on education and health in countries ‘badly’ 
governed. 
The remainder of the chapter is as follows: Section 2 presents the econometric model of the 
relationship between remittances, governance and public spending, Section 3 discusses the 
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results of estimations and provides empirical regularities, Section 4 checks the robustness of 
these results and we conclude with policy implications in Section 5.  
5.2. Empirical design 
5.2.1. Econometric specification 
The model specified is designed to measure the impact of remittances on the level of public 
spending on education and health among different levels of governance. For the choice of 
control variables, we take advantage of previous empirical models of the determinants of 
public spending on education and health in developing countries. These models are 
augmented with linear and multiplicative terms of remittances, and remittances crossed with 
the governance variables. Formally, the specification retained is the following: 
( )XGGRRSSit ,,, ∗=                                 (1) 
where S is either the overall measure of social spending, public spending on education or 
public spending on health in percent of GDP. R is remittances as a percentage of GDP, and G 
is the index of governance quality. All the variables are expressed in the natural logarithmic 
form except the governance variables. 
By controlling additively for the levels of remittances and governance quality, we ensure that 
the interaction term does not proxy for remittances or the level of institutional quality. This is 
an important point because remittances may have a direct effect on the quality of domestic 
institutions as has been shown by Abdih et al. (2008). The impact that we identify here is 
however the influence of remittances on the level of public pro-poor expenditures in countries 
with governance problems. 
The model estimated with a yearly panel data structure is a dynamic panel data model with 
the following form: 
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tiitititititititi uGGRRXSS ,,3,,2,1,1,, ' εθθθβρ +++∗+++= −        (2) 
with iu  the country fixed effects. 
A dynamic specification is used given the strong inertia characterizing government spending, 
which is often renewed every year in budgets. The hypotheses tested are that remittances (R) 
are negatively associated with public spending on education and health at high levels of bad 
governance (existence of a public moral hazard effect due to remittances). Formally, this 
suggests that 02 <θ  and 03 <θ .73  
Remittances are suspected of endogeneity because of omitted variables bias and reverse 
causality. Indeed, there exist some variables which might affect both remittances and public 
spending. For example, external shocks could influence remittances as well as the level of 
public social spending. Another omitted variable is the level of emigration, which is directly 
linked to remittances, and also affects the propensity of government to subside social sectors. 
Moreover, emigration of individuals decreases the domestic tax base, government tax revenue 
and its capacity to supply public services.74 Finally, endogeneity of remittances may also arise 
because of reverse causality. If the level of public spending on education or health is too low 
to permit households to use services, remittances can be sent to increase the access of 
recipient households to health care services or education (e.g. in the private sector). Moreover, 
a low level of public spending, which results in a low quality of public services, could 
encourage households to use remittances in the private sector, where the quality of similar 
services (e.g. schools, private clinics) is expected to be higher. Altogether, it can be expected 
that the coefficients associated with remittances in OLS estimations will be downward biased.  
                                                 
73
 G is an indicator of governance quality with high values corresponding to a bad governance score. 
74
 Docquier et al. (2008) have recently shown in a cross-sectional analysis, a negative impact of skilled migration 
on public subsidies for education: the average elasticity of public education subsidies to skilled migration rates 
amounts to − 0.20. 
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Hence an econometric strategy based on instrumental variables must be implemented. We 
therefore resort to dynamic panel data estimators that allow the instrumentation of the 
explanatory variables suspected of endogeneity. Two commonly used estimators are retained: 
the difference-GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and the system-GMM estimator 
(Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998).75 In the difference-GMM estimator, 
the model (2) is taken in first differences (to remove country fixed effects), and the first 
differentiated variables are instrumented by the lagged values of the variables in level. 
However, it has been recognized that the lagged values of variables in level are sometimes 
poor instruments for variables in first differences. The system-GMM estimator therefore 
increases the moment conditions in order to improve the efficiency. The equation in levels 
and the equation in first differences are combined in a system, then estimated with an 
extended GMM estimator system which allows for the use of lagged differences and lagged 
levels of the explanatory variables as instruments. 
The GMM estimators designed for dynamic panel data are suitable to deal with endogeneity 
problems arising from simultaneity bias but also from reverse causality. Regarding the latter 
case, if low levels of public education and health expenditures increase the level of 
remittances sent to a country (because migrants may remit more to countries with low levels 
of public spending on education and public health), the naïve estimation techniques such as 
the OLS method give biased results. In contrast, the GMM estimators could reduce this 
reverse causality bias given that the lagged values of remittances used as the instruments for 
                                                 
75
 The Anderson-Hsiao estimator (A-H) is another estimator that can be used to estimate this type of dynamic 
panel model.  The A-H estimator specifies the original model in its first difference form and instruments the 
endogenous variables with their lagged values.  Although the A-H estimator is simple to implement, the major 
concern is that the autocorrelation of the residuals in first difference is not taken into account and tested. This is 
why the dynamic panel GMM estimators (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998) are useful since 
they resort to the generalized method of moments to estimate the parameters. This method dominates in 
efficiency the traditional 2SLS (the procedure used in the implementation of the A-H estimator) in the case of 
non-spherical perturbations (heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown forms). I tried to estimate all the 
models using the A-H estimator but I obtained unreliable results with no significant coefficients for all the 
explanatory variables. 
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remittances are not affected by the contemporaneous levels of public spending. However, one 
limitation often recognized in the dynamic panel GMM techniques is that the lagged values of 
the endogenous variables are sometimes poor instruments for the variables in first differences. 
If this holds, correcting the reverse causality bias through the use of the lagged values of the 
explanatory variables as instruments is misleading. This is why in this paper, the standard 
GMM estimator techniques are augmented by adding an “external instrument” that is 
suggested by the recent empirical literature on the macroeconomic determinants of 
remittances. The income per capita in the migrant host countries is therefore retained as the 
“external source of variation” for remittance inflows (see Section IV for a detailed discussion 
justifying the choice of this instrument).The addition of this external instrument should go 
some way towards vitiating the potential “weak instruments”, simultaneity and reverse 
causality problems, that often arise in the context of traditional GMM estimations.  
5.2.2. The variables 
Two models are estimated according to the dependent variable used. We begin in each case 
with the model of public education spending. The exercise is repeated afterwards for public 
health spending.76  
Data on public health spending and public education spending are taken from a dataset 
compiled by the Fiscal Affairs Department of the IMF (FAD).77  
Following the empirical literature on the determinants of public spending on education and 
health in developing countries (Gbesemete and Gerdtham, 1992; Feyzioglu et al., 1998; Baqir, 
2002; Okunade, 2005; Stasavage, 2005; Fosu, 2007, 2008; Docquier et al., 2008), the set of 
control variables includes: 
                                                 
76
 Baqir (2002) and Gomanee et al. (2005) also used these categories of public spending as proxies for pro-poor 
public expenditures. 
77
 These data have been previously used by Baqir (2002) and Hauner and Kyobe (2010). 
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- GDP per capita in constant prices: this variable is included to control for the level of 
development among countries in the sample, but also to catch the elasticity of public spending 
with respect to income. Previous studies have found that public spending in social sectors is a 
normal good in developing countries (Okunade, 2005).  
- Foreign aid: this variable catches the sensitivity of pro-poor government expenditure to 
external assistance from donors. This variable appeared to be positively related to government 
spending in previous studies (Gbesemete and Gerdtham, 1992; Gomanee et al., 2005; Fosu, 
2007). Three variables of aid are used in this paper: aggregate aid, education aid and health 
aid, according to the dependent variable retained. Aggregate aid per capita series are drawn 
from the World Development Indicators while sectorial aid comes from the Country 
Reporting System (CRS) of the OECD.78 The main advantage of the CRS is to provide data 
on aid commitments with a high degree of disaggregation by purpose (sector). Its main 
disadvantage though, is that the data are only reliable for recent years (since 1995). For 
sectorial data on aid, we always use aid commitments to each sector for education and 
health.79 All series of aid are normalized by the country nominal GDP before taking them in 
logarithms.  
- Debt service ratio: this variable is included to control for the effect of financial constraints at 
the government level on the amount of pro-poor (social) spending. As seen in previous works 
(Fosu, 2007, 2008), we expect a negative impact of this variable. 
- Young population (age <14): this variable catches the demand for public subsidies in the 
education sector. We also control for this variable to drain off the possible impact of 
remittances on the demand for schooling. This is important to ensure that the effect of 
                                                 
78
 CRS database is available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/document/0/0,2340,en_2649_34447_37679488_1_1_1_1,00.html 
79
 The CRS also provides a disaggregation of disbursements by sector. Unfortunately disbursements are even 
more underreported than commitments. 
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remittances on government spending is not driven by the positive correlation between 
remittances and the demand for schooling, but only by the supply effects arising from public 
sector behavior. 
- Total population growth rate: this variable measures the annual growth rate of the population 
in each country and would be positively correlated with public health spending. We also 
control for this variable to ensure that the effect of remittances is primarily due to supply 
effects emanating from the public health sector, rather than a demand effect for health 
services fueled by the positive correlation between remittances and fertility.80  
- Inflation rate: We control for the inflation rate (the growth rate of the GDP deflator index) to 
assess the impact of overall macroeconomic instability on the composition of public social 
spending. We therefore expect the coefficient of this variable to be negative. 
- Urbanization rate: this variable is introduced to capture the public preference in the 
geographical allocation of public funds for education and health to rural or urban areas. 
- Remittances: data on remittances are drawn from the IMF Balance of Payments Yearbooks. 
The remittance variable is defined as current private transfers from migrant workers, who are 
residents of the host country, to recipients in their country of origin. We do not include the 
other components, such as compensation of employees or migrant transfers, which do not 
exactly represent remittances as a flow and as private decisions. Data are expressed in 
percentage of GDP before transforming into logarithm.  
- Governance: This variable captures the inability of the government to implement policies for 
sustainable development.81  
                                                 
80
 The relationship between migration, remittances and the fertility of recipient households has been addressed 
by (Marchiori et al., 2008). 
81
 Catrinescu et al. (2009) pointed out that ‘good’ institutions are viewed as establishing an incentive structure 
that reduces uncertainty and promotes efficiency – so contributing to stronger economic performance. The IMF 
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Following Abdih et al. (2008), we use the World Bank Governance Indicators dataset since 
this dataset has provided measures of governance for a large number of countries since 
1996.82 The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project has reported aggregate and 
individual governance indicators for 212 countries and territories since 1996. Six dimensions 
of governance are reported: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of 
violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption.  
More recently, the six indicators were defined as: 
 Voice and Accountability – measuring the extent to which a country’s citizens are able 
to participate in selecting their government; as well as freedom of expression, freedom 
of association, and a free media.  
 Political stability and Absence of Violence – measuring perceptions of the likelihood 
that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent 
means, including political violence or terrorism.  
 Government effectiveness – measuring the quality of public services; the quality of the 
civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures; the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s 
commitment to such policies.  
                                                                                                                                                         
(2003) recognizes that development-positive institutions are those that protect private property rights and the 
operation of the rule of law; lead to low levels of corruption; and facilitate all private interactions rather than 
protect a small elite. Overall, I assess that a country is vulnerable when its level of governance quality is low 
according to the measures of governance quality published in the empirical literature. 
82
 Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009) construct a meta-indicator that aggregates a host of different 
measures, from firm, investor, and population surveys to expert and international organization assessments to 
come to their overall measurements of the quality of governance. Data are available at the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI) project website under the following address: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp 
For more details on the construction of the indices, refer to Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2009). 
“Governance Matters VIII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators, 1996-2008”. World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper Series, 4978. 
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 Regulatory quality – measuring the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development.  
 Rule of law – measuring the extent to which Law Enforcement agents have confidence 
in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, the police and courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.  
 Control of corruption – measuring the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain (including both petty and grand forms of corruption), as well as “capture” 
of the state by elites and private interests.  
It should be noted that these governance indicators are all based on data from expert 
assessments, polls of experts and surveys of government officials and businesses, and 
therefore capture perceptions of the government process rather than any formal aspects of the 
actual government structure in any given country.  This creates the important problem that 
perceptions are shaped not just by the government environment, but also by many other 
aspects of the socio-economic environment, thereby creating its own set of endogeneity and 
reverse causality issues. There is a large literature critical of the World Governance Dataset 
(Arndt and Oman, 2006; Kurtz and Shrank, 2006; Kurtz and Shrank, 2007). Kaufmann, Kraay 
and Mastruzzi have categorized some of these critiques as concerns about the comparability 
of the indicators across countries and across time; concerns about bias in expert polls or in 
particular sources; and concerns about the independence of the different data sources and the 
consequences for the aggregate indicators. (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2006). More 
recently, Thomas (2010) dismisses the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) as an 
‘elaborate and unsupported hypothesis’ because of the failure to demonstrate the ‘construct 
validity’ of these indicators. A short answer to Thomas (2010) is provided by Kaufmann et al. 
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(2010). The authors cast doubts on the practical consequences of failure to meet the criteria of 
construct validity and therefore minimize this critique. 
To build the indicators of governance used in the econometric estimations, we reverse all the 
original indicators of governance quality by the following formula: 
( )
( ) ( )titi
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xx
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max
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−
=                        (3) 
where x is each indicator of governance quality. Min(x) and max(x) represent the minimum 
and the maximum of each indicator, respectively. This transformation ensures that G will 
have a range between 0 and 1. On this basis, G increases with the deterioration of the quality 
of governance. Moreover, equation (3) applied on each governance variable ensures the 
standardization of these variables into new indices which are therefore reasonably 
comparable. Given the fact that the indices are distributed over the same interval [0, 1], the 
coefficients of the interactive terms (remittances crossed with the governance variable) will 
allow direct comparison across the different equations. Descriptive statistics of all the 
variables and the list of countries in the sample are available in Table E1 and Table E3 in the 
appendix. The sample used covers a large number of developing countries (86 countries). 
Next, we turn to the estimations of the econometric models. The panel data is unbalanced 
given missing values for some countries.  
5.3. Results  
5.3.1. Results for public education spending 
The results of the estimations of Model 2 specified for the case of public education are 
presented in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. Table 5.1 presents the results using the difference-GMM 
estimator, whereas Table 5.2 shows the results derived from the estimator of the system-
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GMM. In each table we present the diagnostic tests associated with these estimators, to be 
precise the test of autocorrelation of the residuals in first difference and the Hansen 
overidentification test. The estimations always pass the GMM specification tests. The 
residuals in first difference exhibit in each case a significant first order correlation, while the 
second order correlation is not significant. This validates the use of lagged values of 
explanatory variables as instruments. The Hansen overidentification tests do not reject the 
hypothesis that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals of the models. 
In order to check the exogeneity of the instruments, we present the results of the difference-
in-Hansen test which examines whether the instruments of the equation in level are exogenous 
in the system-GMM estimator (Roodman, 2009). Again, the results suggest that the 
instruments used in the system-GMM estimator are valid. Meanwhile, the number of lags of 
the endogenous variables has been limited to avoid the overfitting bias due to instrument 
proliferation (Roodman, 2009).  
The public moral hazard problem induced by remittances would be validated if the interaction 
term of remittances crossed with the governance indicators is significantly negative once the 
additive terms of remittances and governance are controlled for. It appears that the interaction 
between remittance inflows and governance negatively affects the level of public spending on 
education. The results obtained by the difference-GMM method (Table 5.1) show that 
remittances are likely to reduce public education spending in countries suffering from 
governance problems (regarding the control of corruption, regulation, government 
effectiveness  and accountability). We have not obtained a significant effect for the interaction 
of remittances crossed with the rule of law and political stability variables even if their 
coefficients show the expected negative sign. 
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When we turn on the system-GMM estimator, the results highlight a negative and significant 
coefficient of the interaction of remittances crossed with each of the six indicators of bad 
governance (Table 5.2). It also appears that a high level of government ineffectiveness and a 
low score on the variable rule of law are the most important sources of public moral hazard 
effects of remittances. The coefficients of the interactive terms with these variables exhibit the 
highest absolute values. 
Regarding the control variables introduced, the results indicate that the only control variable 
that is consistently significant is the lagged dependent variable with a relatively high 
estimated coefficient close to 0.6 across the specifications. It is also worth noting that we have 
obtained higher values of the coefficient associated with the lagged dependent variable in the 
case of the system-GMM method compared to the values obtained from the standard 
difference-GMM (Table 5.1). These results have important implications in the context of 
GMM estimations. Indeed, given the strong inertia characterizing the dependent variable, 
there is an obvious “weak instrument” problem in the case of the difference-GMM estimator. 
This arises because the lagged values of the dependent variable used as instruments do not 
explain much of the sample variation in the first difference of the dependent variable.83 In 
such a case, the difference-GMM estimate (Arellano and Bond, 1991) is asymptotically close 
to zero. In contrast, the system-GMM estimator which increases the set of the moment 
conditions by combining the equations in level with the ones in first difference helps reduce 
the bias of the difference-GMM estimator. This is why in this paper, the preferred results are 
clearly those obtained through the system-GMM estimator.  
The results also highlight a positive and significant effect of the additive term of remittances 
in the models. Since the coefficient of this variable identifies the effect of remittances on 
                                                 
83
 This is also the case for the remittance variable which is recognized to have a strong inertia due to the high 
stability that the flow exhibits over the time. 
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government spending on education when the governance variable equals 0, this suggests that 
remittances increase the level of public expenditure in countries which do not suffer from 
governance problems. This result can be explained by the impact that remittances can exert on 
government indirect tax revenues, which help government to finance more public services. 
5.3.2. Results for public health spending 
The results are presented in Tables 5.3 and 5.4. All the diagnostic tests associated with the 
GMM methodology validate the estimation results. In Table 5.3, we present the results by 
using the Arellano-Bond estimator, and the system-GMM results are shown in Table 5.4. The 
difference-GMM results of Table 5.3 validate (in 5 cases out of 6) the hypothesis that 
remittance inflows reduce public health spending in countries experiencing governance 
problems.84 The system-GMM results (Table 5.4) highlight a fiscal retrenchment in the health 
sector in 4 cases out of 6. The coefficient of the interactive term of remittances crossed with 
the governance indicators is not statistically significant in the case of corruption and 
regulatory quality, even though they exhibit the expected negative sign. In all the remaining 
cases, the hypothesis that remittances reduce strongly the allocation of public funds into the 
health sector is not rejected by the data. Again, the strongest impact is observed when the 
variable “Rule of law” is used (column 2). 
Regarding the control variables, only the lagged dependent variable, the GDP per capita, and 
the additive term of remittances exhibit statistically significant coefficients in some 
specifications. 
5.4. Robustness checks 
We proceed in three steps to check the robustness of the previous results.  
                                                 
84
 The only case for which the coefficient of the interaction term is not significant is the specification using the 
regulatory quality. 
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5.4.1. Adding an external instrument for remittances 
We estimate the models with an augmented system-GMM-IV estimator in which remittances, 
and remittances crossed with the indicators of governance, are instrumented by their lagged 
value and by an external instrument borrowed from the recent macro-econometric literature 
on remittances. Though we do not possess a sufficient number of excluded instruments for it 
to be possible to apply standard IV techniques, the addition of these external instruments 
should go some way towards vitiating the potential “weak instruments” problem that often 
arises in the context of traditional GMM estimation (Arcand et al., 2008). Two external 
instruments were added: the log-weighted GDP per capita for each of the migrant host 
countries, and this variable crossed with each indicator of governance quality (Aggarwal et 
al., 2011; Acosta et al., 2009).85  
5.4.2. Testing for the existence of a common factor representation in the system-GMM-
IV estimation 
Consider again the model describing the effect of remittances on public spending conditional 
on the level of governance: 
tiititititititi uGVGVRRXS ,,3,,2,1,, ' εθθθβ +++∗++=         (4) 
Suppose that the error term of the model is serially autocorrelated, 
tititi ,1,, υσεε += −  with 1<σ  and ti,υ ~ MA(0)                  (5) 
                                                 
85
 We computed the GDP per capita in the migrants’ host countries by weighting the GDP per capita of all other 
countries by the share that each of these countries represents in the emigration of workers of developing 
countries. The bilateral migration matrix used to make calculations was drawn from the World Bank web site: 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPECTS/0,,contentMDK:21154867~
pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:476883,00.html 
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As noted by Blundell and Bond (2000) and Arcand et al. (2008), this type of model has a 
dynamic common factor representation which involves σ-differencing the model so as to 
obtain: 
+∗+∗+++++=
−−−−− 1,1,2,,21,1,11,,1,, '' titititititititititi GVRGVRRRXXSS σθθσθθσββσ  
                                                
( ) 1,,1,3,3 1 −− −+−++ titiititi uGVGV σεεσσθθ         (6) 
which can be rewritten as: 
+∗+∗+++++=
−−−−− 1,1,6,,51,4,321,1,1,, '' titititititititititi GVRGVRRRXXSS pipipipipipiσ  
 tiititi uGVGV ,
*
1,8,7 υλpipi +++ −       (7) 
and where the common factor restrictions are given by: 
                            1−−= ll piσpi  (l = 2, 3 … 8).                         (8) 
Given consistent estimates of the unrestricted parameter vector πl and var(πl), these 
restrictions can be tested and imposed using minimum distance to obtain the restricted 
parameter vector ( )σθβ ,, . 
5.4.3. Aggregating all the dimensions of governance into a single index using the 
principal component analysis 
We estimate the public spending models using an aggregate index of governance quality 
which combines all the 6 separate dimensions into a single index. The principal component 
analysis method is used to achieve this. The aggregate index of governance is the first 
principal component of the vector of the six indicators of governance already constructed. 
Table E2 in the appendix shows that the first principal component accounts for almost 75% of 
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the overall variance. The table also presents the eigenvectors and the correlation between the 
synthetic indicator and each of the variables.  
5.4.4. Results of the robustness tests 
In Table 5.5 (public education spending models) and 5.6 (public health spending models), we 
test the robustness of the results using the augmented system-GMM-IV in which we include 
the external instrument for remittances, and remittances crossed with the indicator of 
governance. We also test and impose the common factor representation in this system-GMM-
IV. The results indicate that the set of the instruments used (the lagged internal instruments 
and the external instruments) are valid according to the p-values of the difference-in-Hansen 
tests, the second order autocorrelation tests of the residuals in first difference, and to the 
Hansen over-identification test p-values. Moreover, the test of the common factor restrictions 
suggests that the null hypothesis that these restrictions are valid cannot be rejected in all 
cases.  
For the public education spending model (Table 5.5), all the coefficients of the interactive 
variables exhibit the expected negative signs and are statistically significant. These results 
confirm the hypothesis that remittance inflows are creating a public moral hazard problem in 
the public education sector for badly governed countries. The same results are obtained for the 
case of public health spending (Table 5.6). However, there remain two instances for which the 
coefficients of the interactive term are not statistically significant - Regulatory quality and 
Corruption). This result had already been demonstrated in Table 5.4.   
In Table 5.7 and Table 5.8, we replace the separate indicators of governance by the composite 
index of governance derived from the principal component analysis.86 In each of Tables 5.7 
and 5.8, column 1 presents the results obtained by using only internal instruments (lagged 
                                                 
86
 The aggregate index is rescaled so that the variable is between 0 and 1. 
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value) while column 2 tests the robustness of the results by adding the two external 
instruments for remittances. Column 3 shows the results obtained by re-estimating the model 
as in column 2, but by imposing the common factor representation.  
Whatever the specifications, the results highlight a negative and highly significant coefficient 
of the interactive term of remittances crossed with the composite governance index. 
Moreover, the range of the estimates of this coefficient is similar to what have been estimated 
in the previous tables.  
We can therefore conclude that even when all the dimensions of governance are combined 
into a composite index, the finding that remittances reduce public spending on education and 
health in countries experiencing governance problems still remains, and is highly significant. 
 
 
5.5. Concluding remarks 
This chapter analyzed the effect of remittances on public policies in countries affected by 
governance problems. We tested the hypothesis that governments of badly governed countries 
tend to reduce the level of public spending in social sectors (education and health) when the 
level of remittances increases. More generally, we argued that remittances create a public 
moral hazard problem in those developing countries with governance problems. Using a large 
cross-section of developing countries (86 countries) observed over the recent period 1996-
2007, and after factoring in the endogeneity of remittances, the potential effect of remittances 
on the demand for public services and the other sources of financing for the social sectors, the 
paper concludes that the remittance-induced fiscal retrenchment in social sectors takes place 
in developing countries with serious governance problems. 
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The paper has illustrated how remittances combined with bad public governance might induce 
a moral hazard problem both on government and households. Indeed, the negative effect of 
remittances on public spending on social sectors in institutionally vulnerable countries is the 
combination of two reinforcing effects: (i) public moral hazard - because the government has 
more incentive to reduce and divert resources, rather than providing subsidies since it thinks 
that remittances will do the “job”. (ii) household moral hazard - because remittances mollify 
the recipient households which do not have the incentive to monitor the government and so 
leave the cost of insurance to the migrant. 
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Table 5.1: Governance quality, remittances and public education spending, difference-GMM estimation results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Remittances 0.145 0.060 0.062 0.105 -0.029 0.042 
 (1.35) (0.71) (1.20) (1.35) (0.58) (1.11) 
Remittances*Corruption -0.451*      
 (1.89)      
Remittances*Rule of law  -0.246     
  (1.23)     
Remittances*Regulatory quality   -0.415*    
   (1.68)    
Remittances*Government Effectiveness    -0.367*   
    (1.73)   
Remittances*Political stability     -0.081  
     (0.49)  
Remittances*Voice and accountability      -0.242** 
      (2.61) 
Corruption -0.719      
 (0.68)      
Rule of law  -0.428     
  (0.26)     
Regulatory quality   -1.836    
   (1.33)    
Government Effectiveness    -0.214   
    (0.30)   
Political stability     -0.396  
     (0.44)  
Voice and accountability      -1.008 
      (1.11) 
Lag of the dependent variable 0.532** 0.509** 0.313 0.550** 0.398* 0.362 
 (2.12) (2.22) (1.20) (2.42) (1.89) (1.61) 
Education aid  0.006 0.001 0.000 0.002 -0.000 -0.002 
 (0.36) (0.03) (0.01) (0.12) (0.01) (0.13) 
GDP per capita 0.562 0.468 0.296 0.833 0.388 0.461 
 (0.67) (0.66) (0.37) (1.24) (0.78) (0.79) 
Debt service 0.006 0.005 -0.029 0.015 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.21) (0.17) (0.78) (0.52) (0.06) (0.02) 
Population aged <14 0.779 0.902 0.507 1.628 0.757 0.807 
 (0.44) (0.58) (0.29) (1.13) (0.67) (0.64) 
Inflation  -1.026 -0.713 -0.931 -0.856 -0.888 -0.812 
 (1.15) (0.91) (1.14) (1.09) (1.02) (1.15) 
Urbanization 1.564* 1.462** 2.200* 1.319* 1.570** 1.417* 
 (1.71) (2.03) (1.92) (1.72) (2.15) (1.98) 
Observations 433 437 439 439 439 439 
Countries 77 78 78 78 78 78 
Joint significance of coefficients of 
Remittances., p-value 
0.124 0.349 0.240 0.224 0.434 0.038 
m1:p-value 0.055 0.065 0.182 0.045 0.110 0.083 
m2:p-value 0.467 0.521 0.543 0.700 0.383 0.478 
Hansen OID test, p-value 0.707 0.269 0.288 0.457 0.125 0.201 
Nb instruments 19 19 19 19 19 19 
Note: Absolute robust t statistics in parentheses. The governance variables are reverted so that high values indicate a high level of bad 
governance. All the variables excepting the governance measures are expressed in natural logarithm form. m1 and m2 p-values refer to 
the Arellano and Bond (1991) test of autocorrelation of order 1 and 2 of residuals in first difference, respectively. The one-step 
difference-GMM is retained to estimate the coefficients. The unit of analysis is the country and the unit of observation is the year. 
Remittances and remittances crossed with the governance variables are treated as predetermined and therefore instrumented by their 
lagged values. Dependent variable: log of public education spending-to-GDP. 
*
 p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 5.2 : Governance quality, remittances and public education spending, system-GMM estimation results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Remittances 0.072 0.153* 0.063* 0.113 0.047* 0.086** 
 (1.35) (1.70) (1.85) (1.60) (1.73) (2.11) 
Remittances*Corruption -0.169*      
 (1.72)      
Remittances*Rule of law  -0.386**     
  (2.03)     
Remittances*Regulatory quality   -0.220**    
   (2.47)    
Remittances*Government Effectiveness    -0.306**   
    (2.05)   
Remittances*Political stability     -0.206**  
     (2.24)  
Remittances*Voice and accountability      -0.256*** 
      (2.65) 
Corruption -0.359      
 (1.58)      
Rule of law  -0.433     
  (1.19)     
Regulatory quality   -0.198    
   (0.95)    
Government Effectiveness    -0.532   
    (1.56)   
Political stability     -0.189  
     (0.92)  
Voice and accountability      -0.311 
      (1.45) 
Lag of the dependent variable 0.665*** 0.643*** 0.657*** 0.683*** 0.662*** 0.645*** 
 (3.72) (3.54) (3.62) (3.82) (3.99) (3.41) 
Education aid  0.009 0.006 0.011 0.007 0.006 0.007 
 (0.53) (0.35) (0.65) (0.45) (0.41) (0.41) 
GDP per capita 0.001 0.014 0.025 -0.012 0.030 0.005 
 (0.03) (0.32) (0.51) (0.32) (0.67) (0.12) 
Debt service 0.002 -0.017 0.004 -0.009 0.006 -0.003 
 (0.08) (0.67) (0.16) (0.45) (0.23) (0.10) 
Population aged <14 -0.012 -0.011 -0.002 -0.006 -0.033 -0.030 
 (0.09) (0.07) (0.01) (0.04) (0.26) (0.20) 
Inflation  -0.715*** -0.761*** -0.624*** -0.671*** -0.595** -0.677*** 
 (2.98) (3.32) (2.74) (2.91) (2.52) (2.90) 
Urbanization 0.014 0.009 0.000 0.028 -0.038 0.005 
 (0.23) (0.13) (0.01) (0.51) (0.58) (0.08) 
Intercept 0.725 0.719 0.451 0.765 0.661 0.752 
 (1.11) (0.89) (0.67) (1.09) (1.03) (1.06) 
Observations 537 541 543 543 543 543 
Countries 80 80 80 80 80 80 
Joint significance of coefficients of 
Remittances., p-value 
0.143 0.070 0.033 0.035 0.084 0.030 
m1:p-value 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
m2:p-value 0.644 0.660 0.670 0.717 0.719 0.724 
Hansen OID test, p-value 0.736 0.595 0.610 0.624 0.536 0.535 
Difference-in-Hansen test, p-value 0.832 0.366 0.937 0.541 0.539 0.292 
Nb instruments 27 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Absolute robust t statistics in parentheses. The governance variables are reverted so that high values indicate a high level of bad 
governance. All the variables excepting the governance measures are expressed in natural logarithm form. m1 and m2 p-values refer to 
the Arellano and Bond (1991) test of autocorrelation of order 1 and 2 of residuals in first difference, respectively. The one-step system-
GMM is retained to estimate the coefficients. Difference-in-Hansen test reports the p-values based on the null hypothesis that the 
instruments in the levels equation are exogenous. The unit of analysis is the country and the unit of observation is the year. Remittances 
and remittances crossed with the governance variables are treated as predetermined and therefore instrumented by their lagged values. 
Dependent variable: log of public education spending-to-GDP. 
*
 p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 5.3: Governance quality, remittances and public health spending, difference-GMM estimation results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Remittances 0.152* 0.113 0.022 0.109** 0.036 0.047 
 (1.68) (1.46) (0.31) (2.44) (0.58) (0.70) 
Remittances*Corruption -0.516**      
 (2.22)      
Remittances*Rule of law  -0.404*     
  (1.71)     
Remittances*Regulatory quality   -0.143    
   (0.40)    
Remittances*Government Effectiveness    -0.469**   
    (2.50)   
Remittances*Political stability     -0.354*  
     (1.78)  
Remittances*Voice and accountability      -0.392** 
      (2.56) 
Corruption 0.097      
 (0.08)      
Rule of law  -1.259     
  (0.65)     
Regulatory quality   0.680    
   (0.96)    
Government Effectiveness    -0.656   
    (0.49)   
Political stability     -1.040  
     (0.98)  
Voice and accountability      -0.117 
      (0.07) 
Lag dependent variable 0.682*** 0.666*** 0.396 0.623*** 0.723*** 0.535** 
 (3.66) (2.74) (1.49) (3.22) (2.87) (2.04) 
Health aid -0.005 0.005 0.000 0.006 -0.014 0.016 
 (0.15) (0.16) (0.00) (0.22) (0.34) (0.43) 
Debt service 0.034 0.027 0.046 0.049 0.041 0.017 
 (0.86) (0.66) (1.08) (1.41) (0.98) (0.37) 
GDP per capita -0.440 -0.639 -0.052 -0.657 -0.514 -0.554 
 (0.90) (1.30) (0.12) (1.32) (1.12) (0.78) 
Inflation rate -0.597 -0.803 -0.482 -0.553 -0.515 -0.278 
 (0.94) (1.31) (1.03) (1.12) (0.96) (0.51) 
Population growth 0.216** 0.176 0.080 0.150* 0.145 0.229 
 (2.09) (1.65) (0.83) (1.71) (1.65) (1.00) 
Urbanization 0.769 0.976 0.682 1.051 1.506* 0.492 
 (0.88) (1.57) (0.82) (1.57) (1.86) (0.39) 
Observations 464 467 469 469 467 469 
Countries 83 84 85 85 85 85 
Joint significance of coefficients of 
Remittances., p-value 
0.084 0.231 0.922 0.032 0.189 0.035 
m1:p-value 0.003 0.012 0.077 0.005 0.010 0.033 
m2:p-value 0.308 0.293 0.325 0.222 0.247 0.313 
Hansen OID test, p-value 0.810 0.616 0.283 0.658 0.520 0.594 
Nb instruments 19 19 19 19 19 19 
Note: Absolute robust t statistics in parentheses. The governance variables are reverted so that high values indicate a high level of bad 
governance. All the variables excepting the governance measures are expressed in natural logarithm form. m1 and m2 p-values refer to 
the Arellano and Bond (1991) test of autocorrelation of order 1 and 2 of residuals in first difference, respectively. The one-step 
difference-GMM is retained to estimate the coefficients. The unit of analysis is the country and the unit of observation is the year. 
Remittances and remittances crossed with the governance variables are treated as predetermined and therefore instrumented by their 
lagged values. Dependent variable: log of public health spending-to-GDP. 
*
 p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 5.4 : Governance quality, remittances and public health spending, system-GMM estimation results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Remittances -0.001 0.148* 0.020 0.052 0.046 0.071** 
 (0.01) (1.84) (0.59) (1.36) (1.51) (2.07) 
Remittances*Corruption -0.057      
 (0.76)      
Remittances*Rule of law  -0.392**     
  (2.31)     
Remittances*Regulatory quality   -0.137    
   (1.59)    
Remittances*Government Effectiveness    -0.211**   
    (2.33)   
Remittances*Political stability     -0.222**  
     (2.38)  
Remittances*Voice and accountability      -0.252*** 
      (2.96) 
Corruption -0.218*      
 (1.81)      
Rule of law  -0.238     
  (0.96)     
Regulatory quality   -0.190    
   (0.97)    
Government Effectiveness    -0.244   
    (1.07)   
Political stability     -0.012  
     (0.07)  
Voice and accountability      -0.283 
      (1.62) 
Lag dependent variable 0.736*** 0.754*** 0.735*** 0.741*** 0.760*** 0.728*** 
 (8.37) (7.96) (8.03) (8.08) (9.27) (7.90) 
Health aid 0.012 0.006 0.011 0.011 0.005 0.003 
 (0.83) (0.40) (0.78) (0.79) (0.39) (0.21) 
Debt service 0.010 -0.021 0.005 -0.003 -0.002 -0.006 
 (0.40) (0.71) (0.18) (0.12) (0.08) (0.24) 
GDP per capita 0.070* 0.055 0.076* 0.066 0.076** 0.049 
 (1.76) (1.36) (1.75) (1.58) (2.26) (1.23) 
Inflation rate -0.273 -0.558 -0.259 -0.347 -0.325 -0.452 
 (0.78) (1.34) (0.76) (0.93) (0.85) (1.14) 
Population growth -0.007 -0.011 -0.008 -0.011 -0.007 -0.005 
 (0.35) (0.47) (0.40) (0.54) (0.37) (0.25) 
Urbanization -0.000 0.040 0.001 0.014 -0.007 0.026 
 (0.01) (0.67) (0.02) (0.24) (0.14) (0.46) 
Intercept -0.115 -0.119 -0.204 -0.120 -0.250 -0.046 
 (0.54) (0.44) (0.89) (0.45) (1.13) (0.19) 
Observations 578 581 583 583 580 583 
Countries 86 86 86 86 86 86 
Joint significance of coefficients of 
Remittances., p-value 
0.173 0.034 0.105 0.029 0.053 0.012 
m1:p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
m2:p-value 0.275 0.304 0.221 0.234 0.257 0.208 
Hansen OID test, p-value 0.173 0.222 0.156 0.109 0.164 0.312 
Difference-in-Hansen test, p-value 0.070 0.081 0.073 0.015 0.034 0.129 
Nb instruments 31 31 31 31 31 31 
Note: Absolute robust t statistics in parentheses. The governance variables are reverted so that high values indicate a high level of bad 
governance. All the variables excepting the governance measures are expressed in natural logarithm form. m1 and m2 p-values refer to 
the Arellano and Bond (1991) test of autocorrelation of order 1 and 2 of residuals in first difference, respectively. The one-step system-
GMM is retained to estimate the coefficients. Difference-in-Hansen test reports the p-values based on the null hypothesis that the 
instruments in the levels equation are exogenous. The unit of analysis is the country and the unit of observation is the year. Remittances 
and remittances crossed with the governance variables are treated as predetermined and therefore instrumented by their lagged values. 
Dependent variable: log of public health spending-to-GDP. 
*
 p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 5.5 Governance quality, remittances and public education spending, system-GMM-IV with a Common Factor 
representation.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Remittances 0.033 0.103** 0.045 0.095** 0.013 0.058* 
 (0.94) (1.97) (0.709) (2.51) (0.45) (1.83) 
Remittances*Corruption -0.136*      
 (1.67)      
Remittances*Rule of law  -0.359**     
  (2.55)     
Remittances*Regulatory quality   -0.245*    
   (1.64)    
Remittances*Government Effectiveness    -0.319***   
    (2.95)   
Remittances*Political stability     -0.211**  
     (2.04)  
Remittances*Voice and accountability      -0.228*** 
      (3.38) 
Corruption -0.081      
 (0.44)      
Rule of law  -0.097     
  (0.308)     
Regulatory quality   0.026    
   (0.08)    
Government Effectiveness    -0.258   
    (0.89)   
Political stability     0.345  
     (1.30)  
Voice and accountability      -0.013 
      (0.05) 
Lag of the dependent variable 0.954*** 0.943*** 0.942*** 0.949*** 0.953*** 0.952*** 
 (87.97) (93.70) (75.78) (109.13) (84.62) (88.71) 
Observations 421 427 430 430 430 430 
Countries 75 76 76 76 76 76 
m1:p-value 0.013 0.013 0.002 0.016 0.009 0.005 
m2:p-value 0.667 0.608 0.967 0.622 0.513 0.517 
Hansen OID test, p-value 0.536 0.411 0.243 0.513 0.181 0.367 
Difference-in-Hansen test, p-value 0.486 0.589 0.190 0.635 0.315 0.377 
Comfac, p-value 0.581 0.835 0.868 0.961 0.484 0.589 
Nb instruments 35 35 35 35 35 35 
Note: Absolute robust t statistics in parentheses. Control variables are included in all the models but are not reported. Comfac is a 
minimum distance test of the non-linear common factor restrictions imposed in the restricted models. P-values are reported. Difference-
in-Hansen test reports the p-values based on the null hypothesis that the instruments in the levels equation are exogenous. The 
governance variables are reverted so that high values indicate a high level of bad governance. All the variables excepting the governance 
measures are expressed in natural logarithm form. m1 and m2 p-values refer to the Arellano and Bond (1991) test of autocorrelation of 
order 1 and 2 of residuals in first difference, respectively. The one-step system-GMM is retained to estimate the coefficients. The unit of 
analysis is the country and the unit of observation is the year. Remittances and remittances crossed with the governance variables are 
treated as predetermined and therefore instrumented by their lagged values. The log of the GDP per capita in the host countries and this 
variable crossed with the indicators of governance are added in the instrument matrix. Dependent variable: log of public education 
spending-to-GDP. 
*
 p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 5.6: Governance quality, remittances and public health spending, system-GMM-IV with a Common Factor 
representation.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Remittances 0.022 0.057* 0.010 0.055*** 0.008 0.047*** 
 (0.842) (1.70) (0.32) (2.63) (0.37) (3.03) 
Remittances*Corruption -0.063      
 (1.03)      
Remittances*Rule of law  -0.178**     
  (1.96)     
Remittances*Regulatory quality   -0.093    
   (1.15)    
Remittances*Government Effectiveness    -0.187***   
    (2.94)   
Remittances*Political stability     -0.116**  
     (2.43)  
Remittances*Voice and accountability      -0.190*** 
      (3.77) 
Corruption -1.002***      
 (2.88)      
Rule of law  -1.137*     
  (1.88)     
Regulatory quality   0.048    
   (0.09)    
Government Effectiveness    -0.570   
    (1.30)   
Political stability     -0.272  
     (0.67)  
Voice and accountability      -0.822* 
      (1.86) 
Lag of the dependent variable 0.802*** 0.749*** 0.777*** 0.739*** 0.806*** 0.735*** 
 (13.05) (8.53) (11.00) (9.40) (11.77) (8.67) 
Observations 532 538 539 539 537 539 
Countries 81 82 82 82 82 82 
m1:p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
m2:p-value 0.699 0.446 0.351 0.320 0.402 0.289 
Hansen OID test, p-value 0.615 0.602 0.633 0.296 0.576 0.634 
Difference-in-Hansen test, p-value 0.812 0.741 0.768 0.265 0.843 0.472 
Comfac, p-value 0.983 0.965 0.976 0.984 0.917 0.975 
Nb instruments 41 41 41 41 41 41 
Note: Absolute robust t statistics in parentheses. Control variables are included in all the models but are not reported. Comfac is a 
minimum distance test of the non-linear common factor restrictions imposed in the restricted models. P-values are reported. Difference-
in-Hansen test reports the p-values based on the null hypothesis that the instruments in the levels equation are exogenous. The 
governance variables are reverted so that high values indicate a high level of bad governance. All the variables excepting the governance 
measures are expressed in natural logarithm form. m1 and m2 p-values refer to the Arellano and Bond (1991) test of autocorrelation of 
order 1 and 2 of residuals in first difference, respectively. The one-step system-GMM is retained to estimate the coefficients. The unit of 
analysis is the country and the unit of observation is the year. Remittances and remittances crossed with the governance variables are 
treated as predetermined and therefore instrumented by their lagged values. The log of the GDP per capita in the host countries and this 
variable crossed with the indicators of governance are added in the instrument matrix. Dependent variable: log of public health 
spending-to-GDP. 
*
 p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 5.7: Governance quality, remittances and public education spending, Results 
using the principal component analysis of the governance indicators. (system-GMM 
estimator) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Remittances 0.097 0.086 0.069 
 (1.47) (1.37) (1.55) 
Remittances*Governance quality  -0.294** -0.275** -0.298** 
 (1.99) (1.99) (2.12) 
Governance quality index (composite index) -0.547 -0.560 0.204 
 (1.56) (1.53) (0.51) 
Lag of the dependent variable 0.675*** 0.670*** 0.950*** 
 (3.81) (3.72) (93.79) 
Observations 537 526 421 
Countries 80 78 75 
m1:p-value 0.000 0.001 0.016 
m2:p-value 0.807 0.760 0.448 
Hansen OID test, p-value 0.694 0.691 0.295 
Difference-in-Hansen test, p-value 0.705 0.485 0.248 
Comfac test, p-value .. .. 0.575 
Nb instruments 27 29 35 
Note: Absolute robust t statistics in parentheses. Control variables are included in all the models but 
are not reported. The governance index is computed from a principal component analysis on the six 
dimensions of governance used before and is rescaled between 0 and 1. All the variables excepting 
the governance measure are expressed in natural logarithm form. m1 and m2 p-values refer to the 
Arellano and Bond (1991) test of autocorrelation of order 1 and 2 of residuals in first difference, 
respectively. The one-step system-GMM is retained to estimate the coefficients. Difference-in-
Hansen test reports the p-values based on the null hypothesis that the instruments in the levels 
equation are exogenous. Comfac is a minimum distance test of the non-linear common factor 
restrictions imposed in the restricted models. P-values are reported. The unit of analysis is the 
country and the unit of observation is the year. Remittances and remittances crossed with the 
governance variable are treated as predetermined and therefore instrumented by their lagged values 
(Column 1) and we augment the instrument matrix with the log of GDP per capita in the host 
countries and with this variable crossed with the governance index (Column 2). In column (3), we 
estimate the model by imposing and testing for the common factor representation. Dependent 
variable: log of public education spending-to-GDP. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 5.8: Governance quality, remittances and public health spending, Results using the 
principal component analysis of the governance indicators (system-GMM estimator). 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Remittances 0.078 0.055 0.037** 
 (1.64) (1.31) (2.14) 
Remittances*Governance quality -0.271** -0.226** -0.162** 
 (2.47) (2.12) (2.49) 
Governance quality index (composite index) -0.368 -0.373 -1.450** 
 (1.45) (1.44) (2.18) 
Lag dependent variable 0.745*** 0.756*** 0. 783*** 
 (8.19) (8.45) (9.36) 
Observations 575 565 530 
Countries 86 83 81 
m1:p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
m2:p-value 0.239 0.241 0.315 
Hansen OID test, p-value 0.210 0.285 0.666 
Difference-in-Hansen test, p-value 0.043 0.056 0.522 
Comfac test, p-value .. .. 0.946 
Nb instruments 31 33 41 
Note: Absolute robust t statistics in parentheses. Control variables are included in all the models but are 
not reported. The governance quality index is computed from a principal component analysis on the six 
dimensions of governance used before and is rescaled between 0 and 1. All the variables excepting the 
governance measure are expressed in natural logarithm form. m1 and m2 p-values refer to the Arellano 
and Bond (1991) test of autocorrelation of order 1 and 2 of residuals in first difference, respectively. The 
one-step system-GMM is retained to estimate the coefficients. Difference-in-Hansen test reports the p-
values based on the null hypothesis that the instruments in the levels equation are exogenous. Comfac is a 
minimum distance test of the non-linear common factor restrictions imposed in the restricted models. P-
values are reported. The unit of analysis is the country and the unit of observation is the year. Remittances 
and remittances crossed with the governance variable are treated as predetermined and therefore 
instrumented by their lagged values (Column 1) and we augment the instrument matrix with the log of 
GDP per capita in the host countries and with this variable crossed with the governance index (Column 
2). In column (3), we estimate the model by imposing and testing for the common factor representation. 
Dependent variable: log of public health spending-to-GDP. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Appendix E 
Table E1: Descriptive statistics 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Governance measures 
     Corruption 1664 0.58 0.17 0 1 
     Rule of law 1692 0.51 0.15 0 1 
     Regulatory quality 1716 0.43 0.16 0 1 
     Government Effectiveness 1716 0.48 0.16 0 1 
     Political stability 1684 0.40 0.19 0 1 
     Voice and accountability 1730 0.49 0.22 0 1 
     Composite index  1636 0.47 0.16 0 1 
GDP per capita (log) 1688 6.94 1.09 4.19 9.20 
Education aid (% GDP) (log) 1572 -1.60 1.94 -10.32 2.91 
Health aid (% GDP) (log) 1519 -1.91 2.39 -11.54 2.73 
Debt service (% GDP) (log) 1524 1.24 0.94 -2.94 4.91 
Population aged <14 (%) (log) 1703 3.54 0.28 2.60 3.91 
Population growth rate (%) 1795 1.59 1.25 -10.96 9.09 
log (100+Inflation rate) 1709 0.10 0.20 -0.27 4.01 
Urbanization rate (log) 1783 3.73 0.51 2.00 4.54 
Public education spending (% GDP) (log) 1065 1.33 0.54 -1.29 3.14 
Public health spending (%GDP) (log) 1143 0.63 0.70 -1.76 2.76 
Remittances (% GDP) (log) 1113 0.35 2.07 -10.19 3.90 
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Table E2: Aggregating governance variables: principal 
components analysis (first eigenvector, correlation) 
Variables Governance quality,  
Composite index 
  
Control of corruption 0.423 
 (0.899) 
Rule of law 0.437 
 (0.930) 
Regulatory quality 0.405 
 (0.860) 
Government effectiveness 0.430 
 (0.913) 
Political stability 0.363 
 (0.771) 
Voice and Accountability 0.386 
 (0.821) 
  
Eigenvalue 4.52 
Variance proportion 75.3% 
Note: We report the first eigenvector resulting from the first 
principal component analysis of governance quality. The aggregate 
index of governance is obtained using the following formula: GV = 
0.423*K1 + 0.437*K2 + 0.405*K3 + 0.430*K4 + 0.363*K5 + 
0.386*K6, where K1, K2, K3, K4, K5, and K6 represent 
standardized measures of Control of corruption, Rule of law, 
Regulatory quality, Government effectiveness, Political stability, 
and Political stability, respectively. In addition, the numbers in 
parentheses (below the different eigenvectors) represent the 
correlation of the first principal component with the corresponding 
governance variable. The governance quality variables have been 
rescaled so that high values indicate high level of bad governance. 
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Table E3: List of countries in the sample (86) 
Albania Dominica Kenya Papua New Guinea Ukraine 
Argentina Dominican Rep. Kyrgyz Rep. Paraguay Uruguay 
Armenia Ecuador Lebanon Peru Vanuatu 
Azerbaijan Egypt Lesotho Philippines Venezuela 
Bangladesh El Salvador Liberia Senegal Yemen, Rep. 
Belize Ethiopia Madagascar Seychelles Zambia 
Benin Fiji Malawi Sierra Leone 
Bolivia Gabon Mali Sri Lanka 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Gambia Mauritania St. Kitts and Nevis 
Botswana Georgia Mexico St. Lucia 
Brazil Ghana Moldova St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
Burkina Faso Grenada Mongolia Sudan 
Burundi Guatemala Morocco Swaziland 
Cambodia Guinea Mozambique Tajikistan 
Cameroon Guinea-Bissau Nepal Tanzania 
Cape Verde Honduras Nicaragua Togo 
Colombia India Niger Tonga 
Costa Rica Jamaica Nigeria Tunisia 
Cote d'Ivoire Jordan Pakistan Turkey 
Djibouti Kazakhstan Panama Uganda   
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6.1. Introduction 
One of the most important issues faced by developing countries and which is raised even 
more seriously today is finding  ways to improve the internal mobilization of domestic 
resources in order to finance public goods. In a context of degradation of public finances in 
the developed world, the high dependency of developing countries on external development 
assistance should be addressed and reversed by acting on the ways to efficiently increase the 
mobilization of domestic resources. In this vein, looking at the ways to improve the 
mobilization of domestic resources and to build fiscal space in these countries is therefore 
crucial for the sustainability of public finances and for economic development in general. 
If the trend is a stagnation of foreign aid and other forms of development assistance to 
developing countries, it is worth noting that, at the same time, developing countries receive 
large amounts of external private transfers, namely migrant remittances. Remittances 
constitute a bulk of resources received by developing countries and some scholars argue they 
represent an external and stable source of funding for development (Ratha, 2005). To put 
some numbers in mind, the level of remittances has attained 338 billions of US dollars in 
2008. And despite the recent world wide crisis, remittances have shown a stronger 
comparative resilience than the other types of financial flows received by developing 
countries. Moreover, for a number of countries, remittances represent the most important 
source of external funding, going beyond the levels of foreign aid or foreign direct investment 
(Ratha, 2009).  
A number of studies has analyzed the macroeconomic impact of remittances in terms of 
growth, poverty, competitiveness and macroeconomic instability in receiving countries. The 
result showing that remittances significantly reduce poverty rates is largely accepted among 
scholars (Adams, 2005; Gupta et al., 2009). However, the role played by remittances in 
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enhancing economic growth is still an open debate. If the direct and linear contribution of 
remittances to economic growth seems difficult to conclude (Chami et al., 2009b), their 
positive effect on economic growth conditioned upon some factors (the quality of governance 
and the financial development) is now recognized (Catrinescu et al., 2009; Giuliano and Ruiz-
Arranz, 2009; Singh et al., 2009). On average, remittances also contribute towards reducing 
the volatility of output and consumption in the receiving countries (Chami et al., 2009a; 
Craigwell et al., 2010). However, these beneficial macroeconomic effects have a price. 
Remittances can appreciate the real exchange rate in countries and therefore reduce their 
external competitiveness (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2004; Acosta et al., 2009).  
In this macroeconomic literature on remittances, little is said about their consequences on 
public policy. Two recent papers, however, have questioned the implications of remittance 
inflows in terms of the sustainability of public finances and economic policy management. 
Abdih et al. (2009) investigated the impact of remittances on the sustainability of government 
debt using Lebanese fiscal data. Their main result is that the inclusion of remittances in the 
traditional analysis of the sustainability of the debt alters the amount of fiscal adjustment 
required to place debt on a sustainable path. They argue that one of the ways remittances can 
affect fiscal sustainability is the increase of the tax base. Even if they are not taxed directly, 
remittance flows may indirectly increase the revenue that the government receives from 
consumption-based and trade-based taxation since they contribute to a higher consumption of 
domestic and imported goods. This idea has been empirically confirmed by Abdih et al. 
(2010) using panel data for countries in the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia. 
Another paper on the link between remittances and public finances is Chami et al. (2008). 
Using a dynamic general equilibrium model calibrated to match the characteristics of Chilean 
economy, they showed that the use of a tax on labor income has the undesirable effect of 
making the government rely more on inflation to appropriate resources as the level of 
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remittances increases. This happens because remittances decrease the labor supply and 
consequently the labor tax base. In contrast, when the government uses consumption taxation, 
an increase in remittances leads to an increase in tax revenues through private consumption 
and the government policy is relatively less distortionary. 
The main conclusions of these three recent papers are twofold. Firstly, migrants’ remittances 
might increase the government tax revenue even if they are not directly taxed by the 
government. Secondly, since remittances enter the receiving economy through familial 
transfers they indirectly affect fiscal policy and the debt sustainability through the activities of 
remittance-receiving households, primarily through their consumption and saving decisions. 
Abdih et al. (2009) stressed that it is in this respect that remittances are different from natural 
resources, which governments may own and from which they derive revenue, from foreign 
and domestic public aid, which directly enter the government budget constraint, and from 
private capital flows that enter directly into the production process.    
This paper extends the previous analyses to the whole sample of developing countries. It 
investigates the contribution of remittances to both the level and the stability of government 
tax revenue. Since the effects of remittances on tax revenue are essentially indirect (through 
consumption), this paper therefore examines the role of a value added tax system in the 
relationship between remittances and total tax revenue ratio.  
Two main hypotheses are tested. (i) Without taxing remittances directly, government can 
enjoy more tax revenue ratios through the VAT system since remittances are largely used for 
consumption purposes and since the main tax base for VAT is consumption. (ii) Given the 
positive contribution of remittances  to output and private consumption smoothing (Chami et 
al. 2009a; Craigwell et al., 2010; Bugamelli and Paternò, 2011), countries that have adopted a 
VAT will enjoy less volatile tax revenue ratios thanks to remittance inflows.  
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This paper raises at least two important debates. Firstly, it explores a new way through which 
the adoption of a VAT could enhance the level of tax revenue. A recent paper has shown the 
positive contribution of the VAT to the domestic resource mobilization and its main 
conclusion is that the VAT is more efficient for tax revenue mobilization the more opened the 
economy is (Keen and Lockwood, 2010). By looking at another aspect of globalization with 
remittances, our study complements earlier papers. Secondly, the study examines whether the 
presence of a VAT is also stabilizing to the extent that it enhances the stabilizing contribution 
of remittances to the tax revenue ratio. This question seems important to investigate since 
previous studies have highlighted that the volatility of government tax revenue is quite large 
for developing countries (Brun et al., 2006) and leads to an instability of government 
spending (Lim, 1983; Bleaney et al., 1995; Ebeke and Ehrhart, 2011). To our knowledge, this 
study is the first one that combines remittances and the VAT-based taxation system to analyze 
both the dynamic of the level and the volatility of government revenue in the developing 
world. 
To test the two formulated hypotheses, a large sample of developing countries and panel 
estimators are retained. Whatever the estimator (OLS with fixed effects, Least Squares 
Dummy Variables Corrected estimator, Difference-GMM estimator and System-GMM 
estimator), the results do not reject the hypothesis that remittances increase both the level and 
the stability of government tax revenue in presence of a VAT. These results are also robust to 
an alternative definition of workers’ remittances. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the econometric models of 
the relationship between remittances, the level and the volatility of the tax revenue ratio. The 
section also discusses the data that are used and the identification strategy. Section 3 presents 
and discusses the results and the robustness checks that are conducted. Section 4 concludes on 
policy implications.  
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6.2. Empirical analysis 
This section presents the specified econometric models, the methodology that is implemented 
and the data that are used.  
6.2.1. Tax revenue ratio equation 
The econometric model 
The econometric model of the determinants of the tax revenue ratio is similar to previous 
studies for the choice of control variables (Gupta, 2007; Mahdavi, 2008 and Keen and 
Lockwood, 2010). We add two terms to the traditional model: remittances and remittances 
interacted with a dummy variable for the VAT. More precisely, the specification takes the 
following form: 
titititititititi VVRRXty ,,,,2,1,, εηµλθθβα ++++∗++′+=    (1) 
where tity ,  is the total tax revenue ratio excluding grants (divided by country GDP), R is the 
remittance ratio (in percentage of GDP) and V a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if 
there is a VAT in each country i  for each year t and 0 otherwise. iµ , tη  and ti ,ε  are the 
country-specific effect, time-specific effect and the error term, respectively. X is the set of 
control variables. We control for the share of agriculture in GDP that is expected to be 
negatively correlated with the revenue ratio. It may also serve as a broad indicator of 
informality and economic development. Openness (measured as the sum of the GDP shares of 
imports and exports) is also a candidate: Rodrik (1998), for example, finds openness to be 
positively related to the size of government.87 We also allow demographic variables–the 
proportions of the population aged 14 or younger and 65 or over – to play a potential role. 
                                                 
87
 Given the importance to the VAT of collection at border points, one might also expect this variable to 
influence the VAT adoption decision and therefore reduces the selection bias behind the VAT adoption. 
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These variables may affect the need for the tax revenue to support those out of the labor 
market. Finally, we control for macroeconomic instability via the inflation rate (measured as 
the growth rate of the GDP deflator). 
In equation (1), the hypothesis tested is that 01 ≤θ  and 02 >θ  so that the impact of 
remittances in presence of a VAT ( 21 θθ + ) is positive while the impact of remittances on tax 
revenue ratio in absence of a VAT ( 1θ ) is negative or null.88 
Equation (1) is firstly estimated by ordinarily least squares with country and time fixed-effects 
(OLS-FE). However, this method has important shortcomings in our context. It does not allow 
to take into account the dynamic properties of the dependent variable (the tax rate) nor does it 
deal with the endogeneity of some regressors.89 The endogeneity of remittances is of concern 
here given that altruistic migrants can send more remittances in order to maintain the 
purchasing power of their family in their country of origin, especially when the tax burden is 
too high and reduces the disposal income. The endogeneity of remittances can also arise in the 
case of omitted variables. For example, the emigration of individuals can directly reduce the 
labor tax base and therefore total tax revenues, and at the same time, it determines the amount 
of remittance inflows.  
The endogeneity of the VAT adoption is due to the main motivation behind this reform. 
Countries choose to adopt a VAT in order to increase the efficiency of the revenue 
mobilization. Therefore, the VAT adoption is highly predetermined.  
To deal with these important issues, we proceed in two steps. Firstly, we adopt a dynamic 
panel specification of the equation (1). By introducing the lagged value of the tax revenue 
                                                 
88
 The impact of remittances in a context of no VAT is supposed to be negative or null since remittances can 
reduce labor force participation and therefore reduce the revenue collected from direct taxes (Chami et al., 
2008). 
89
 Indeed, the tax revenue ratio seems strongly autoregressive year by year given the slow dynamic of changes in 
the official tax rates in countries. 
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ratio, we both control for the inertia of the dependent variable and expect reducing the self-
selection bias in the VAT adoption. The equation takes the following form: 
tititititititititi VVRRXtyty ,,,,2,1,1,, εηµλθθβρα ++++∗++′++= −    (2) 
Given that the OLS-FE estimator is biased due to the presence of both the lagged dependent 
variable and the country fixed-effects, we use the Least Squares Dummy Variables Corrected 
estimator (LSDVCE) a method recently proposed by Kiviet (1995), Judson and Owen (1999), 
Bun and Kiviet (2003), and extended by Bruno (2005), to unbalanced panels such as the one 
used in this study. This method corrects the bias associated with dynamic panel data model 
with fixed-effects. The procedure has to be initialized by a consistent estimator to make the 
correction feasible, since the bias approximation depends on the unknown population 
parameters. In this study, we initialize the bias correction with the OLS-FE estimator. 
However, the main drawback is that the estimated asymptotic standard errors may provide 
poor approximations in small samples, possibly generating unreliable t-statistics. The 
statistical significance of the LSDVCE coefficients is therefore tested using bootstrapped 
standard errors (with 100 replications). 
The second strategy that we adopt to test the robustness of our results is to control for both the 
dynamic properties of the tax revenue ratio and the endogeneity of the regressors. Hence an 
econometric strategy based on instrumental variables must be implemented. Equation (2) in 
level and equation (2) in first differences are combined in a system and estimated with an 
extended GMM estimator system which allows the use of lagged differences and lagged 
levels of the explanatory variables (remittance terms and VAT dummy) as instruments 
(Blundell and Bond, 1998).90  
                                                 
90
 The paper uses the System-GMM estimator developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) for dynamic panel data 
with the Windmeijer (2005) correction for finite sample bias.  
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In order to improve the quality of the instrumentation of the VAT dummy, we augment 
standard GMM estimation techniques by adding an external instrument for the VAT dummy: 
for each country, the external instrument is the lagged share of geographical neighbors that 
have already adopted the VAT for each year t.91 The lagged value of this variable is used 
instead of its current value because imitation and neighborhood effects take time. This 
variable is also interacted with the lagged values of remittance ratio to instrument the 
interactive term of remittances crossed with the VAT dummy.  
For robustness checks, we also conduct estimations using the difference-GMM estimator 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991). In this context, equation (2) is firstly differentiated to eliminate 
the fixed-effects and the first-differentiated variables are instrumented by the lagged value of 
these variables in level. However, our preferred results are derived from the System-GMM 
estimator which is asymptotically more efficient in small samples.  
Data 
Tax revenue data are drawn from the IMF Government Financial Statistics database and from 
several IMF article IV reports. Data exclude grants and are expressed at the General 
Government level.  
We follow the World Bank in defining remittances as the sum of workers’ remittances and 
employees’ compensation(s). Workers’ remittances properly refer to current transfers by 
migrants who are employed and reside in the countries where they migrated (destination 
country); employees’ compensation should comprise wages, salaries and other benefits earned 
by individuals in countries different from their resident country (country of origin) and for 
work performed for and paid by residents of the destination countries. We use the sum of 
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 Keen and Lockwood (2010) used a similar variable as an important determinant of the VAT adoption. They 
also showed that the lagged value of tax revenue ratio significantly and negatively determines the adoption of the 
VAT. Thus, by controlling in equation (2) for the lagged value of the tax revenue ratio, we reduce the 
endogeneity of the VAT adoption. 
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these two items because for many developing countries the statistical distinction between the 
two could be highly problematic (Bugamelli and Paternò, 2011).  However, in order to check 
the robustness of the results in sub-section 3.3, we test an alternative measure of remittances 
by using the narrower definition (only workers’ remittances).  
VAT dummy is constructed according to the information on the dates of the adoption of the 
VAT that are provided by Ebrill et al. (2001) and updated. All the data for the remaining 
control variables are drawn from World Development Indicators. 
6.2.2. Tax revenue instability equation 
Econometric model 
The econometric model of the determinants of the instability of tax revenue ratio is similar to 
previous studies for the choice of control variables (Lim, 1983; Bleaney et al., 1995 and 
Ebeke and Ehrhart, 2011). We add two terms to the traditional models: remittances and 
remittances interacted with a dummy variable for the presence of a VAT. More precisely, the 
specification takes the following form: 
tiiiiiiiii VVRRX ,,,,2,1,1,, εηµθγγβφσασ ττττττττ ++++∗++′++= −    (3) 
where τσ ,i  is the standard deviation of the growth rate of the total tax revenue ratio (excluding 
grants)  over the sub-period τ . R is the remittance ratio (in percentage of GDP) and V a 
dummy variable which takes the value 1 if there is a VAT in each country i for at least 3 years 
in a sub-period τ . iµ , τη  and τε ,i  are the country-specific effect, time-specific effect and the 
error term, respectively. X is the set of control variables, which includes the standard 
determinants of macroeconomic volatility such as trade openness and the standard deviation 
of the inflation growth rate (inflation volatility). The hypothesis tested is 02 <γ  and 
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( ) 021 <+ γγ  so that the impact of remittances on the instability of tax revenue is more 
negative in the presence of a VAT than without a VAT ( 1γ ). 
We do not control additively for the volatility of the GDP per capita nor for the volatility of 
household consumption because they represent the main channels for remittances to stabilize 
the tax revenue ratio. However, to test the fact that the stabilization of private consumption 
represents the channel for remittances to stabilize the tax revenue ratio in a country that has 
adopted a VAT, we add to   equation (3) the standard deviation of household consumption per 
capita growth rate. If this channel works, we would get a reduction in the magnitude (in 
absolute value) and in the significance of the coefficient of the interaction of remittances 
crossed with the VAT dummy.  
The time period of this panel consists of non-overlapping sub-periods of 5 years defined as 
follows: 1980/1984, 1985/1989… 2000/2005. The variables defined as standard deviation are 
computed over each of these sub-periods while the other remaining variables are defined in 
terms of sub-period averages. 
The dynamic specification is retained to catch the inertia of the instability of government tax 
revenue in developing countries. OLS-FE applied to equation (3) leads to biased estimates 
and we therefore retain the system-GMM estimator.  
Endogeneity issues are still of concern here. Regarding remittances, the endogeneity can be 
explained by the fact that they tend to increase in case of negative shocks that generate 
macroeconomic instability and therefore government revenue instability. Regarding the VAT, 
if governments choose this taxation system in order to improve the stability of their tax 
revenues, there is therefore a self-selection bias. By controlling for the lagged value of tax 
revenue instability, we partially reduce this bias. However, we will follow the same 
identification strategy built in the system-GMM framework by instrumenting remittances and 
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the VAT dummy by their lagged values and the share of geographical neighbors with a VAT, 
respectively. The interactive term of remittances crossed with the VAT dummy is 
instrumented by the product of lagged values of remittances and the share of geographical 
neighbors that have adopted the VAT.  
Except for the tax revenue data, all the other variables used in equation (3) are drawn from the 
World Bank Tables. Descriptive statistics of all the variables and the list of countries included 
in the sample are reported in the appendix.  
6.3. Estimation results 
The first set of results concerns the impact of remittances on the level of tax revenue ratio. 
The second set of results describes the contribution of remittances to  the stabilization of 
government tax revenue ratio. 
6.3.1. Remittances, VAT and the tax revenue ratio 
Table 6.1 presents the estimations of the impact of remittances on the tax revenue ratio. For 
each estimator used, the Table informs about the linear impact of remittances and, in every 
second column, about the impact conditional on the presence of the VAT.   
Whatever the estimator used, the results indicate that, on average, remittances do not have a 
significant impact on the tax revenue ratio. This can be explained by two effects: on the one 
hand, remittances may increase tax revenue by expanding the private demand (consumption 
of tradable or non-tradable goods, domestic investment). On the other hand, remittances could 
reduce the labor supply and increase leisure time at home (Chami et al., 2005). It results a 
contraction of the domestic production and therefore in a sharp decrease in tax revenue ratios 
for countries that exclusively depend on corporate and individual taxes (Chami et al., 2008) 
but not on VAT. 
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The story changes when remittances are interacted with the VAT dummy. Whatever the 
estimator used, the interactive term of remittances is statistically significant and exhibits a 
positive sign. It is important to keep in mind that the coefficient of the additive term of 
remittances identifies the impact of remittances in countries without a VAT. The sum of the 
two coefficients associated with remittances gives the impact for countries that have a VAT 
system. It emerges that the contribution of remittances in countries without a VAT is never 
statistically significant. This is consistent with the previous papers already quoted. In contrast, 
remittances seem to significantly increase the tax revenue ratio when countries have 
implemented a VAT system.92  
When we turn to our preferred estimations by the system-GMM method (columns [1.7] and 
[1.8]), the results indicate that the impact of remittances in country with a VAT stands at 0.08. 
Perhaps a better sense of the quantitative significance of this coefficient can be obtained from 
the following calculation. The median share of the remittance ratio in our sample is around 
1.8 %GDP. A shift from the median toward the 75th percentile of the distribution of the 
remittance ratio (an increase from 1.8 to 5.3 %GDP) which corresponds to a variation of 3.5 
percentage points of GDP would lead to an increase in the total tax revenue ratio by 0.3 
%GDP in a country that has a VAT system.    
6.3.2. Remittances, VAT and the instability of the tax revenue ratio 
Table 6.2 presents the estimation of the impact of remittances on the instability of the tax 
revenue ratio. The estimator used is the system-GMM since remittances are taken as 
endogenous and the instability of tax revenue appears strongly autoregressive in the sample. 
Column [2.1] reports the linear (unconditional) impact of remittances on the instability of the 
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 Table 6.1. reports the sum of the two coefficients associated with remittances and this sum is always positive 
and statistically significant in the case of OLS-FE, LSDVC and System-GMM results. 
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tax revenue ratio. The results indicate a non significant stabilizing effect of remittance 
inflows.  
In column [2.2], the VAT dummy is introduced additively and in interaction with the 
remittance ratio. Three important results emerge. Firstly, the presence of a VAT appears 
stabilizing. Countries that have adopted a VAT (and whatever their characteristics, such as 
openness, the level of development, governance quality or remittance levels), enjoy more 
stable tax revenue than the others. This result complements early studies on the fiscal impact 
of the VAT adoption. For instance, Keen and Lockwood (2010) showed that the VAT 
adoption is a factor enhancing the efficiency of the tax revenue collection.93 Our results 
indicate that the VAT is not only a determinant of the level of the tax revenue ratio, but also a 
tax revenue stabilizer. Since the VAT is based on a macroeconomic aggregate (consumption) 
that is relatively more stable, countries that rely on this tax instrument would have less 
volatile tax revenue. This result posits the VAT as an effective determinant of overall fiscal 
performance (measured as the level of mobilization of revenue and the stability of these 
revenues) in developing countries. 
Secondly, the additive term of remittances which measures the impact of these flows on the 
instability of tax revenue in countries without a VAT system, appears not to be statistically 
significant although it is negative. This is in line with our expectations. Indeed, if remittances 
stabilize private consumption over time, countries that do not tax consumption via a VAT 
system would not take advantage of the stabilizing effects of remittance inflows on private 
consumption.  
Thirdly, the results of column [2.2] indicate a stabilizing effect of remittances on tax revenue 
in countries with a VAT. The impact is negative (the sum of the two remittances coefficients) 
                                                 
93
 More precisely, they showed that the positive effect of the VAT on the tax revenue is conditional on the 
degree of trade openness and the level of economic development.  
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and stands around -0.28.94 In column [2.3], we test whether this stabilizing contribution of 
remittances passes through the stabilization of private consumption. Hence, the model 
includes the instability of the household consumption per capita growth. As expected, its 
effect on the tax revenue instability is strongly positive and significant. The inclusion of this 
variable, however, deteriorates the significance of the remittance coefficients. This confirms 
our guess that one of the main channels through which remittances could stabilize government 
tax revenue in countries with a VAT system is through their consumption smoothing 
properties.  
6.3.3. Robustness checks 
One of the main difficulties that arise in the macroeconometric works on remittances is the 
measurement error in the remittance variable. Remittances data are essentially underreported 
for many countries due to the existence of informal channels. Another concern is the fact that 
many empirical papers that used World Bank data define remittances as the sum of workers’ 
remittances and employees’ compensations. The main justification is that, for many countries, 
the distinction between workers’ remittances and employees’ compensations is difficult to 
make. Nevertheless, we test the robustness of all the previous results, with an alternative 
definition of remittances by only using the narrower definition. We define remittances in this 
section as current transfers by migrants who are employed and resident in the countries where 
they migrated (destination country). Data are drawn from the IMF Balance of Payments 
Yearbook (various editions). As previously, remittance values are normalized by country 
GDP.  
Table 6.3 reports the results of the impact of remittances on the tax revenue ratio. The results 
appear broadly the same than those of Table 6.1. When remittances are included additively, 
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 In Table 6.2, the results of the Wald-test of the joint significance of the two remittance coefficients indicate a 
significant effect at almost 5%. 
Chapter 6. Remittances, value added tax and tax revenues 
209 
 
and whatever the estimator (OLS-FE, GMM), they do not exhibit a significant coefficient. In 
contrast, the conditional effect of remittances on the tax revenue ratio is statistically 
significant. Indeed, the interaction term of remittances is positive and significant, and this 
result confirms the proposition that remittances tend to significantly increase the tax revenue 
ratios in countries that have already adopted a VAT system. The contribution of remittances 
in countries with a VAT stands around 0.05 (column [3.6] in the case of system-GMM 
estimations).    
Table 6.4 reports the results of the impact of remittances on the instability of the tax revenue 
ratio. The results remain qualitatively the same as those of Table 6.2. The inclusion of 
remittances additively doesn’t lead to any stabilizing effect (column [4.1]). However, when 
the model enables to include the interactive term of remittances crossed with the VAT 
dummy, the stabilizing contribution of remittances is observed. The value of the coefficient of 
remittances for countries that have adopted the VAT (the sum of the two remittance 
coefficients) stands at – 0.38 (column [4.2]), a value close to that of Table 6.2 (– 0.28). In 
column [4.3], the inclusion of the instability of consumption per capita leads to a deterioration 
of the significance of the coefficients of interest. The consumption smoothing channel is then 
empirically confirmed by the data.  
6.4. Concluding remarks 
This chapter showed robustly that remittances can increase both the level and the stability of 
government tax revenue in receiving countries. However, these positive effects on fiscal 
performance are only conditional on the presence of the value added tax system (VAT) in the 
remittance dependent countries. Even after factoring in the endogeneity of remittances and the 
adoption of the value added tax, or even after using an alternative measure of remittances, the 
results still remained robust. 
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The results interestingly add to the positive link between remittances and debt sustainability 
analysis in receiving countries (Abdih et al., 2009). They are important for at least two 
reasons. Firstly, they showed that public authorities can take advantage of remittance inflows 
without taxing them directly, and without creating distortions and reducing incentives to 
remit. The presence of a VAT is therefore useful to capture the positive effect of remittances 
on consumption smoothing. Secondly, we got clear policy implications: the adoption of a 
VAT and measures to increase its effectiveness in remittance dependent countries can help 
build fiscal space. This is a part of an ongoing work in which we measure the effect of 
remittances on a de facto measure of fiscal space using the framework recently proposed by 
Aizenman and Jinjarak (2010).  
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Table 6.1: Remittances, VAT and the tax revenue ratio. 
Period: 1980-2006 
Years Unit of observation: 
 OLS-FE  LSDVCE  Difference-GMM  System-GMM 
 [1.1] [1.2]  [1.3] [1.4]  [1.5] [1.6]  [1.7] [1.8] 
            
Remittances (% GDP) 0.006 -0.021  0.005 -0.003  0.128 0.057  -0.025 -0.033 
 0.11 0.53  0.56 0.67  1.05 0.76  0.23 0.56 
Remittances * VAT  0.116**   0.042***   0.165*   0.116** 
  2.21   6.52   1.69   2.44 
VAT dummy  -0.859   -0.032   -3.050**   -1.631 
  1.12   0.54   2.13   1.47 
Tax revenue % GDP (t-1)    0.759*** 0.730***  0.656*** 0.593***  0.636*** 0.638*** 
    46.66 69.22  7.95 6.80  7.78 9.86 
Agriculture value added (% GDP) -0.208*** -0.204***  -0.054*** -0.053***  -0.238* -0.471**  -0.253** -0.341*** 
 3.53 3.63  4.33 8.26  1.95 2.57  2.27 2.80 
Trade openness 0.069*** 0.071***  0.030*** 0.032***  -0.053 -0.052  0.018 0.025 
 3.05 3.16  9.12 18.88  1.29 1.25  0.83 1.35 
Population aged 14- (%) 0.076 0.073  0.074*** 0.092***  0.035 0.037  0.290* 0.364** 
 0.50 0.47  3.76 8.27  0.26 0.21  1.77 2.24 
Population aged 65+ (%) -0.417 -0.506  0.230* 0.248***  0.749 -0.361  0.636** 0.709*** 
 0.58 0.78  1.77 3.80  1.36 0.41  2.24 2.58 
log (1+Inflation) -1.109 -1.107  -0.084 -0.114  0.207 -0.117  -1.079* -1.103* 
 1.22 1.22  0.58 1.56  0.47 0.20  1.73 1.85 
Intercept 19.545** 20.135**        -1.760 -2.586 
 2.37 2.56        0.25 0.45 
No observations 1702 1702  1640 1640  1526 1492  1640 1600 
No countries 98 98  98 98  95 95  98 95 
Ho: θ1+θ2=0, p-value  0.093   0.000   0.232   0.016 
θ1+θ2  0.09   0.04   0.222   0.083 
First order serial correlation p-value       0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
Second order serial correlation p-value       0.301 0.271  0.204 0.177 
Hansen OID test p-value       0.114 0.214  0.095 0.251 
No instruments       17 22  15 20 
Note: Absolute t-statistics are presented below the corresponding coefficients. Symbols ***, ** and * means significant at 1%, 5% and at 10%. Dependent variable: Total tax 
revenue (excluding grants) in percentage of GDP. LSDVCE means the Least Squares Dummy Variable Corrected Estimator initialized by the OLS-FE estimator. In the system-
GMM and difference-GMM framework, the additive term of remittances is taken as endogenous and instrumented by its lagged values. The VAT dummy and the interactive term 
remittances*VAT are instrumented by the proportion of geographical neighbors with a VAT and by this variable crossed with lagged values of remittances, respectively. Two-steps 
GMM estimator with the Windmeijer (2005) correction for finite sample bias is implemented. 
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Table 6.2: Remittances, VAT and the instability of the tax revenue ratio. 
Period 1980-2005 
Unit of observation: Non-overlapping 5-year averages 
 [2.1] [2.2] [2.3] 
    
    
Remittances (%GDP) 0.425 -0.038 -0.004 
 1.02 0.36 0.04 
Remittances * VAT 
 -0.245* -0.185 
 
 1.72 1.53 
VAT dummy 
 -4.525* -2.377 
 
 1.79 1.07 
Instability of tax revenue (t-1) 0.205 0.297** 0.202** 
 1.52 2.51 2.29 
Trade openness 
-0.027 -0.007 -0.025* 
 1.36 0.46 1.74 
Instability of inflation rate 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 7.42 15.58 14.49 
Instability of private consumption 
  0.194** 
 
  2.16 
Intercept 9.366*** 10.075*** 9.738*** 
 4.76 5.37 5.45 
No observations 269 241 235 
No countries 96 89 87 
Ho: γ1+γ2=0, p-value  0.055 0.161 
γ1+γ2=0  -0.283  
First order serial correlation p-value 0.123 0.093 0.108 
Second order serial correlation p-value 0.275 0.301 0.374 
Hansen OID test p-value 0.215 0.460 0.387 
No instruments 14 20 21 
Note: Absolute t-statistics are presented below the corresponding coefficients. Symbols ***, ** 
and * means significant at 1%, 5% and at 10%. Dependent variable: Instability of total tax 
revenue ratio growth rate (excluding grants). The VAT dummy takes the value 1 if there is a 
VAT in at least 3 years in a considered sub-period and 0 elsewhere. In the system-GMM and 
difference-GMM framework, the additive term of remittances is taken as endogenous and 
instrumented by its lagged values. The VAT dummy and the interactive term remittances*VAT 
are instrumented by the proportion of geographical neighbors with a VAT and by this variable 
crossed with lagged values of remittances, respectively. Two-steps GMM estimator with the 
Windmeijer (2005) correction for finite sample bias is implemented. Time dummies are included 
in all specifications. 
 
Chapter 6. Remittances, value added tax and tax revenues 
216 
 
Table 6.3: Remittances (excluding compensations of employees), VAT and the tax revenue ratio. 
Period 1980-2006     
Unit of observation: Years     
 OLS-FE  Difference-GMM  System-GMM 
 [3.1] [3.2]  [3.3] [3.4]  [3.5] [3.6] 
         
Remittances (% GDP) 0.115 0.034  -0.473 -0.059  -0.131 -0.070 
 1.56 0.39  1.44 1.15  1.43 1.27 
Remittances * VAT  0.160*   0.145**   0.122** 
  1.84   2.07   2.05 
VAT dummy  -1.512**   -1.600**   -1.795** 
  2.10   2.32   2.26 
Tax revenue % GDP (t-1)    0.501*** 0.595***  0.612*** 0.598*** 
    3.88 6.99  10.62 11.81 
Agriculture value added (% GDP) -0.212*** -0.217***  -0.401** -0.231**  -0.186 -0.302*** 
 4.70 5.10  2.17 2.51  1.49 2.76 
Trade openness 0.086*** 0.091***  0.037** 0.044***  0.045*** 0.034*** 
 4.10 4.40  2.16 3.17  3.83 2.65 
Population aged 14- (%) 0.133 0.102  0.251* 0.154  0.255 0.322*** 
 0.83 0.65  1.75 1.54  1.58 2.89 
Population aged 65+ (%) -0.861 -0.908  0.206 -0.124  0.608** 0.645*** 
 1.01 1.18  0.36 0.40  2.42 2.98 
log (1+Inflation) -1.131 -1.160  -0.465 -0.367  0.256 0.224 
 1.36 1.41  0.72 0.63  0.58 0.53 
Intercept 17.739* 19.707**     -3.071 -1.390 
 1.89 2.24     0.73 0.39 
No observations 1746 1746  1558 1530  1674 1645 
No countries 96 96  96 96  96 96 
Ho: θ1+θ2=0, p-value  0.025   0.100   0.114 
θ1+θ2  0.194   0.086   0.052 
First order serial correlation p-value    0.003 0.000  0.000 0.000 
Second order serial correlation p-value    0.324 0.218  0.280 0.264 
Hansen OID test p-value    0.688 0.350  0.147 0.368 
No instruments    12 20  12 16 
Note: Absolute t-statistics are presented below the corresponding coefficients. Symbols ***, ** and * means significant at 1%, 5% and at 10%. Dependent variable: 
Total tax revenue (excluding grants) in percentage of GDP. In the system-GMM and difference-GMM framework, the additive term of remittances is taken as 
endogenous and instrumented by its lagged values. The VAT dummy and the interactive term remittances*VAT are instrumented by the proportion of geographical 
neighbors with a VAT and by this variable crossed with lagged values of remittances, respectively. Two-steps GMM estimator with the Windmeijer (2005) correction 
for finite sample bias is implemented. 
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Table 6.4: Remittances (excluding compensations of employees), VAT and the 
instability of the tax revenue ratio. 
Period 1980-2005 
Unit of observation: Non-overlapping 5-year averages 
 [4.1] [4.2] [4.3] 
    
    
Remittances (%GDP) -0.125 0.391 0.283 
 0.64 1.16 0.63 
Remittances * VAT  -0.775** -0.524 
  2.07 1.16 
VAT dummy  -1.252 -2.677 
  0.43 1.00 
Instability of tax revenue (t-1) 0.240** 0.168** 0.168** 
 2.12 1.96 2.51 
Trade openness 0.061 0.089 0.023 
 0.72 0.96 0.23 
Instability of inflation rate 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 6.72 10.26 7.56 
Instability of private consumption   0.186* 
   1.69 
Intercept 6.014 4.607 7.268 
 1.29 0.92 1.60 
No observations 269 252 243 
No countries 93 88 85 
Ho: γ1+γ2=0, p-value  0.024 0.267 
γ1+γ2=0  -0.384  
First order serial correlation p-value 0.114 0.146 0.133 
Second order serial correlation p-value 0.248 0.305 0.400 
Hansen OID test p-value 0.773 0.761 0.796 
No instruments 14 19 20 
Note: Absolute t-statistics are presented below the corresponding coefficients. Symbols ***, ** 
and * means significant at 1%, 5% and at 10%. Dependent variable: Instability of total tax 
revenue ratio growth rate (excluding grants). The VAT dummy takes the value 1 if there is a 
VAT in at least 3 years in a considered sub-period and 0 elsewhere. In the system-GMM and 
difference-GMM framework, the additive term of remittances is taken as endogenous and 
instrumented by its lagged values. The VAT dummy and the interactive term remittances*VAT 
are instrumented by the proportion of geographical neighbors with a VAT and by this variable 
crossed with lagged values of remittances, respectively. Two-steps GMM estimator with the 
Windmeijer (2005) correction for finite sample bias is implemented. Time dummies are included 
in all specifications. 
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Appendix F: Summary statistics and list of countries in the sample 
 
 Annual observations 
Variables Obs. Mean Std dev. Minimum Maximum 
Tax revenue % GDP 2341 20.38 9.03 1.30 70.90 
Remittances and Compensations % GDP 2463 4.74 8.35 0 90.42 
Remittances % GDP  2561 2.81 5.23 0 41.51 
VAT dummy 3888 0.38 0.48 0 1 
Percentage of other VAT adopters in the region 3888 37.68 28.59 0 100 
Agriculture value added share (%) 3104 23.18 14.51 1.61 93.98 
Trade openness (%) 3181 75.48 39.62 1.53 280.36 
Population aged 65+ (%) 3648 4.89 2.89 1.89 17.32 
Population aged 14- (%) 3648 38.14 8.44 13.57 51.92 
log (100+inflation rate) 3295 0.20 0.47 -0.34 5.59 
 5-year averaged observations 
Tax revenue instability 427 13.38 13.95 0.52 195.78 
Remittances and Compensations % GDP 483 4.52 8.12 0 78.68 
Remittances % GDP  514 2.67 4.86 0 33.15 
VAT dummy 720 0.35 0.48 0 1.00 
Percentage of other VAT adopters in the region 720 35.16 27.14 0 89.58 
Trade openness (%) 606 74.70 38.36 2.35 226.87 
Inflation instability 619 104.00 655.15 0.50 11158.63 
Instability of real private consumption per capita 
growth rate 550 8.44 27.05 0.37 617.30 
 
 
Countries in the sample (98): Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, 
Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, 
Central African Rep., Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo Rep., Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, 
Dominican Rep., Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, 
Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, 
Kenya, Kyrgyz Rep., Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, 
Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New 
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, 
Swaziland, Syrian Arab Rep., Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, Vanuatu, 
Vietnam, Yemen Rep., Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
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General conclusion 
Main results 
This thesis has examined the consequences of remittance inflows in developing countries by 
relying on cross country data. It consists of two parts: the impact of remittance inflows on 
several indicators of the aggregate welfare and the impact of remittances on the public policy 
in receiving countries. The thesis begins (Chapter 1) by an analysis of the effect of 
remittances on the share of people selling low wages. The results of the econometric 
estimations reveal that remittances lead to a decrease in the prevalence of working poor in 
receiving economies. In addition, this effect appears stronger in a context of high 
macroeconomic volatility but is mitigated by the unpredictability of remittances: remittances 
are more effective to decrease the share of working poor when they are easily predictable. 
Moreover, domestic finance and remittances are substitutes: remittances are less efficient in 
reducing the prevalence of working poor whenever finance is available.  
The analysis of the consequences of remittances on the aggregate welfare is extended toward 
the issue of their stabilizing effects (Chapters 2 and 3). Several results emerged. First, 
remittances significantly reduce household consumption instability. Second, remittances play 
an insurance role by dampening the effects of various sources of consumption instability in 
developing countries (natural disasters, agricultural shocks, discretionary fiscal policy, 
systemic financial and banking crises and exchange rate instability). Third, the stabilizing role 
played by remittances is stronger in less financially developed countries. Fourth, the overall 
stabilizing effect of remittances is mitigated when remittances exceed 6% of GDP. Fifth, the 
dependency from remittance inflows helps dampen the destabilizing consequences of natural 
disasters on the aggregate output. Indeed, it appeared that the effect of natural disasters 
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disappears for a remittance ratio above 8% of GDP. However, remittances aggravate the 
destabilizing effects of natural disasters when they exceeded 17% of GDP. 
The second part of the thesis focuses on consequences of remittance inflows on public policy. 
This second part begins with an analysis of the effect of remittance inflows on the elasticity of 
the government final consumption ratio with respect to trade openness (Chapter 4). The 
hypothesis that there is a partial substitution between public insurance through government 
spending and a private insurance through remittances in more open countries is tested. The 
insurance role of remittances is examined by computing annual panel data coefficients of 
remittance cyclicality with respect to the real GDP cycle. It appears that remittances have 
become more countercyclical during the end 1990s. In addition, the trade openness, natural 
disasters, inflation and the shallowness nature of the financial system are among the main 
determinants of the countercyclicality of remittance inflows to developing countries. From a 
simple theoretical model close to Rodrik (1998) and on the basis of econometric estimations, 
it emerges that the positive impact of trade openness on government spending decreases with 
the level of remittances. Moreover, the mechanism described here works when remittances 
are effectively countercyclical.  
The analysis of the effect of remittances on the government has continued with an exploration 
of the consequences of remittance inflows on the willingness of public authorities to subside 
the social sectors (education and health sectors), a phenomenon called the public moral hazard 
problem (Chapter 5). Using a large sample of developing countries the results suggest a 
negative impact of remittances on public spending on education and health when governance 
is bad in remittance-dependent economies. These results are robust to alternative measures of 
governance quality. 
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The last result of the thesis concerns the implications of remittance inflows on the fiscal space 
in the receiving economies (Chapter 6). The chapter hypothesizes that remittances could 
increase fiscal space in the dependent economies through their positive effects on the level 
and the stability of the government tax revenue ratio. However, this fiscal impact depends 
strongly upon the presence of the value added tax system in the countries. This is supported 
by the fact that remittances are largely used for consumption purposes and smooth the private 
consumption. The econometric investigations have validated these hypotheses. 
To sum up, this thesis has shown that remittances represent an effective pro-poor engine and 
positively affect the welfare of the receiving households. However, this effect is not linear and 
conditional on the levels of financial development and remittances. The results also uncover 
that remittances could induce a fiscal retrenchment even in the social sectors and could 
therefore lead to a public moral hazard problem. Regardless, remittances inflows help build 
fiscal space in countries having adopted a VAT.  
 
Policy implications 
The main challenge for remittance-dependent economies is to design policies that increase the 
level of remittance inflows, foster their benefits while mitigating adverse side effects (Chami, 
2011). This thesis has therefore clear policy implications to achieve these objectives.  
First, given the positive effects that remittances exert on the welfare, their level must increase. 
For many developing countries especially the less financially developed ones remittances 
obviously have pro-poor effects. However, the level of remittance inflows is constrained by 
the high transfer costs associated with the lack of financial inclusion and competition amongst 
the Money Transfer Operators. Hence, the international community should move toward clear 
actions favoring the reduction of remittance transaction costs in poor countries. The 
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declaration of the Aquila summit in 2009 calls for such actions: “Given the development 
impact of remittance flows, we will facilitate a more efficient transfer and improved use of 
remittances and enhance cooperation between national and international organizations, in 
order to implement the recommendations of the 2007 Berlin G8 Conference and of the Global 
Remittances Working Group established in 2009 and coordinated by the World Bank. We will 
aim to make financial services more accessible to migrants and to those who receive 
remittances in the developing world. We will work to achieve in particular the objective of a 
reduction of the global average costs of transferring remittances from the present 10% to 5% 
in 5 years through enhanced information, transparency, competition and cooperation with 
partners, generating a significant net increase in income for migrants and their families in the 
developing world”. 
The World Bank in its “remittance prices worldwide” web portal recognizes that cutting 
prices by at least 5 percentage points can save up to $16 billion a year. This amount 
approximately represents 5% of the total amount of remittances received by the developing 
countries in 2010 and around 75% of the amount of remittances received by a region such as 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Increasing the competition amongst the MTO is one of the main urgent 
actions. This can also take the form of a more effective inclusion of banks in the remittance 
market. One could expect a reduction in transaction costs but also simplification of the 
procedures. 
In the remittance-dependent countries, clear actions toward increasing the level of these funds 
could be also undertaken. As it has been shown by Freund and Spatafora (2008) and Beck and 
Martinez Peria (2009), sustaining financial development and competition in the banking 
system and in the remittance market significantly reduces the transaction costs associated with 
remittances. 
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The role of the financial development is not limited to its contribution to the rise of 
remittances but also serves as a way to increase the absorption capacity of remittances and to 
limit the Dutch disease risks. Indeed, this thesis has shown that in certain circumstances 
remittance inflows could be destabilizing. This arises when these inflows are too high 
compared with the size of the receiving economies (Chapter 2). One of the strategies which 
could mitigate these adverse side effects is to increase the level of financial development. As 
it has been shown by Acosta et al. (2009), financially developed countries are less concerned 
by the Dutch disease effects of remittance inflows compared to the others. This arises because 
well-developed financial sectors can more effectively channel remittances into investment 
opportunities, what prevents from exchange rate appreciation. Moreover, the reinvestment of 
remittances could lead to a better social equilibrium with more people – not only the receiving 
households – taking advantage of remittance inflows due to the diffusion effects of 
remittances in the economy. 
In addition, the amelioration of investment climate in a broader sense could certainly help 
achieving the objective of the reinvestment of remittances. Actions toward the reduction of 
the costs to start a business at home and better information on the investment opportunities 
provided to the migrants, should increase the share of remittances devoted to the investment 
and should enhance the developmental effects of remittances in poor countries. 
However, the risk associated with remittances being more efficient in reducing poverty and 
promoting long term economic growth is that governments may become reluctant to do their 
own part of the job. The thesis has shown that the public moral hazard effect exists especially 
in badly governed countries. Hence, the positive effects of remittances on welfare can be 
neutralized by the reduction of government incentives to enact policy reforms, to subside 
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social sectors and finally to provide public goods. This risk seems to be important and actions 
toward an improvement of governance quality in developing countries are therefore needed. 
Regarding the government revenue side, the thesis says something about the choice of the 
appropriate taxation system in the remittance-dependent countries. The adoption of the VAT 
could help create and secure fiscal space in receiving economies.  
This thesis has highlighted that remittances could foster economic development in developing 
countries but at the same time, some beware news exist and the challenge is to design policies 
that maximize benefits while mitigating adverse side effects.  
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Summary of the thesis 
This thesis focused on the consequences of remittance inflows in developing countries. The first part 
explored the causal impacts of remittances on some indicators of aggregate welfare while the second 
part examined the effects of remittances on public policy. Several results emerged. First, remittance 
inflows help reduce the proportion of individuals selling low wages and this effect is stronger in a 
context of low level of financial development, high macroeconomic instability and less unpredictable 
remittances (Chapter 1). Second, remittances have a robust stabilizing impact on the private 
consumption. However, this effect tends to decrease with the levels of remittance inflows and financial 
development. Moreover, remittance-dependent economies seem to be strongly sheltered against the 
damaging effects of various types of shocks affecting consumption (Chapter 2). In Chapter 3, the 
results highlighted that remittance inflows dampen the positive effect of natural disasters on the output 
growth volatility. However, this impact was strongly reduced as the level of remittances increased. 
The second part of the thesis revealed interesting results regarding the effects of remittance inflows on 
public policy. First, remittance inflows reduce the insurance role played by the government 
consumption in more open economies and this effect is more likely to hold when remittances exhibit a 
countercyclical behavior (Chapter 4). In Chapter 5, the results showed that the fiscal retrenchment 
induced by remittance inflows, is particularly marked for the public education and health spending in 
countries characterized by various types of governance problems. Finally, the thesis showed that the 
effects of remittances do not only concern the expenditure side but also the revenue side. Remittances 
are more likely to increase the fiscal space in receiving economies that rely on the value added tax 
system. In these countries, remittance inflows help increase both the level and the stability of the 
government tax revenue ratio (Chapter 6). 
Keywords: Remittances, financial development, working poor, consumption instability, natural 
disasters, output growth volatility, public spending, tax revenues 
Résumé de la thèse 
Cette thèse s’intéresse aux effets macroéconomiques des envois de fonds des migrants dans les pays 
en développement. La première partie de la thèse analyse l’effet causal des envois de fonds sur 
plusieurs indicateurs de bien-être, tandis que la deuxième partie examine l’effet des envois de fonds 
sur la politique publique des pays receveurs. Plusieurs résultats émergent. Premièrement, les envois de 
fonds des migrants réduisent significativement la part des individus travaillant pour moins de 2 dollars 
et cet effet apparaît renforcé dans un contexte de faible développement financier, forte instabilité 
macroéconomique et forte prévisibilité des envois de fonds (Chapitre 1.). Deuxièmement, les envois 
de fonds réduisent l’instabilité de la consommation privée et cet effet est d’autant plus important que 
le niveau de développement financier est faible et que le niveau des envois de fonds est faible. Par 
ailleurs, les envois de fonds absorbent différents types de chocs (Chapitre 2.). Troisièmement, les 
envois de fonds atténuent significativement les effets des catastrophes naturelles sur l’output agrégé, 
cependant cet effet stabilisateur diminue avec le niveau d’envois de fonds reçus (Chapitre 3.). La 
deuxième partie de la thèse analyse l’impact des envois de fonds des migrants sur la politique 
publique. Premièrement, il apparaît que la contracyclicité des envois fonds contribue à réduire le rôle 
d’assurance joué par la consommation publique dans les pays ouverts sur l’extérieur (Chapitre 4.). 
Deuxièmement, les envois de fonds réduisent significativement la part des dépenses publiques sociales 
dans les pays caractérisés par une mal gouvernance (Chapitre 5.). Troisièmement, les envois de fonds 
contribuent à accroître à la fois le volume et la stabilité du taux de recettes fiscales dans les pays ayant 
adopté une taxe sur la valeur ajoutée (Chapitre 6.).  
Mots clés : Envois de fonds, développement financier, salaire, instabilité de la consommation, 
désastres naturels volatilité du taux de croissance du PIB par tête, dépenses publiques, recettes 
fiscales. 
